Trade Union Politics and Elections in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia by Nawawi
 














Submitted in accordance with the requirements for the degree of 















The University of Leeds 







The candidate confirms that the work submitted is his own and that appropriate credit has 
been given where reference has been made to the work of others. 
 
This copy has been supplied on the understanding that it is copyright material and that no 
quotation from the thesis may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 


































This thesis could not have been completed without the support of many people and 
organisations. First and foremost, my sincere gratitude must go to all those interviewed for this 
thesis who patiently answered my questions and made my research in the field possible. My 
sincere thanks also go to my supervisors, Hugh Dyer and Adam Tyson, who encouraged me to 
think in new ways with their critical and constructive ideas, comments and suggestions and the 
challenging questions raised in every supervision meeting, which all contributed significantly 
to make this thesis as it is now. I would like to formally thank the Ministry of Research, 
Technology and Higher Education (Ristekdikti) and the World Bank for funding my study and 
the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) for giving permission for my temporary leave to 
study abroad.  
 
I also wish to acknowledge my POLIS friends and officemates who have endured the 
same PhD process and set aside time for me - Binh Trinh, Petra Desatova, Ben Former, Alex 
Prior, Daniel Poprdan, Jack Newman, Rungchai Yensabai, Zain Maulana and Turgey Demir- 
and also Matthew Wilkinson and Jane Love for all of their help. My special thanks are extended 
to Indonesian students in Leeds who made me feel at home, notably Pak Agung, Pak Mukrim, 
Pak Jumadi, Pak Brahma, Pak Faridh, Pak Munajat, Pak Arief, Pak Avicenna, Pak Bekti, Mas 
Taufiq, Mas Dodi, Mas MY, Mas Arizka, Mbak Cesa and Mbak Lusi. From Jakarta and LIPI, 
I would like to thank Puji Hartana for his support providing data from KPU, Haning Romdiati 
and Titik Handayani who provided material support in the initial process of my study and my 
fellow researchers at the Department of Labour Studies P2K LIPI who encouraged me to 
complete this thesis. 
 
Last, but not least, my immeasurable gratitude and grateful appreciation also go to my 
beloved parents, Asmat and Sawina, for their continuous support, attention and prayers for the 
completion of my study. My truly grateful and prayers are always with my dearest parents in 
law, Hasan Basri and Farina, as well as my beloved aunts, Kholifah, Kholilah and Bulek Nik, 
and my grandmother, Bonisah, who all passed away in the course of my study.  Most of all, 
finally, I am really grateful for the greatest support and understanding of my beloved wife -
Endang Sri Wahyuni- who endured my enthusiasms and despairs during thesis writing, and to 
my beloved children- Muhammad Alief Reefandi, Syauqina Izzati and Avicenna Erbandi who 







Political reforms since 1998 changed the ways in which Indonesian trade unions are organised 
and operate, as well as the extent to which unions have developed their political strategies to 
compete in legislative elections. Trade unions were controlled and depoliticised for almost 32 
years under Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime. They have since re-emerged in the post-
1998 democratisation era, following an alteration in the political policies that were used to curb 
the political freedom and independence of the labour movement.  
 
This thesis provides new insights into the political dynamics of trade union politics in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia, with consideration given to the changing roles and positions of 
trade unions toward electoral politics, and the ways in which union elites are vying for power 
and mobilising organisational resources. The thesis also questions the impact of the unions’ 
new political roles in policy-making. Empirical data for this thesis is gathered from in-depth 
interviews involving trade unionists, union legislative candidates, politicians, union members 
and workers, as well as from direct observation of union political activities during field research 
in the districts of Bekasi and Serang and the city of Medan. 
The core chapters of this thesis find that the process of union engagement in electoral 
politics is evolving. Unions have endeavoured to overcome their lack of financial resources by 
developing their organisational capacity and strategically channelling resources into election 
campaigns. Unions are learning from their failure of previous elections, giving rise to new 
political identities and interests, and using their roles in parliament to influence policy-making. 
In response to the complex structural and organisational constrains that exist, however, a more 
consolidated movement, a strong, programmatic and sustained political alliance with well-
established parties, and enhancing worker understandings of their political identity and 
strategic role in elections are crucial to determine the success of union electoral engagement in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia. In developing these arguments, this thesis offers a way forward 
for a better understanding on the varied possibilities for, and limitations of, union electoral 
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This thesis compares and analyses the engagement of Indonesian trade union elites in the 
2009 and 2014 legislative elections. By operationalising the concept of union electoral 
engagement, this thesis explores how unions develop their political movements, deploy 
their collective power during elections, establish their electoral strategies by means of 
mobilising organisational resources, and perform their political roles in local parliament. 
My argument is that since democratisation in 1998 Indonesian trade unions can be viewed 
as economic and political actors with the potential to develop their collective power to 
challenge elitism, expand political representation for workers, and put the interests of 
workers at the centre of legislative agendas. Electoral democracy in Indonesia today is 
primarily a contestation between different political identities and interests (Aspinall and 
Mietzner 2010) and old rivalries (Hadiz 2004), but also confronts the challenges created 
by the legacy of the past (Caraway 2015). In this context, the engagement of trade union 
elites in electoral contestation represents specific constituents (workers) that enable the 
unions to take an active role in policy-making for their specific political agenda and 
interests. Post-authoritarian Indonesia is an important timeframe because it has been the 
era when trade unions and workers have found their new roles and position to be 
contingent upon the process of economic and political development, including their 
interaction with political institutions and attempts to bring labour interests into the policy-
making process. 
The fall of longstanding president Suharto in May 1998 changed the ways in 
which Indonesian unions are organised and operate, as well as the extent to which unions 
engage in electoral politics. Over the last decade, the Indonesian labour movement has 
dramatically changed and improved conditions for organised labour (Ford 2009; Juliawan 
2014; Lane 2018). With the freedom of association they have gained since 1998, trade 
unionists have adopted various political strategies, some of which are progressive, to 
develop their movement. Networking among trade unions is getting stronger, particularly 
when they have the same interests such as the determination of minimum wages and 





and are occurring with greater intensity and purpose (Juliawan 2011: 353).1 Union elites 
have also engaged in electoral politics, either nominated by labour-related parties or by 
well-established mainstream parties.2 The capacity of unions to improve their 
organisation and strategy has been one clear indicator of union activism that has 
strengthened their collective power, and these changes show how the democratisation 
process has provided a context for unionists and workers to mobilise and engage in 
political activism (Ford 2009; Juliawan 2011; Suryomenggolo 2014). 
The labour movement’s newfound collective power is based on the ability of trade 
unions to build networks and mobilise workers, as well as their ability to create influential 
movements against state and capital interests (Tjandra 2010; Suryomenggolo 2014). 
Their movements are not just limited to tactics such as strikes and street demonstrations; 
union leaders also use mass media to raise the profile of their struggles to gain public 
attention and lobby parliament (Juliawan 2011), and they now use legal means to address 
their grievances in the hope of obtaining justice (Tjandra 2010: 12). For instance, in 2004 
the general manager of a Japanese company in Surabaya, East Java province was 
convicted of violating trade union rights under Trade Union Law Number 21/2000. The 
manager was jailed for one and a half years for unlawfully dismissing four trade union 
leaders in his company (Tjandra 2010: 11). Such a case is unprecedented since it is the 
first time an employer has been jailed under the act, which seems to be a significant step 
towards address the problem of inconsistent labour law enforcement in Indonesia. Since 
2011, some major unions under the Social Security Action Committee have actively 
campaigned and organised demonstrations to push the government to reform the social 
security system. As a result, the government began to implement the Health Security 
Programs in January 2014 and Employment Security Programs in July 2015, as mandated 
by Law Number 40/2004 concerning the National Social Security System. In 2013, 
workers in the Freeport mining company in Timika district, Papua province won their 
demand to increase their wages after a lock-out protest running for three days. In the same 
year, workers in Bekasi and Serang districts successfully forced local governments to 
 
1 In 2005 the Ministry of Manpower recorded 96 labour strikes nationwide. The number increased 
significantly to 239 labour strikes in 2014 (Pusdatin 2015). In addition, the number of collective 
bargaining agreements at the company level increased steadily from approximately 10,959 in 2010 to 
12,113 in 2013, and this pattern continues. In the same period, according to data from the ILO (2015), the 
likelihood of resolving industrial dispute cases has improved significantly, from approximately 38.1 per 
cent in 2010 (1,456 out of 3,821 industrial dispute cases) to 86.2 per cent in 2013 (2,468 out of 2,861 
cases). 
2  In this thesis, the terms “union elites” and “union leaders” are used interchangeably. See Chapter Three 





increase the minimum wage to a level that was higher than what was initially proposed 
by the local wage council. These examples demonstrate that workers are now able to 
develop stronger bargaining positions through their collective power, although this thesis 
finds that the tendency of union leaders to get involved in electoral politics is proving 
divisive and may undermine this progress. 
The role of non-government organisation (NGO) activists concerned with labour 
movements has also contributed to the re-emergence of organised labour in Indonesia 
(Nyman 2006; Ford 2009; Arifin 2012). NGOs such as the Trade Union Rights Centre, 
the Sedane Institute for Labour Information, and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation 
have undertaken grassroots organisation, research and policy advocacy functions (Ford 
2009: 80). At the grassroots level, labour NGOs are organising factory workers, providing 
legal aid, conducting organisational training, establishing community workers groups, 
and even offering logistical support and encouragement for strike action (Ford 2009: 86). 
Activists from research and policy advocacy NGOs are attempting to raise local, national 
and international awareness in relation to labour conditions in Indonesia. They are using 
mass media and public advocacy campaigns and are lobbying the government and 
international institutions to support the trade unions who are demanding their rights. 
NGOs are documenting the living and working conditions of factory labourers and are 
disseminating their findings in Indonesia and abroad (Ford 2009: 86-87). Moreover, the 
recent success of labour NGOs in supporting the trade unions is complemented by their 
links with international NGOs and labour groups in other countries in Asia, Europe, North 
America, and Australia (Ford 2009; Silaban 2009). Pro-labour NGOs are receiving direct 
funding from government aid organisations, union-sponsored organisations, private 
organisations, and even international human rights campaigns such as the anti-Nike 
campaign (Ford 2009: 88). In this regard, Munck (2002) and Atzeni (2015) are correct 
when they state that globalisation not only affects production systems and economies in 
developing countries, but also brings about new dynamic labour movements and 
strengthens the role of organised labour. 
Some scholars suggest that the labour movement in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
should not be underestimated as it represents the emergence of a movement of society in 
Indonesia’s political development (Nyman 2006; Beittinger-Lee 2010; Juliawan 2011). 
According to Meyer and Tarrow (1998: 128), a movement of society takes place when 
three conditions are fulfilled. First, social protests evolve from being sporadic to a 





frequency in more diverse constituencies and is used to represent a wider range of claims. 
Third, the trend of professionalisation and institutionalisation may change the major 
vehicle of contentious claims into an instrument within the realm of conventional politics. 
Some of these conditions have been met in Indonesia, although this thesis finds that trade 
unions are still struggling with internal organisation problems and the legacy of the 
Suharto years. 
The implementation of decentralisation and new legislation regulating political 
parties and elections are enabling unions in Indonesia to seize new opportunities for 
political mobilisation, particularly in the electoral arena (Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 
2015: 1299). Nevertheless, as political reform in Indonesia is still ongoing, some unions 
have begun to pursue electoral strategies that entail running union elites in legislative 
races at both national and subnational levels. The fact that several union leaders 
successfully gained local legislative seats in the 2009 and 2014 elections is an important 
indicator of their deeper political involvement, but more needs to be done to examine the 
nature and consequences of this shift to formal trade union activism. Political parties are 
the primary agent for trade unions to engage in electoral contestation, for instance by 
providing direct access to the policy-making process. Therefore, alliances with political 
parties have crucial importance for trade unions. When participating in partisan politics, 
however, unionists belong both to political parties and to their specific constituencies and 
union organisations (Murillo 2001: 14-15). They are therefore likely to be confronted 
with a dilemma, between accepting the policy status quo and pursuing policy change to 
guarantee the interests of their specific constituency (Lee 2011: 142). 
Ever since the fall of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, many 
scholars have focused on Indonesia’s political reforms. As one of the most populous 
democratic countries in the world (after India and the USA), with the largest Muslim 
population, Indonesia as a case study can offer rich insights into the relationships between 
Islam, democracy, and development. Moreover, Indonesia can contribute to comparative 
studies on decentralisation processes, which have been attracting the interest of 
international development agencies (Hidayat 2005; Nordholt and Klinken 2007; Tyson 
2010). Some believe that Indonesia has done exceptionally well in consolidating its 
democracy (Prasetyo et al. 2003; Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009). On the other hand, there are 
a number of scholars who argue that despite significant institutional reform in the post-





structures remaining unchanged. It has been found that oligarchic elites have survived the 
1998 regime change and continued to use the state to maintain their political power 
(Robison and Hadiz 2004; Choi 2014; Winters 2014). 
As a crucial part of the story of Indonesia’s democratic reforms, the dynamics of 
trade union engagement in formal politics and the tendency for union elites to contest 
parliamentary elections have received comparatively little attention. Caraway, Ford and 
Nugroho (2015) are among the few scholars to carry out systematic research in this area. 
The authors have analysed how historical legacies, institutional configurations and 
organisational settings have shaped the political activities of two trade union federations 
under the Confederation of Indonesian Trade Unions (KSPI) that participated in the 2009 
legislative elections. They found that the legacy of authoritarianism, electoral rules and 
union fragmentation are significant factors in explaining why none of the union 
candidates won legislative seats in 2009. Ford (2014) also conducted research in Batam, 
questioning the possibility of non-elite actors from trade unions engaging in a meaningful 
way in electoral politics. Ford (2014: 342) sought to challenge mainstream studies of local 
politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia, which often argued that the entrenched and 
dominant role of political elites has effectively excluded non-elite interests from the 
electoral arena. Ford (2014) chose Batam as a study case because organised labour in this 
city has established a purpose-specific structure to promote the political interests of its 
members in electoral contestations. She argued that “despite the ultimate failure of the 
union’s electoral experiments between 2004 and 2009, the process of learning by doing 
embedded in trade unions presents a significant challenge to analyses that discount the 
possibility of substantive popular participation in electoral politics” (Ford 2014: 341).  
This thesis builds on Ford’s (2014) findings by examining the ways in which trade 
union elites perceive their socio-political position and use their collective power to 
develop their political movements in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Little is currently 
known about the political legitimacy of these newcomers who are engaging in electoral 
politics; for instance, why many of them seek political careers at lower levels of authority. 
Even less is known about the manner in which trade unions and their legislative 
candidates develop their strategies to contest legislative elections, and why only a few 
union candidates have successfully gained legislative positions. In relation to the work 
currently being done on Indonesia's local politics, this thesis aims to understand whether 





their political roles in the parliament office and contributed to the improvement of the 
formulation and implementation of labour-related policies. By analysing politically active 
trade union elites, one can better understand emerging power relations within a 
democratic and highly decentralised Indonesia.  
A Brief History of Indonesian Trade Unions 
Historically, the first Indonesian labour organisations were established after 1910, in the 
late period of Dutch colonisation (1602–1942), initiated by Dutch primary and secondary 
school teachers, employees of the state railways, and Indonesian workers at sugarcane 
plantations (Tedjasukmana 1958: 4-8). Around this time, the labour organisations had 
played important roles in the early nationalist movement and were central to the 
development of political consciousness, creating opportunities for Indonesians to acquire 
organisational skills and providing a channel for many to join nationalist political parties 
(Ingelson 2001; Suryomenggolo 2013). One significant development was the 
establishment of the Socialist Party in 1914 by the railway trade union known as 
Vereeniging van Spoor-en Tramweg Personnel in Nederlandsch-Indie (VSTP). Then on 
23 May 1920 some of the VSTP leaders established the Indonesian Communist Party 
(PKI) as a section of the International Communist Organization (Tedjasukmana 1958: 9). 
During the Dutch colonial era, communist trade unions were expanding because they 
were integrated with the international revolutionary movements, particularly since the 
establishment of the PKI which was the member of the profintern in Moscow and Canton 
(Tedjasukmana 1958: 14). As emphasised by Nyman (2006: 95-96), during the Dutch era 
trade unions were not only active in demanding welfare improvements, but also 
participated in radical political movements and the struggle for independence. Therefore, 
the Dutch East Indies authorities treated and framed “labour organisations as a dangerous 
political movement” (Silaban 2009: 117). 
In the post-independence era (post-1945), some scholars used the concept of 
political unionism to explain the existence of trade unions which was more likely to be 
political than economic (Ingelson 2001; Ford 2005; Suryomenggolo 2013). During this 
era, unions had just been freed from colonial restrictions and “grew out of a highly 
politicised context where the nationalist struggle became a priority for society in general” 
(Nyman 2006: 96). Soon after Indonesia’s independence was proclaimed on 17 August 
1945, a number of union representatives gathered in Jakarta to formulate a common 





and strengthening the new republic. This meeting was successful in establishing the 
Indonesian Workers’ Front (BBI) which later strengthened the unions’ link to political 
parties.3  
In 1946, the PKI took the initiative in the establishment of the All-Indonesian 
Central Workers’ Organization (SOBSI) and further built up a huge union federation. In 
1957, SOBSI was the largest trade union federation with 39 national and more than 800 
local affiliated unions. Its membership constituted more than 60 per cent of the whole of 
organised labour or nearly 2.7 million members of workers from plantations, the sugar 
industry, dockworkers and seamen, railroad employees, oil workers, and metalworkers 
(Tedjasukmana 1959: 28-29). At that time, communist-affiliated radical labour unions 
obtained political support from prominent labour figures who had been exiled abroad and 
imprisoned in a detention camp in Boven Digul New Guinea by the Dutch colonial 
authorities (Tedjasukmana 1959: 19).4 As Tedjasukmana concludes (1959: 23), during 
this period (1945-1965), the government under Sukarno regarded trade unions as 
politically necessary. This recognition can be illustrated by the involvement of SOBSI 
that spearheaded the nationalism of foreign enterprises in 1957, an act that was supported 
by Sukarno (Hadiz 2006: 561). Presiden Sukarno also recruited several union leaders in 
his cabinet, such as SK Trimurti and Iwa Kusuma Sumatri, and directly elected 40 
prominent union leaders as temporary parliament members under his ‘Guided 
Democracy’ system. 
The militant radical unionism that prevailed since the early decades of political 
unionism ended abruptly after the PKI was banned in March 1966 for its alleged 
involvement in a failed coup on 30 September 1965, the so-called G30SPKI incident, that 
led to a national emergency. Six top army general and one junior officer were kidnapped 
from their homes in Jakarta and later tortured and murdered on the outskirts of the city at 
Lubang Buaya by a military operation that called itself the Thirtieth September 
 
3 Besides the communist affiliation, trade unions were affiliated with other political parties with different 
ideologies such as nationalist, socialist, and proletarian (Ford 2009). The nationalists were associated with 
the Indonesian National Party led by Sukarno and was supported by the People’s Labour Union. The All-
Indonesia Workers Congress (KSBI) was linked to the Indonesian Socialist Party and the Central 
Organization of Indonesian Workers (SOBSI) had links to the Proletarian Party. These three unions, 
including SOBSI, were just some of the many trade unions from across the political spectrum that were 
established or re-established during the post-independence era (1945-1965). 
4 One of the leaders was Iwa Kusuma Sumantri. He was a leftist who had studied in Eastern University 
Moscow and was sent to Boven Digul detention camp in New Guinea in 1929. During World War II he 
was released and was appointed as Minister of Social Affairs at the beginning of Indonesian independence 
era. During his leadership he set up the first labour congress and contributed to the appointment of several 





Movement (Hearman 2013: 9). It is widely held that the military operation was led by 
Lieutenant Colonel Untung, a member of the Cakrabirawa presidential guard and an 
agent acting on behalf of the PKI (Hearman 2013: 9). 
In 1965, the PKI was the third largest communist party in the world with over 27 
million members including their affiliated organisations such as SOBSI, the Indonesian 
Peasant’s Front (BTI), the youth group Pemuda Rakyat (People’s Youth), and the 
Indonesian Women’s Movement (Gerwani).5 Prior to the G30SPKI incident, the PKI 
were also involved in violence conflicts between poor peasants who were usually backed 
by the BTI and Pemuda Rakyat against the land owners in several rural areas in Java and 
Sumatra, who were mostly religious and society leaders and aligned with the Muslim 
political parties, such as the Nahdatul Ulama and the Masyumi. One example was the 
Kanigoro incident in January 1965 in the Blitar regency of East Java in which members 
of the BTI and youth group Pemuda Rakyat attacked an Islamic service held in an Islamic 
boarding school (pesantren), killed the religious leader (kiyai) and defiled the Qur’an 
(McGregor 2009: 198). 
Following the G30SPKI incident, the army led by Mayor General Suharto took 
control and ordered the destruction of the PKI including its labour wings, SOBSI. The 
army under Suharto labelled the G30SPKI as a coup d’état and accused the PKI and its 
organisational wings of masterminding the incident. After Suharto gained power in 1968, 
anti-communist propaganda was very strong. Communist ideology was forbidden, 
including the spreading of communist teachings and the use of communist symbols.6 To 
spread the anti-communist campaign, the army formed alliances with civil society groups 
such as student and religious groups which were opposed to the PKI (Hearman 2013: 10). 
Former communist party supporters were arrested, and thousands were killed, especially 
those considered to be involved in the 1965 coup and political violence in the early 1960s, 
while their family members faced various economic and political pressures and 
 
5 For decades after the G30SPKI incident, the ‘communist threat’ was promoted in school textbooks and 
the G30SPKI was commemorated through a national public holiday and remembered as a ‘black day’ in 
Indonesia’s history during which communists attempted to seize state power through violent means. Since 
1981, on every 30 September, a state ceremony was held at the monument of Pancasila Sakti at Lubang 
Buaya (the site where the victims of G30SPKI were tortured and killed), which was always attended by 
president and vice president, ministers, leaders of political parties and government institutions, family 
members from the victims, and representatives of mass organisations, including youth and students. On 
the night of 30 September, a film entitled The Betrayal of the G30SPKI was also broadcasted through 
national TV networks, reinforcing the message of the dangers of communism. 
6 See Tap MPRS (People Assembly Council’s Decision) No. XXV/1966 on the destruction of the PKI and 





restrictions (Sulistyo 2000; Cribb 2002). Amnesty International estimated that between 
600,000 and 750,000 people were imprisoned for varying lengths of time after the 
G30SPKI. In addition, about half a million PKI supporters were killed in the 1965-1966 
massacres (Sulistiyo 2000; Cribb 2002). 
Under Suharto’s repressive regime, the labour movement was depoliticised and 
strictly controlled. Trade unions were systematically suppressed with no opportunities to 
build independent organisations as well radical leftist movements (Tjandra 2010: 56). 
This policy was carried out by the New Order regime due to the perceived need to pre-
empt the re-emergence of leftist political tendencies within organised unions (Hadiz 
2006: 564). Labour activists who opposed Suharto and his regime were sometimes 
abducted and imprisoned. Harsh repression of workers’ protests was routine, including 
military intervention when dealing with industrial disputes (Quinn 2003: 23). The high-
profile case of Marsinah, an Indonesian worker who was kidnapped by the army and 
brutally murdered on 8 May 1993 because of her involvement in the strike action at her 
workplace, is one example of the repressive efforts used against the labour movement 
during the Suharto era.7 
A range of anti-trade union policies were implemented, including the forcing of 
trade unions to amalgamate into a single union. The New Order’s single union, the SPSI, 
was primarily an instrument of power rather than a representative body for unions and 
workers (Ford 2005: 200). The SPSI was enforced, just like any other functional groups 
in the state’s corporatist structure, to maintain close institutional ties to the New Order 
electoral machine, the Golkar Party (Ford 2005; Mietzner 2013). Using the enforcement 
of the ideology of Pancasila, a Sanskrit word which translates as five principles, for 
encapsulating the idea of a kind of social partnership and deliberation to reach a 
consensus, the New Order government argued that “the trade unions must be renovated 
in order to avoid repeating the mistake of the past, when trade unions eschewed its social-
economic responsibilities in favour of a divisive political unionism in which political 
parties’ interest were prioritized over member’s needs and the national interest” (Sukarno 
1984, cited in Ford 2005: 3). Therefore, the legacy of the political anti-communist 
struggle of the 1960s would always identify militant radical trade unions as politically 
dangerous leftist organisations (Hadiz 1997; Nyman 2006). Consequently, unions and 
 
7 The Marsinah case generated international attention about human rights violations in Indonesia and 
inspired many workers, NGOs and student activists to rally against the militaristic regime. This is widely 





workers lost their leftist antagonistic traditions as well as their political identity in 
elections and negotiations. In addition, the doctrine of socio-economic (depoliticised) 
trade unionism which was strictly imposed for almost 32 years seems to have survived 
and been adopted by the majority of unions in Indonesia today. 
In the post-New Order era, democratisation has brought some positive effects on 
the emergence of organised unions as well as civil society movements. The industrial 
relations system has transitioned from exclusionary corporatism backed up by strong state 
intervention to collective bargaining that requires bipartite and tripartite dialogues as 
favoured by the International Labour Organization (ILO). This has resulted in a better 
representation of workers’ interests in companies, and at regional and national levels 
within Indonesia’s bipartite and tripartite structures (Ford 2005; Mizuno 2005). Further, 
the establishment of the Industrial Relations Court in 2004 has shifted the function of 
settling disputes from the Committee for Labour Disputes Settlement, an agency 
controlled by the government during the New Order era, to the Tribunal of Industrial 
Relations, an entity independent of the government. One of the designed features of the 
whole process is the move to the rule of law (Mizuno 2005: 199). In addition, the 
implementation of the decentralisation policy has contributed to the shift from centralised 
labour administration to district and provincial levels. Under Law Number 32/2004 on 
Regional Government, the implementation and inspection of employment regulations as 
well as dispute settlement functions are devolved to the local government. 
 
The Return of Political Unionism 
The engagement of trade unions in electoral politics in the post-authoritarian era is 
reminiscent of the long history of the political unionism before and after Indonesia’s 
independence in 1945, during which labour organisations were often associated with 
political parties. As noted by Suryomenggolo (2013: 40), the early labour movement in 
Indonesia “constituted nothing more than a political arm of the new Indonesian state”. 
Trade unions developed their political aspirations by getting involved directly in political 
parties and maintaining close relations with political parties. However, the legacies from 
the Suharto era continue to shape the context in which Indonesian unions mobilise today 






Union repression, de-politicisation and the association of unions as leftist 
organisations with communist affiliations during the New Order era have effectively 
amounted to the suppression of trade unions’ abilities to re-engage with formal politics. 
The freedom of association guaranteed since 1998 did not immediately bring strong 
political consolidation among labour organisations. On the contrary, the labour movement 
experienced significant fragmentation. When conflicts between union elites occur, the 
result is usually the establishment of a new union organisation. This is not only because 
of inter-elite rivalry and clashes of interests, but also because the Trade Union Law 
Number 21/2000 is said to place too much emphasis on freedom of association and 
facilitates “extreme fragmentation” by setting loose requirements for establishing new 
trade unions (Juliawan 2011: 352). 
Despite these challenges, Indonesia’s democratic reform did create new 
opportunities for trade unions to transform their movements not just industrially, but also 
politically (Ford 2005). Moreover, their relative success on industrial recognition in the 
post-1998 era further increased trade union elites and labour activists’ optimism as to 
their ability to compete in electoral politics (Ford 2005; Juliawan 2011). This condition 
has been evident since the first multi-party elections in 1999 and the first direct elections 
in 2004, during which some trade unions and labour activists established labour political 
parties with varying degrees of success. For instance, there were five labour parties out 
of 48 parties that took part in the 1999 general elections. Three labour parties came from 
sections of the All-Indonesia Workers’ Union (SPSI) which was established during the 
authoritarian New Order era. In the 2004 elections, four labour parties passed the 
administrative verification procedures, although only the Social Democratic Labour Party 
(PBSD) passed the final stage of verification from the Electoral Commission. The PBSD 
failed in the national level elections; however, the party attracted 636,397 votes 
nationwide and gained 22 seats in various districts in 2004, doing particularly well in the 
North Sumatra province. 
Several large and established political parties are now building political alliances 
with trade unions in attempts to secure votes from workers, particularly in several union-
dense provinces in Java and Sumatra islands. In the 2009 legislative elections, for 
instance, the Prosperous Justice Party (PKS) ran nine labour candidates for national 
assembly in union-dense electoral districts in the Riau Archipelago, Central Java, West 





leaders affiliated with 12 established parties were registered in the Batam municipal 
assembly election (Ford 2014: 352).  
Out of three acknowledged and registered national trade union confederations in 
the Ministry of Manpower, only the KSPI have begun to fully participate in legislative 
elections. The KSPI is the only trade union confederation among three biggest 
confederations that has no link with previous labour organisations during the Suharto era. 
The majority of KSPI members are union federations concentrated in industrial zones and 
come from large companies, making it easier for them to form organised unions. In 
developing labour movements, the KSPI is also building a network with labour NGOs, 
such as with the Trade Union Right Center and the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation. At 
the international level, the KSPI is affiliated with the International Trade Union 
Confederation and is a member of Industrial All (KSPI 2017). In addition, the other two 
biggest national confederations - the Confederation of All-Indonesia Workers’ Unions 
(KSPSI) and the Confederation of Indonesian Prosperous Trade Unions (KSBSI) - are 
not fully united but they both tend to disagree with union involvement in electoral politics. 
Indonesian trade unions have found several different ways to participate in 
electoral politics in the post-authoritarian era. The first, already mentioned, is by 
establishing labour-related political parties. The second is by nominating the trade union 
elites and labour organisation leaders as legislative candidates through organisational 
partnerships with political parties. The third is to form individual contracts with different 
political parties (even though they came from the same trade union or labour 
organisations). The fourth is by becoming members of political parties. Given that union 
electoral strategies are part of a dynamic process aimed at gaining membership support, 
as well as ensuring electoral victory, analysis of these modes of electoral participation 
among trade union elites is extremely significant not only for understanding how the 
union elites vie for voters, but also for a broader analysis of contemporary Indonesian 
politics. It is also important to consider the fact that labour constituencies are difficult to 
mobilise, and that political party elites tend to see unions as outsiders with nothing to 
contribute financially to parties (Ford 2014: 356). 
Trade unions are positioned to serve a strategic role in the formal political arena 
to represent the interests and political aspirations of the working population. In particular, 
as the trade unions have quite a substantial membership base, with 120 federations 





swings in votes, particularly in the union-dense areas. The political potential of trade 
unions is also supported by the gradual changes of the Indonesian economic structure in 
recent decades. Before the 1970s the Indonesian economy was heavily dependent on the 
agriculture sector, reflecting both its stage of economic development and government 
policies to achieve agricultural self-sufficiency. Furthermore, since the beginning of the 
1980s, the government focused on diversifying export orientation from oil to 
manufactured products and it caused a gradual process of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. When trade barriers were reduced in the mid-1980s, the Indonesian 
economy became more globally integrated (Elias and Noone 2011: 1). After being hit 
hard by the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997, the manufacturing sectors, as the main 
contributor to union membership, grew by about 6 per cent from 2007 to 2014, compared 
with -5 per cent growth in the 1997-2000 period. This growth particularly occurred in 
labour-intensive industries such as textiles, garments, footwear, food and beverages, 
electrical goods and electronics, and furniture. These sectors employ a third of the total 
manufacturing workforce. A larger and more stable workforce, manufacturing growth, 
urbanisation and investment in education are seen as positive developments for industry 
and union membership (Lane 2018: 12). 
Trade union participation in electoral politics in post-Suharto era is influenced by 
the changes to Indonesia’s electoral system. Before the 2004 general elections, the 
members of the national and local legislature were chosen by the political parties based 
on a closed proportional system. Consequently, this system gave too much power to the 
political parties, and members of the legislature put their party interests above those of 
their constituents (Suryadinata 2002: 76). Since 2004 the electoral system in Indonesia 
has changed, allowing voters to vote directly for legislative candidates as proposed by the 
participating political parties in legislative elections. This new rule also applies to the 
election of local government leaders such as mayor and regent. In the 2009 legislative 
elections, a new electoral law with an open proportional system was established showing 
that Indonesia’s democracy is continuing to improve its electoral system. The reform of 
the electoral system in the 2009 elections resulted in the practice of real and more 
democratic political competition (Aspinall and Mietzner 2010: 34). Since 2009 each 
legislative candidate should compete to get their voters not only against the candidates 
from other parties, but also the candidates from the same party. In particular, this open 





before to be more actively involved in the political development of their regions and to 
contest legislative positions which possess real policymaking powers. 
Trade Union Politics 
Several trade unions elites have started to compete in electoral politics since the first 
multi-party general elections began in 1999. The responses coming from the labour 
unions, labour activists and the workers have been varied. Some unionists seem to reject 
this approach and actively campaign against the involvement in formal politics as well as 
the forming of alliances with political parties, while others respond differently in different 
contexts, which speaks to the complexity of the issue (Aspinall 2014; Ford 2014). 
Törnquist (2004) and Ford (2005) noted that in the early reform period (known in 
Indonesia as reformasi), while union leaders and labour activists showed their intention 
to be more politically assertive, many of them remained suspicious toward the electoral 
participation of several labour parties as well as the forming of political alliances between 
political parties and union elites. Some trade union leaders and labour activists continue 
to question the motives of union elites and fear that the unions will only be used for the 
political interest of political parties. In a national seminar that I attended which was held 
by the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (2013) about the Indonesian labour movement, 
there were questions from the participants about whether or not the labour union elites 
who have been elected to the legislature actually have the capacity and will to strive for 
the interests of labour.8 Some participants at the seminar questioned whether union 
leaders are only being used for political reasons, such as to gain more votes from their 
members, and whether it is the right time for the labour movement in Indonesia to get 
involved actively in electoral politics. These are some of the unresolved issues that this 
research will address. 
A serious debate has also emerged among scholars of Indonesian labour 
concerning the engagement of trade union elites in formal politics. According to Hadiz 
(2010: 151), the contemporary labour movement remains “essentially constricted in its 
capability to influence the fundamental agenda of social and political reform in 
Indonesia”. Labour organisations have been marginalised politically, at national and local 
levels, because the “reform agenda has been largely shaped by economic and political 
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interests unconnected to the worker's interest, and even hostile to that of the labour 
movement” (Hadiz 2010: 151). Other scholars stress the internal problem of fragmented 
unions (Törnquist 2004; Silaban 2014; Caraway and Ford 2017). For example, 
fragmentation resulted in the failure of the Labour Party, led by Muchtar Pakpahan, which 
only attracted 0.56 per cent of the vote in the 2009 legislative elections. At that time, the 
KSBSI was facing internal conflict under two different leaderships, and most of its elites 
refused to support the involvement of the KSBSI with Pakpahan’s Labour Party. Another 
example is the metal workers leaders in Bekasi who chose not to mobilise resources to 
support union candidates in the 2009 legislative elections because “the union’s national 
leadership had failed to convince them of the soundness of its strategy” (Caraway, Ford 
and Nugroho 2015: 1302). 
In line with Hadiz (2010), Törnquist (2004: 380) noted that labour union 
approaches to politics have been “flawed because of the insufficient political capacity 
among labour elites”. Fragmentation and factionalism have driven a wedge between 
various labour groups, who want to increase their independence and obtain their own 
political contacts and sources of patronage. This is one of the reasons for the failure of 
labour oriented political parties which contested the election in 1999 (Törnquist 2004). 
Indonesia’s democratic transition took place in the wake of a deep financial crisis, and 
while this created room for new labour movements and forces to emerge, it also 
“diminished the bargaining power of workers” (Törnquist 2004: 387). In addition to the 
fragmentation problem, unions also had to operate in a precarious situation where the 
acceleration of informal employment was taking place, including short contracts and 
labour outsourcing (Tjandraningsih 2012: 409). Moreover, Indonesia is still dominated 
by agricultural and informal sectors, and most workers in these sectors are not unionised. 
Despite negative indicators such as union fragmentation, elite factionalism and 
ideological obstacles, dynamic change is taking place and there are new opportunities for 
the engagement of trade unions in electoral politics. Unions in Indonesia are fragmented 
but their membership is geographically concentrated, particularly in the industrial zones. 
Under Indonesia’s decentralisation systems, this condition can be advantageous for union 
elites to build political alliance with political parties and bring labour issues into local 
parliamentary politics. In this regard, union elites in industrial-dense areas have more 
opportunity to engage in electoral politics as well as to shape decisions concerning areas 





leftist, labour leaders have secured parliamentary seats and unions are engaging in 
political activities despite facing significant constraints, indicating new opportunities and 
a growing pluralism in the Indonesian democratic system. 
Since the freedom of association has been granted as a legal right in 1998, the 
political activism among trade unionists has increased significantly. Labour 
confederations such as the KSPI are increasingly participating in electoral politics and 
have been successful in securing legislative seats for members. In order to increase their 
political strength, trade unions have also been sharpening their political activism through 
training and education programs for their leaders and members. 
As reported by Lane (2018: 14), between the period of the 2009 and 2014 
legislative elections, thousands of members of the Federation of Indonesian Metal 
Workers’ Union (FSPMI), the largest federation under the KSPI, were trained under the 
so-called “Ekopol” (political economy) training programmes. They were trained to 
understand important issues beyond their workplace and are increasingly equipped with 
skills to think critically and use political language to articulate their interests. Educators 
of these training are not only senior union leaders but also “activists who had been part 
of the radical wing of the opposition during New Order era” (Lane 2018: 14). Many 
Ekopol-trained unionists have become union leaders in the factory level, enabling them 
to transfer their knowledge and to build solidarity with workers in other companies. The 
role of the Ekopol training programmes has been “central in enabling the escalation” of 
labour mobilisation on the street demonstration as well as political campaign in 2014 
legislative elections (Lane 2018: 14). 
The likes of Törnquist (2004) and Hadiz (2010) accurately capture the re-
emergence of the labour movement in the early years of the democratic transition, when 
the political involvement of labour unions was still weak, and the economic condition of 
Indonesia was still volatile due to the impact of the Asian Financial Crisis. The work of 
Caraway, Ford and Nugroho (2015) is more relevant now, as they focus on the trade union 
elites who participated in the 2009 legislative elections. They concluded that with 
democratisation, unions have greater opportunities to engage in the electoral arena. 
Despite the unfavourable legacy from Suharto’s New Order and trade union failures 






Some scholars contend that the emergence of organised labour and attempts to re-
engage in electoral politics is an attempt to make the best use of their new freedoms in 
Indonesia’s post-authoritarian regime. As part of the civil society movement, the 
engagement of trade union elites in formal politics is important not only on election day, 
but also in the daily struggle to provide a strong countervailing political power resource 
that is necessary to counter the dominance of oligarchic power in contemporary 
Indonesia. Further, from her study on civil society and democracy in Indonesia, Nyman 
(2006: 10) argued that democratisation has had noticeably positive effects on the 
organisational capacities of industrial workers in post-authoritarian Indonesia. As one of 
the chief beneficiaries of the post-Suharto political reforms, the labour movement can 
now organise more freely to form unions and to use collective bargaining power when 
dealing with workplace issues. These newfound abilities are part of the fundamental pre-
conditions that can be used to support the labour movement to reach a higher level, that 
is, to be involved in the labour policy decision-making process that can only be reached 
by engaging in formal politics (Nyman 2009: 12). 
Research Questions 
I have established that Indonesia’s democratic reforms provide wider political 
opportunities for trade union elites to participate in electoral politics. Indonesia has 
carried out four successful general elections since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 
1998. Two major challenges often raised separately by scholars are: (1) the dominance of 
old elite alliances from the New Order era; (2) the lack of successful candidates from civil 
society groups managing to get seats at the legislative assembly (Suryadinata 2002; 
Robison and Hadiz 2004; Nyman 2006; Aspinall 2010; Liddle 2013; Choi 2014; 
Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 2015). While the participation of civil society groups in 
electoral politics has increased, they continue to exist in the margins of the new political 
landscape, and organised labour is no exception. In response to this situation, I argue that 
in contesting legislative elections, the trade unions not only have to compete with well-
funded elites, but also have to deal with internal organisational obstacles, structural 
barriers and contextual challenges. To better understand the changing nature of the labour 
movement in Indonesia, I propose the following primary research question: how have 
trade union electoral strategies, organisation and political roles evolved during the 2009 
and 2014 legislative elections? To support this primary research question, I pose five 





1. What patterns of change have occurred within the Indonesian labour movement since 
democratisation in 1998? 
2. Why do trade union elites engage in electoral politics, and how do they seek to 
legitimise this engagement? 
3. What type of electoral strategies are union elites using to mobilise union members 
and worker constituencies while contesting legislative elections? 
4. To what extent do structural and organisational constraints affect the mobilisation 
capacity of union candidates during legislative elections? 
5. In what ways are elected trade union elites using their parliamentary positions to 
advocate workers’ interests and rights? 
Operationalising the Concept of Trade Union Electoral Engagement  
This study builds upon the theoretical understanding that trade unions are not merely 
economic actors, but are inevitably political (Bartolini 2007; Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick 2010; Upchurch, Croucher and Flynn 2012; Lee 2015). Trade unions are 
organisations founded by working people as “a response to the inequalities of social, 
economic and political power of the emerging industrial society” (Marks 1989: 51). In 
many capitalist industrial states, trade unions are generally supressed by the market, and 
“thus trade unions are primarily reactive and defensive in their political behaviour” 
(Taylor 1989: 16). 
Trade unions are typically in a disadvantaged position when compared to 
employers, who enjoy far greater resources in the labour market. Trade unions have to 
negotiate with employers for the improvement of working conditions and influence the 
ways in which the state shapes the rules of the game in the labour market. Referring to 
Keynesian economic theory and policy, Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010: 315-
317) argued that the labour market is “subject to government intervention” and therefore 
“regulating labour markets is a question of power resources” and involves political issues. 
The involvement of unions in formal politics reflects the growing importance of industrial 
workers as well as the emergence of class politics (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 
2010: 319). In this concept, trade unions are not simply concerned with their economic 
interests and negotiations with employers, most notably through collective bargaining. 
Their interests extend to influencing labour-related policies through partisan politics 
(unions acting as interest groups). For these interests to be manifested in their movements, 





other political actors or political institutions which are often conditioned by specific 
opportunities and constraints (Lee 2015: 5). 
The purpose of studying trade unionism from a political perspective is to explain 
its emergence, the way trade unions respond to political opportunities, the decisions they 
make about the most appropriate site for political action, the strategies they pursue, and 
their adaptation to changing political situations (Marks 1989: 59-60). Trade unions are 
engaged in a political arena with strategic objectives to develop their collective power 
and membership interest, to endorse fairer labour market policy, and to build up their 
organisational capacity for a wider range of interventions, for example in labour-related 
policy-making and in the monitoring and implementation of industrial regulations 
(Boreham and Hall 1994: 76). Therefore, in order to be able to fully grasp the dynamics 
of trade union activism, research on trade union politics needs to combine the perspective 
that unions are primarily tied to their position in the socio-economic structure with  an 
understanding of the conditions that shape union interactions with party politics and 
worker mobilisations (Lee 2015: 14). 
Studies of trade unionism often benefit from an interdisciplinary approach (Marks 
1989; Ford 2005; Benson and Zhu 2008). According to Marks (1989: 9), “the study of 
unions and industrial relations is an intellectually cosmopolitan discipline, and this is 
nowhere more apparent than in the field of union political activity”. For instance, in 
sociology, trade unionism is essentially about collective behaviour which in various ways 
has been given an institutional form. Other disciplines that are relevant are economics, 
politics and law. The analysis of wage determination, income distribution and the effect 
of trade unionism in production, falls within the economic strand. The analysis of pressure 
groups, lobbying, and political alliances falls within the political strand. The analysis of 
legal frameworks within which unions have to operate falls within the legal strand. No 
single discipline can claim a monopoly over the study of trade unionism as unions have 
been conceptualised from a variety of perspectives. Unions can be viewed as “close-knit 
communities that are working for their members, or as business-like organisations 
attempting to bargain with employers, or as part of a political movement seeking diverse 
political goals” (Benson and Zhu 2008: 36). Each of these perspectives may provide 
useful insights into the others and they are intimately linked to each other (Benson and 





Trade unions have emerged at different times in different countries. Each country 
has a different trade union structure and a variety of economic and political experiences 
which have largely determined attitudes and responses to union activism (Hyman and 
Gumbrell-McCormick 2010: 316). For example, in the case of developed countries such 
as Britain, Germany and France, trade unions came into existence during the industrial 
revolution, especially from the 1870s onward. In countries like New Zealand, Australia 
and South Africa, by contrast, trade unions were popular before they reached the 
industrialisation phase. In these countries, the formation of labour parties is commonly 
used as part of trade unions’ political strategies to extend their political influence. 
Meanwhile, in several developing countries, trade unions emerged following prolonged 
periods of colonial rule as part of nationalist movements to attain independence. In 
addition, they gained political momentum after regime changes as a result of democratic 
transition. Therefore, in relation to the study of trade union activism, the methods to be 
used are in accordance with the varied structural origins of trade unions, their histories, 
and the prevailing economic and political conditions in which they are situated (Lee 2015: 
16). 
Several studies on trade unions have concluded that their political strength 
constitutes the main variable in explaining the diverging pattern of economic performance 
and social security in many countries (Boreham and Hall 1994; Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick 2010; Upchurch, Croucher and Flynn 2012). For instance, Boreham and Hall 
(1994) have demonstrated the correlation between union strategies and the level of 
industrial economic democracy. Utilizing data from three different surveys of union 
strategies and measures of industrial and economic democracy in seven capitalist 
countries since the mid-1970s, they found that union movements that have pursued a 
strategy of political unionism, such as those in Sweden and Germany, have been able to 
gain significant concessions in securing institutional rights to influence policy formation 
both at macroeconomic and microeconomic levels. On the other hand, in countries such 
as the US and Japan, where unions have traditionally pursued strategies locked in at the 
enterprise level, there is little prospect of improvement for their movements. In these 
countries, trade unions will remain isolated from key decision-making opportunities at 
the macro political level and will, therefore, be denied the chance to decisively influence 






Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick’s (2010) study reinforces the findings of 
Boreham and Hall (1994) and sheds considerable light on the question of why trade 
unions must explicitly redefine their political identities. Focusing on trade unions’ role in 
the political arena and their relationship with governments and political parties with 
reference to ten European countries, they found four key dimensions that have particular 
political influence. These are the union’s ideology, opportunity structure, organisational 
capacity, and contextual challenges. A recent and similar study has been carried out by 
Fairbrother (2015), focusing on three key dimensions for union renewal in an increasingly 
globalised world. She notes that the need for trade union renewal comprises a dialectical 
relationship between union purpose, union organisation and union capacities. These three 
dimensions provide the basis of a union’s collective authority and power (Fairbrother 
2015: 572-573).  
In most developed industrial countries in Europe as well as in some countries in 
Latin America, political unionism has grown since the early industrial era, concurrent 
with the formation of democratic institutions, the growing political identity of the 
working class, a demand for improvement working conditions and rights, the electoral 
success of labour-related parties, and the construction of the welfare state (Marks 1989; 
Murillo 2001). In the case of the UK, for instance, political unionism saw its highest 
growth in the period following the Second World War; when unions were recognised, 
membership was expanded, their leaders were increasingly involved in formal politics, 
and unions became an integral part of both the bargaining arena and of polity (Fairbrother 
and Gerard 2002: 56). Thus, in those countries, organised unions and workers were 
viewed as one of the influential elements of political development and to have 
successfully determined “the politics and policies of their own society” (Lee 2015: 141). 
In Indonesia however, and in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia, Thailand 
and the Philippines, operationalising union political engagement requires conceptual 
adjustment. In these countries, union density is low, democracy is still fragile, elite 
politicisation is strong, and no left-leaning parties have survived to play a major role in 
politics.  In this thesis, therefore, trade union political engagement is understood as any 
union’s relationship with political institutions, particularly political parties, in which 
union elites are fully engaged in electoral competition by mobilising their members and 
workers in general, to gain political representation and influence policy-making. The term 
“political unionism” is used in this thesis to operationalise the engagement of trade 





To answer my research questions, I adopt the four key dimensions of political 
unionism identified by Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010) as well as similar 
criteria used by Fairbrother (2015). First, in response to the debate about the importance 
of the Indonesian labour movement in the post-authoritarian era - whether trade unions 
should engage or remain neutral in electoral politics - I gathered qualitative data 
concerning trade union elites’ perceptions of political unionism. The analysis will focus 
on the dimension of unions’s ideology, particularly their organisational identities and 
purposes. In particular, the analysis is also related to trade union elite’s motivation to 
engage in electoral politics as a way of understanding the unions’ purpose in engaging 
with formal politics. Referring again to Fairbrother (2015: 566), he notes that “the purpose 
of a union is to pursue objectives that reflect its identity”. Trade unions articulate their 
organisational purpose in several ways: as a “business-like service organisation”, as a 
“sword of justice” or as a “vested interest”. These different types of purpose and identity 
have a strong impact on the ways in which trade unions determine and pursue their modes 
of struggle (Fairbrother 2015: 567).  
The next dimension is the opportunity structure. Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick (2010: 326) define opportunity structures as the “varying degrees and forms 
of economic and political transformation that enabled trade unions to utilise their power 
resources to seek ways of influencing public policies”. Opportunity structures can cause 
strong trade unions to shift their priorities increasingly from issues in the industrial arena 
to decision-making policy in the political arena (Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010: 
327). In the Indonesian context, opportunity structures rely upon to the approval of ILO 
Convention Number 87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to 
Organise, the establishment and complicated implementation of three new labour laws, 
the localisation of labour issues under decentralisation policy, and the ongoing changes 
in the electoral system that have created wider political opportunities for trade union elites 
to participate in elections. 
To understand union organisational capacity, several different union electoral 
strategies are analysed in this thesis. According to Levasqu and Murray (2010: 341) union 
capacities can be defined as “the ability of unions to address and define union concerns 
toward labour-related issues that can be exercised, developed, transmitted, and learned”. 
Furthermore, Fairbrother (2015: 563) argued that union capabilities without strong 





the dimension of unions’ organisational capacity relies on their ability to use their 
collective resources, which is reflected in the processes of workers’ mobilisation during 
electoral campaigns. Thus, in contrast to party cadres who have a wider range of 
constituents, the union candidates are highly dependent on workers’ political support to 
gain votes. According to Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010: 318), political 
unionism requires relatively high membership density and financial resources to support 
it. If organisational resources are modest, coalitions with other groups, such as political 
parties, may make it easier to achieve their goals. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate 
how and why the Indonesian trade unions have chosen different electoral strategies, in 
particular how they network and form strategic coalitions to influence elections. 
The final dimension to consider is the contextual challenges. This is related to the 
contemporary economic and political issues which confront trade unions and shape the 
appropriateness of different strategies. In his study, Fairbrother (2015: 562) explains the 
types of contextual challenges that exist and questions the prospect of trade unionism in 
relation to the changing economic system, from mass-based industries to new industries, 
and the balance of power that has caused union membership levels to decline 
dramatically, narrowing the political interests and purposes of both of them and workers. 
Fairbrother (2015: 562) notes that those challenges occurred especially in advanced 
capitalist (or highly industrialised) countries. Meanwhile, Hyman and Gumbrell-
McCormick (2010: 318) explores this dimension by giving examples of how trade unions 
in some advanced capitalist economies have sought alternative forms of action in 
response to drastic economic and political changes. One example is the decision of most 
German trade unions to adopt the demand for a minimum wage policy, after the opening 
up of the German labour market through European Union (EU) enlargement and an 
increase in low-wage workers.  
In this thesis, I define contextual challenges as systemic political practices and 
electoral dynamics that are beyond the control of trade union elites and directly or 
indirectly affect the success or failure of union engagement in electoral contestation and 
policy-making. These aspects include corrupt practices and material inequalities, union-
party alliances, fragmentation and elite factionalism, the decline in union membership, 
and changes in workers’ political identity. Furthermore, noting the current dynamics of 
Indonesian local politics, in this study the dimension of contextual challenges is also 





generally acknowledged, the presence of unionists in electoral contestations represent the 
population of a specific constituency, namely the union members and workers. To a 
certain extent, they can act as a new class of politician and can build bridges by voicing 
worker interests at the policy-making table. In practice, however, unionists turned-
politicians often face a representation dilemma: are they activists or party representatives? 
Given the pattern of elite politics and culture in Indonesia (Noor 2010: 14), unionists in 
parliament may be isolated by their new position or “belittled by career politicians as 
idealist or naïve beginners”, while those who have turned against their former associates 
to pursue their own interests or align themselves with the oligarchy and status quo will 
be viewed as “traitors” (Mietzner 2014: 45). Therefore, analysis of this issue will lead to 
a deeper understanding of the impact on democratisation, particularly concerning the 
question of how trade unions have exercised and developed meaningful engagement in 
formal politics. 
Research Methodology 
This study employs a qualitative research method because explaining the engagement of 
trade union elites in electoral politics requires thick analysis and nuanced process-tracing 
through the triangulation of data, which are attainable through qualitative study. 
Qualitative research has been described as the most appropriate method to examine the 
thoughts, beliefs and ideas of individuals or groups, so as to provide a deeper 
understanding of social phenomena (Silverman 2005: 34). According to Pierce (2008: 
44), the strength of qualitative research “lies in its unique capacity, to learn and 
understand the underlying values of individuals and groups”.  Qualitative research helps 
us to understand the behaviours and beliefs of individuals and groups and can help us to 
interpret how individuals and groups make sense of their setting through social structures 
and roles, and through the observation of symbols, motivations, feelings, emotions, and 
opinions (Berg 2001; Powner 2015). These are in line with Klenke’s (2008: 34) view that, 
in term of design, one of the characteristics of qualitative research is its “flexibility and 
reflexivity”.   
 Research concerning trade union politics should encompass two convictions that 
capture the qualitative character of union strength and political identity (Marks 1989; 
Benson and Zhu 2008; Upchurch, Croucher and Flynn 2012). The first is that union 





orientation in their occupational communities, union bargaining power in the industrial 
or sectoral context, and at the level of formal politics. In the Indonesian context, local 
level political analysis is also necessary in order to understand the specific factors that 
shape union strengths (and weaknesses) and the propensity for organised labour to seek 
power in the era of decentralisation. It is because political reforms in Indonesia through 
decentralisation have transformed the nature of local politics and given local elites greater 
political influence (Hidayat 2005; Tyson 2010; Choi 2014). The implementation of the 
decentralisation policy has been one of the most critical and observable political changes 
in Indonesia since 1998. It marks the end of the uniformity of policies carried out by the 
central government in the districts and municipalities across the country. Its 
implementation has contributed to the shift from centralised labour administration to the 
district and provincial levels. Analysing this issue will lead to a deeper understanding of 
the impact on democratisation, for instance how trade unions exercise and develop 
different modes of political engagement.  
The second conviction is that in seeking to understand union political activity one 
should consider the role of union elites, who exercise political power or influence and 
directly engage in struggles for political leadership. Compared to their members, union 
elites have greater control over shaping agendas and deploying resources and are 
therefore more directly engaged in the political process (Upchurch, Croucher and Flynn 
2012: 23). Union elites play a significant role in every organisational decision and 
influence the extent to which unions maintain or abandon ideology, design union 
strategies, and agitate for change on behalf of a wide membership, raising questions of 
representation (Burnham et al. 2008; Benson and Zhu 2008). 
Burnham et al. (2008: 231) explain that a key research technique for political 
scientists interested in decision-makers is semi-structured elite interviewing. According 
to Drever (2003: 1), during semi-structured interviews the “interviewer sets up a general 
structure by deciding in advance what ground is to be covered and what main questions 
are to be asked”. By their very nature, elite interviews provide the political scientist with 
an insight into the mindset of the elites who have played a role in shaping politics, policy 
or society. Richards (1996: 200) highlights a number of putative advantages in elite 
interviewing. The first is that the elite respondent can help in interpreting documents, 
particularly if the interviewee can gain access to the authors responsible for putting 





interpreting the personalities involved in the relevant decisions and help explain the 
outcome of events. The third is that the elite respondent can provide information that is 
not recorded elsewhere, or that is not yet available to the public. The fourth is that the 
elite respondent can help to understand the context, set the tone, or establish the 
atmosphere of the area that is being researched. The fifth advantage is that elites can help 
the researcher to establish a network or provide access to other individuals, in line with 
the so-called snowball effect.  
Interviews with elites require certain research skills and experience and pose a 
number of operational challenges (Richards 1996; Gubrium and Holstein 2002). Thus, 
researchers who use this technique should be aware of its pitfalls. One potential pitfall is 
the tendency of elites to dictate viewpoints by directing researchers to accept or 
accommodate what they have pointed out. This challenge often centres on power relations 
and is typically found in interviews with elites who hold strategic positions and want to 
control and dominate the interview process (Gubrium and Holstein 2002: 33). The next 
challenge is related to the issues, goals and purposes of the research. For instance, a 
research project coinciding with the highly politicised and polarised election environment 
tend to make elite respondents suspect that the interview is being used as a cover for their 
political opponents to acquire potentially damaging information. If so, gaining the trust 
of elite respondents is crucial to ensure the reliability of the data and findings (Keren and 
Edith 2015: 109). According to Richards (1996: 200) “elites may adjust their 
interpretation of an event in order to avoid being seen in a poor light, or in certain cases, 
they may have an axe to grind”. In extreme examples, the elites can give different 
opinions in different interviews or change what they have said in the course of a single 
interview (Keren and Edith 2015: 109). Researchers should therefore be constantly aware 
that the information elites supply can be of a highly subjective nature (Gubrium and 
Holstein 2002: 39). 
Data Collection 
The primary and secondary data analysed in this thesis are based on information collected 
through fieldwork carried out in Indonesia between August 2016 and January 2017. 
Mixed methods are used for data collection: (1) semi-structured, in-depth interviews with 
unionists, labour activists, union legislative candidates, party politicians, government 





range from labour demonstrations on the street, union and workers meetings, parliament 
meetings, and seminars; (3) documents published by trade unions, labour NGOs, and the 
Electoral Commission (KPU). 
Prior to this research, I had carried out several studies involving trade unionists, 
labour activists as well as workers. After finishing my MA degree in Japan in 2010 I 
joined a research team formed under a recommendation of Commission IX DPR RI 
(National Parliament) and National Tripartite Institution to carry out a study on Law 
Number 13/2003 on Manpower. I was also involved as a facilitator working on trade 
union representation at local and national levels to formulate a position paper that was to 
be submitted to the parliament in support of the government plan to revise Manpower 
Law Number 13/2003. Nevertheless, this plan failed to gain consensus among union 
leaders; instead, they decided to use their political channels and opted to struggle in 
electoral politics and lobby parliament. These experiences encouraged me to conduct 
further research for my PhD program in relation to trade unions’ involvement in politics 
and their attempts to engage in electoral contestation. In addition, as a researcher working 
in the government research institution, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI), I have 
been conducting other research that includes my interests in minimum wages, the concept 
of decent working conditions, and labour movements, which date from the early 2000s. I 
have therefore had a relatively long association with trade unionists and workers. 
I consider my interviews to be the core empirical evidence in this thesis. I 
interviewed 67 informants, mainly union elites, with the length of interviews ranging 
between 30 and 120 minutes. The total number of interviewees does not include several 
dozen workers and unionists that I spoke to during my participatory observation, because 
the interactions were closer to casual conversations than formal interviews. Detailed 
interviewee profiles, as well as participatory observations, appear in Appendix A and B. 
Most of the interviews were recorded, with the full consent of each interviewee, but if an 
interviewee refused to be recorded I took notes instead. There were also some 
interviewees who asked me to turn off the recording during their interviews and who 
requested to make off-the-record comments especially when we were discussing personal 
opinions or particular union elites. 
In reflecting on my fieldwork experience, I noticed that trust and establishment of 
informal relations with trade unionists are often crucial elements in gaining richer data. 





however as a researcher working for a government research institution, I could be 
considered an insider for several participants. Therefore, it is necessary to consider that 
my dual roles as PhD student and government researcher should be balanced in order to 
effectively and objectively analyse the information that I gathered from my participants. 
In the overall interview process, I always maintained that all the data or information that 
I was gathering was part of my efforts to gain valid and credible study findings. Data 
collection followed ethical conventions and protocol related to consent, confidentiality, 
anonymity, and data protection. My project received ethical approval in May 2016 
(reference number AREA 15-122). 
I prepared for the interviews by collecting information and researching any issues 
related to my informants’ organisational backgrounds, as well as their views on particular 
issues through social media, news and related publications. In an effort to deal with the 
potential bias of my dual identity, I positioned myself as an objective researcher and 
stressed to my respondents that any answers they provided would constitute very valuable 
information for my research. Such reassurances seemed to work to alleviate certain 
insecurities and anxieties felt by some respondents. In certain interviews, I found several 
informants appeared to try to judge their position and opinions, and even tried to question 
me, attempting to involve my position in their conflict of interests. To deal with such 
cases, I tried to put myself in a neutral position and reassured them that there were no 
wrong answers. In short, all empirical data from interviews are obviously not intended to 
offer statistical confirmation or disconfirmation of the claims I offer in this thesis, but 
rather to enable examination of how unionists and workers perceive, interpret, and assess 
their movements, allies and the political context that surrounds them. Their stories and 
experiences helped me answer my research questions, understand the complexities of 
trade union politics and their involvement in electoral politics, and formulate nuanced 
qualitative explanations in my thesis.  
Case Selection 
In order to gain in-depth knowledge and insights about trade unions politics and to 
investigate specific strategies and decisions concerning trade unions’ involvement in 
formal politics, I selected case studies in three different research locations: Bekasi in West 
Java, Serang in Banten, and Medan in North Sumatra. These three research locations are 
industrial centres and were selected because of their specific features of trade unions’ 





A case study in Bekasi district was selected to represent the Labour Go Politics 
movement that was established by the FSMPI during its attempt to participate in the 2014 
legislative elections. Under this movement, the FSPMI has successfully established a new 
type of political alliance with political parties and placed its two cadres in Bekasi’s district 
parliament office. As one of the most union-dense and industrialised areas in Indonesia, 
the strength of the labour movement in Bekasi has become a barometer of organised 
unions conducting any collective action. In addition, its proximity to Jakarta as the capital 
city of Indonesia puts Bekasi in an important position for understanding the political 
dynamic of trade union activism in this region. 
In the case of Serang district, this research location has been selected to represent 
the origin of the Labour Vote Labour movement. This movement is an electoral strategy 
that was initially pursued by an inter-union alliance in Serang district to support nine trade 
union elites who ran for legislative seats via five different parties in the 2009 legislative 
elections. Serang has also been selected to represent a new form of union political strategy 
in the 2014 legislative elections via individual partnerships between particular union 
elites with certain political parties. Through this strategy, the union elites compete in 
elections by joining certain political parties, though they generally do not receive support 
from their home union organisation. 
While Bekasi and Serang represent two large industrial centres and the birthplace 
of strong trade unionism in the post-Suharto era, the case of Medan was selected to 
represent the most important industrial centre outside of Java Island in terms of size and 
history. Medan is well known as a stronghold of worker mobilisation from the All 
Indonesian Labour Federation (FSBSI), and some independent labour organisations such 
as the SBMI and FNBI. Labour movements in Medan, and North Sumatra in general, 
have a long history and connection to the legacy of Dutch colonisation, where North 
Sumatra was designated as plantation area. Since the first democratic elections in 1999, 
Medan has become one of the most attractive locations for the labour constituency in 
North Sumatra, especially for labour-related political parties such as the Labour and 
Social Democratic Party (2004), and the Labour Party (2009). In the 2009 legislative 
elections, the Labour Party successfully placed one legislative member in Medan’s local 
parliament. Thus, the centrality of the labour movement in these three industrial areas 





and how their political engagement influences policy-making and the nature of industrial 
relations in these areas. 
Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis proceeds in seven chapters. Following the introduction, Chapter 2 provides a 
review of the development of Indonesian trade union politics since the end of Suharto’s 
authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It discusses how political reforms, 
democratisation, and economic liberalisation have developed, and explains the 
development of labour politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. This chapter also 
highlights the significant influence of democratisation and globalisation on the 
development of labour movements in several countries. Chapter 3 addresses the second 
research question (hereafter RQ2), concerning the engagement of trade union elites in 
electoral politics. It focuses on trade union legitimacy related to political unionism and 
the different political motives behind the participation of trade union elites in electoral 
contest. Chapter 4 provides detailed empirical findings regarading trade union electoral 
strategies through a close examination of the case study of three different types of worker 
mobilisation conducted by trade unions and their elites in the 2009 and 2014 legislative 
elections. It answers RQ3 by considering the extent to which union political engagement 
has impacted the ability of trade union elites to represent their members in gaining 
political support. 
Chapter 5 discusses the empirical findings related to the unions’ structural and 
organisational constraints, which largely determine the success or the failure of the union 
candidates engaging in electoral politics (RQ4). There are four aspects discussed in this 
chapter: corrupt practices and material inequalities, the union-party alliance, union 
membership, and workers’ political identity. Chapter 6 offers an analysis of the political 
role played by elected trade union elites in local parliaments in Bekasi, Serang and Medan 
(RQ5). The discussion of the empirical data on union elite political roles is structured 
according to their representation function as members of local parliaments, particularly 
in terms of legislative and monitoring functions. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis by 
revisiting and synthesising its key arguments and findings. It also discusses the broader 
implications that this research has for an understanding of trade union politics in post-
authoritarian countries. It ends by identifying the continued significance of studying trade 






































Trade Union Politics in Post-1998 Indonesia 
 
Introduction 
This chapter reviews the development of Indonesia’s trade union politics since the end of 
Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998. It aims to understand the importance 
of democratisation in the making of trade union activism. In this thesis, trade union 
politics is understood as various modes of collective actions carried out by union actors 
and workers to seek political representation and to influence the policy-making process. 
As argued by Lee (2011: 5), trade union politics is “a matter of a democratic project where 
union actors and workers are fully immersed in contestation and negotiation for greater 
representation and influence by exploring the opportunities under the political institutions 
in flux”. The capacity of trade unions in mobilising their collective power is largely 
determined by economic structure and the characteristics of trade unions. Both of these 
factors are “potentially materialised in the interaction of opportunities and constraints 
found in the upholding political context” (Lee 2011: 12). In this regard, trade unions are 
viewed as not only economic actors but inevitably political actors that constantly interact 
and negotiate with the political conditions in which they are situated and develop (Hyman 
and Gumbrell McCormick 2010; Lee 2011; Fairbrother 2015). 
The development of trade union politics in post-1998 Indonesia is emphasised 
because there has been a surge of organised labour since the collapse of the New Order 
authoritarian regime in 1998. Along with the establishment of fundamental labour 
political rights in the first-round of Indonesia’s political reforms, trade unions in post-
1998 Indonesia have gained collective power and managed to organise and to strengthen 
their organisational capacities (Suryomenggolo 2014: 12). Furthermore, in response to 
electoral reforms, political institutions have also been reorganised to allow trade unions 
to participate freely in the political mobilisation and policy decision-making process. 
Thus, in contrast to the centralised and restrictive New Order era, post-1998 Indonesia 
has witnessed the emergence of a plurality of new civil society actors, each with their 
own particular interests that are being articulated and defended. For this reason, Mietzner 
and Aspinall (2010: 1) find that Indonesian democracy cannot be described in uniform 
and all-encompassing terms. In addition, the strength of international pressure placed 





reorganising, also appears to influence different unions’ mode of interests as well as their 
capacities for collective mobilisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia (Caraway 2015: 25). 
Analysing the political dynamics of trade unions and workers that have evolved provides 
the basis for understanding the development of trade union politics in Indonesia today as 
well as the prospect of union activism after the 2019 general elections. 
This chapter begins with a discussion of post-authoritarian trade union politics by 
reviewing the development of trade unions in several countries. This first section provides 
comparative contexts to understand trade unions in different settings and the challenges 
of adjusting their movements during periods of democratic transition and economic 
liberalisation. The next sections provide the political and historical context that explains 
the development of post-1998 trade union politics in Indonesia. The analysis is presented 
based on three aspects that crucially contributed to the development of trade union politics 
in post-authoritarian Indonesia. These three aspects are the role of trade unions in the 
ousting of the Suharto New Order regime, the labour legal reforms, and the electoral 
reforms. The chapter concludes with some general observations about the development 
of trade union politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia.  
The Context: Post-Authoritarian Trade Union Politics 
The current literature on post-authoritarian trade union politics highlights the significant 
influence of democratisation and globalisation on the development of labour movements 
in different settings (Murillo 2001; Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; Benson and Zhu 
2008; Backman and Sachikonye 2010; Juliawan 2011; Lee 2011; Caraway 2015; Lane 
2018). Democratisation and globalisation are seen as “twin epochal changes” that 
challenge the trade unions in developing their economic interests and collective 
mobilisation (Caraway, Crowley, and Cook 2015: 3). It emerged as part of the greater 
political and economic agendas of many countries to restore citizens’ fundamental 
political rights and to introduce or expand the economy in the new supposedly democratic 
governments (Juliawan 2011; Caraway, Crowley and Cook 2015).  
After years, even decades of political suppression under an authoritarian regime, 
democratisation in Eastern and Central Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia has 
created more political space for trade unions to advance their political and economic 
interests, both in the workplace and in the broader political arena. Along with the 





political parties and unions have critically shaped the nature of most trade union politics 
in those regions (Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006; Benson and Zhu 2008; Caraway, 
Crowlye and Cook 2015). Specifically, democratisation has given trade unions broader 
opportunities to develop their collective power and to participate in popular politics. 
However, it is argued that “political opportunities given by democratisation are 
outweighed by the economic constraints imposed by market liberalisation”, which has 
forced organised unions onto the defensive or pushed them into different directions 
(Caraway, Crowlye and Cook 2015: 1).  
Market liberalisation has not only restructured the economy of many countries but 
has also integrated the labour market globally by means of greater flexibility (Benson and 
Zhu 2008; Gillan and Pokrant 2009; Caraway, Crowlye and Cook 2015). In many 
countries, the fixed-term employment system has been replaced by contract and 
outsourcing based working systems which has further increased job insecurity and 
precariousness, while weakening the power base of trade unions (Tjandraningsih and 
Nugroho 2008; Anner and Caraway 2010; Amengual and Chirot 2016). Union 
membership has decreased as many workers in the manufacturing sectors lose their jobs 
due to flexibility in production and the intensification of competitive market pressure  
(Isaac and Sitalaksmi 2008; Anner and Caraway 2010). Consequently, trade unions are 
confronted by the dual challenge of advancing their interests and collective power and 
repositioning their strategies in dealing with the pressure of market reforms and economic 
liberalisation. 
Many works on post-authoritarian trade union politics have also shown that trade 
unions varied significantly in how they navigated their collective actions to develop their 
political leverage as well as to deal with economic liberalisation. A major reason for this 
variation is that trade unions in many countries entered a post-authoritarian era with 
different starting points, historical legacies, membership and ideological bases, 
organisational and mobilisation capacities, in addition to relationships with political 
parties (Cadland and Sil 2001: 34). These variation of historical, capability and relations 
of union in particular countries “considerably shapes the trajectories that union follows 
once authoritarian ends” (Caraway, Crowlye and Cook 2015: 4).  
In Central and Eastern European countries such as Poland, the Czech Republic 
and Bulgaria, the development of trade union politics is strongly affected by the legacy 





capability of unions to deal with the challenges from social and labour market reforms 
established by post-communist governments (Mainland and Due 2004; Krzywdzinski 
2010; Ost 2015). The labour market reform was part of various elaborate conditions for 
former communist countries in this region related to accession into the European Union 
(EU) membership as well as demanded by the International Labour Organisation 
(Mainland and Due 2004: 2).9  
As noted by Ost (2015: 101), after the collapse of the communist regime in the 
early 1990s, trade union leaders in Central and Eastern Europe had a difficult time 
adapting to new challenges of democratic transition and market liberalisation in which 
trade unions had little experience mobilising their members, no history of independence 
from the ruling party, and were used to having the monopoly on union representation. As 
a result, trade unions were weak in the political arena, had a lack of willingness and ability 
to negotiate their member’s interests with employers, paid little attention to new 
membership recruitment and remained suprisingly passive (Krzywdzinski 2010: 277). 
The legacy from the long history of unionism which was sponsored by and subordinated 
to the state, made trade union leaders in this region unable to cope with the changes as 
well as unable to build new foundations and consolidate their movement (Guardianchich 
2012; Grdesic 2015; Ost 2015). The legacy from the previous socialist state has meant 
“the enthusiasm connected with the transition to democracy translated seamlessly into 
enthusiasm for a market economy that left unions unprepared and uneager for the 
challenge” (Ost 2015: 101). As with what happened with the Solidarnocs in Poland, for 
instance, after the communist regime was toppled in 1989, its leaders stop playing to 
defend union rights against encroachment from the state. Instead, the Solidarnocs union 
leaders support the new government by means of working to prevent strikes, minimising 
labour activism, and providing succor for the new political leaders (Krzywdzinski 2010: 
278).  
In Latin America - for instance in Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, and 
Chile - a partisan coalition between labour-based parties and unions has strongly affected 
the development of post-authoritarian trade union politics in the region (Murillo 2001; 
Levitsky and Mainwaring 2006). The interaction between trade unions and their allied 
parties have been built in a long history, particularly since the post-war period, which 
 
9 Social and market reforms in Eastern Central Europe covers several areas related to social dialogue, health 
and safety at work, general labour law, equal opportunities for men and women, social security for 





persisted during the authoritarian regime, and even remain important influences until 
today (Bensusan and Cook 2015: 7). Several countries, such as Argentina, Mexico and 
Venezuela, re-gained significant political momentum simultaneously with important 
populist labour-based parties coming to power in the late 1980s. In these countries, 
democratisation preceded market reforms, so unions were in a stronger position to adapt 
or resist liberalisation policies (Caraway 2004: 30). In Argentina, the Peronist unions, the 
leading national labour confederation who had strong-allies during Juan Peron’s 
leadership (1946-1955), accepted the market-liberalisation reforms introduced by the 
Peronist loyalist president Carlos Menem in 1989. However, they had opposed the same 
efforts carried out by the previous non-Peronist president, Raul Alfonsin (1983-1989), as 
shown by 13 national strikes during his administration (Murillo 2001: 2). Despite the 
state’s controlling role, the partisan loyalties between the trade unions and the Peronist 
Party have enabled trade unions in Argentina to negotiate the reforms of social security, 
labour legislation and privatisation policies (Murillo 2001: 45). The Peronist legacies 
subsequently helped Argentina’s trade unions to sustain their influences even after the 
regime changed (Bensusan and Cook 2015: 8).  
A similar history of union partnership with labour-based parties is also found in 
Mexico. The Confederation de Trabajadores de Mexico (CTM), the biggest trade union 
confederation in Mexico, forged an alliance with The Partido Revolucinario Institutional 
for almost 70 years with the ruling party. This partisanship gave the CTM important 
economic and political resources, including strategic positions in political parties and 
government agencies which gave unions the power to influence the decision-making in 
both institutions (Cook 2007: 153). In contrast to Argentina however, trade unions in 
Mexico failed to sustain their political influence when the regime changed in 2000 
(Bensusan and Cook 2015: 161). 
In Africa, historically, trade unions have been active in a broad popular movement 
for indepence and liberalisation, often central in resistance of authoritarianism, and have 
been on the front-line to promote and enhance democratisation (Buhlungu 2006; 
Beckman, Buhlungu and Sachikonye 2010). The relationship between unions and party 
politics in this region is hotly contested either for the unions who supported the alliance 
with the political party or for those who stay out of politics to strengthen their political 
autonomy. In some countries, such as in the cases of Zimbabwe and Ghana, the unions 





own network and alliances against the ruling party. In these countries, most unions prefer 
to strengthen their political autonomy and develop their own street politics. The 
disengagement of unions from party politics has weakened the unions with organisational 
deficits that most union leaders in these countries were anxious to address (Beckman 
2010: 10). In South Africa’s case, such as the Cosatu (the leading South African 
confederation) the story shows a different direction from what happened in Zimbabwe 
and Ghana. The Cosatu in South Africa engaged in a triple alliance, showing that the 
unions have effectively utilised the political potential provided by these alliances. As 
noted by Pillay (2006: 187), the Cosatu in South Africa illustrates a type of political 
unionism that succesfully builds alliances with the ruling party but is still sufficiently 
autonomous to pressure government via the social movement of unionism.   
In East Asia, the political and economic development has strongly influenced the 
existence of trade union politics and its relationship to political parties. Most literature on 
the development of trade unionism in this region is distinguished into two groups of 
countries. The first group is North-East Asian democratic countries, consisting of South 
Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong which are also termed as “New Industrialised Countries” 
(NICs). In this group, except for Hong Kong, the political shifts from labour-repressive 
authoritarian rule to democratic regimes started in the late 1980s. The second group is 
South-East Asian countries; comprising of developing countries such as Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia.  
In South Korea, prior to democratisation in 1987, labour policy was subordinate 
to economic development and the military government adopted labour exclusive policy 
to support its policy on export-led industrialisation. Under this policy, trade unions were 
not considered as an important factor in industrial relations, and “disputes were dealt with 
not as labour issues but as national security issues” (Rowley and Yoo 2010: 53). Post-
1987, the economic liberalisation that soon followed political democratisation 
strengthened South Korean’s trade unions to develop new strategies for the representation 
of their members (Benson and Zhu 2008, Lee 2015). Under a newly created tripartite 
mechanism in 1998, trade unions in South Korea were involved in the various legal 
revisions of labour laws and industrial negotiations to protect labour rights and improve 
working conditions, in addition to the economic and social status of the workers (Rowley 
and Yoo 2010: 53). In democratised South Korea, the two labour organisations, the 





Unions (KCTU), were involved in a partisan coalition. The conservative FKTU continued 
to maintain its status by building a political alliance with the ruling party, whereas the 
KCTU chose a new political path to accommodate labour grievances by forming political 
alliances with other civil society organisations to an established labour-related party in 
2000, namely the Democratic Labour Party (Lee and Lim 2006; Lee 2011). Although 
unions in South Korea had political channels in the elections, most of South Korean 
workers had no interest in political representation (Lee 2015: 73). They have remained as 
electoral outsiders in most electoral democracy in post authoritarian Korea. The reason is 
largely to the failure of party and representation politics to develop as an attractive and 
programmatic political agent as well as to mediate labour interests into institutional 
politics (Lee 2015: 84,143). As a consequence, militant street-level politics still dominate 
trade union politics in South Korea today.   
In democratised Taiwan, in contrast to the South Korean experiences, the issue of 
trade unions has been highly politicised (Lee 2015: 88). Since the end of the authoritarian 
regime in 1986, the organised unions in Taiwan chose to stay on the old path by 
continuing to rely on established parties to enhance labour interests (Lee 2015: 94). The 
changing political landscape has exerted a profound impact on Taiwan’s trade unionism 
in which the political confrontation between different unions has been the inevitable result 
of elite compromise and union cooptation by party politics (Zhu 2008: 60). 
Democratisation in Taiwan has led to the development of independent and autonomous 
unions as well as a change in Taiwan’s industrial relation system, which was transformed 
from state corporatism into societal corporatism (Chen, Ko and Lawler 2003: 320). While 
labour organisations have gained political momentum under democratisation, the 
economic restructuration and market liberalisation have created new challenges for many 
unions in Taiwan (Chen, Ko and Lawler 2003: 322). These challenges include the 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, economic shift from the manufacturing sector to 
service, growing employer utilisation of flexible employment arrangements, and the 
extensive use of foreign guest workers (Chen, Ko, and Lawler 2003: 322). Consequently, 
trade union in Taiwan have experienced the downsizing of and a reduction in membership 
(Lee 2015: 36). Meanwhile, market liberalisation has affected many Taiwanese 
companies (which are characterised by small and medium size enterprises) to move to 
Mainland China and other countries in South-East Asia for cheaper labour costs or more 
competitive locations (Zhu 2008: 63). In addition, uncertainty and change in both political 





trade unions and weakened their ability to influence policy at national level and 
bargaining at industry and company levels (Zhu 2008: 73-74).  
In the South-East Asian countries of Thailand, the Philippines, and Indonesia, the 
trajectory of post-authoritarian trade union politics is generally closer to that of the post-
communist countries in Central Eastern Europe. These three countries had a long history 
of independent unions and strong ties with communist ideology, particularly during the 
pre-independence era. With the exception of Thailand, which had never experienced 
colonialisation, the first development of labour organisation in these three countries were 
inseparable from the independent movement and the spread of communist ideology 
influenced by the Communist Party (Deyo 2000; Hutchison 2015). In Thailand, for 
instance, before the 1932 coup which gave birth to a constitutional monarchy system, the 
influence of the Communist Party was strong on the emergence of the first union 
organisation in this country. Following World War II, the Communist Party in Thailand 
succeeded in establishing national trade unions, the Central Labour Unions (Tejapira 
2001: 52). Nevertheless, the communist link trade union was diminished after the anti-
left authoritarian regime in Thailand took power in 1958. In the Philippines, the 
establishment of first militant labour organisations was led by a communist group which 
carried out various protests against the neglect of labour rights during American 
colonialisation (Hadiz 2012). In the post-authoritarian era, trade unions in Thailand, the 
Philippines and Indonesia are confronted by the challenges of democratisation and 
economic liberalisation that occurred simultaneously. Nevertheless, trade unions in these 
countries have distinctive experiences in dealing with the political opportunities presented 
by democratisation, while they face the same effect from economic liberalisation, such as 
the massive replacement of permanent with casual employment and a decline in union 
membership.  
In Thailand, the modern trade union movement emerged during the period of 
1972-1991 in conjunction with rapid economic growth, following the implementation of 
government export-orientated strategy and the introduction of the first Labour Relations 
Act in 1975 (Yukongdi 2008: 221). During this period, along with the students’ 
movement and relatively stable political condition, trade unions were able to organise 
themselves as effective organisations (Yukongdi 2008: 221). However, a succession of 
military coups in 1991 followed by the removal of state-enterprise unions and the 
prohibition of the right to strike, subsequently limited the development of meaningful 





Thailand have each, over the last four decades, also placed major obstacles in the way of 
Thailand’s trade unions to build and use their organisational capacities (Brown 2016: 
211).  
In the Philippines, worker mobilisation was part of the “people power” movement 
that deposed the authoritarian regime of Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and organised labour 
was accommodated from the outset in the new Corazon Aquino administration (Boudreau 
2009). Aquino’s first labour minister was Agusto Sances, a former human rights lawyer, 
leftist sympathiser, and supporter of My First Movement (Kisulang Mayo Uno, KMU) - 
the labour centre that played an important role in the ousting of President Marcos in 1986. 
Agusto Sances was considered to be too pro-labour and was eased out within a year of 
his appointment (Hutchison 2015). Over time, however, trade unions in the Philippines 
seem to have been unable to adjust to the short-term shifting of the government and the 
return of oligarchs into the political system (Boudreau 2009: 243). Furthermore, the re-
application of the authoritarian legacy of tripartism as a means of co-opting union leaders 
and the strong support of the government to promote greater flexibility regarding 
industrial relations, rapidly narrowed and weakened the labour movement in post-Marcos 
Philippines (Ofreneo 2009; Hutchison 2015). More importantly, as the unions had no 
established party connections, they were marginalised in formal politics and continued to 
be outside the electoral mainstream (Hutchison 2015: 67). In addition, the KMU appears 
to have failed to generate labour reformist pressures. This labour organisation was split 
into two separate organisations in 1998 that further weakened unions’ consolidation. The 
combination of continued co-optation in industrial relations, the decline in union 
membership as an obvious effect of labour flexibility, and divisions among unions have 
contributed to labour weaknesses in the Philippines today (Hutchison 2015: 67).  
The broader literature on trade union politics presented above shows how trade 
unions in many countries have experienced a distinctive pathway and outcome in the post-
authoritarian era. It provides us with a perspective that is rich and comparative in 
understanding the dynamics of trade union politics from the post-authoritarian context, 
with possibilities as well as limitations introduced by democratisation and economic 
liberalisation. In contrast to working-class mobilisation in early twentieth century Europe, 
where “their interest in economic enhancement was closely tied to their political demand 
for universal enrichments” (Bartolini 2007: 29), the collective mobilisation of trade 
unions in the countries presented above differed depending on the workers’ experiences 





trade union politics in the post-authoritarian era, seeing as they are conditioned by specific 
structural and political opportunities and constraints. In the context of Indonesia, although 
trade unions emerged during the onset of the third wave of democratisation, the 
development of Indonesian trade unions in the last two decades have seen extremely 
dynamic change, particularly related to the unions’ responses to political reforms, as well 
as their relationship with political institutions and other political actors. The discussion 
in the subsequent sections provide a more detailed examination of those dynamics. 
Trade Unions in the Ousting of Suharto  
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 that caused a sudden economic collapse, mass 
demonstrations and domestic unrest is well covered in the literature explaining the main 
determinants that forced president Suharto to step-down in May 1998. As noted by 
Crouch (2010: 2), in 1997 nobody had anticipated that Suharto’s authoritarian regime had 
entered its final year. At that time, the Indonesian economy was strong, the military was 
under control and Suharto and the Golkar Party had just won their seventh consecutive 
electoral victory. Most Indonesian and political observers predicted that the leadership of 
Suharto would be succeeded by his trusted cadre from the military who would lead the 
subsequent regime unchanged (Crouch 2010: 2). Yet, within a year Indonesia’s economy 
was devastated by the economic crisis, and Suharto unexpectedly stepped down. 
Having been praised as a high performing economy by the World Bank, 
Indonesia’s economy suffered from the 1997 Asian financial crisis that caused a currency 
crisis, among other things (Dhanani, Islam and Chowdhury 2009: 9). From annual gross 
domestic product growth of nearly seven per cent between 1987 and 1997, Indonesia’s 
economy contracted to 4.7 per cent in 1997 and subsequently declined by -14 per cent in 
1998. The Indonesian currency against the US dollar underwent a dramatic devaluation 
from IDR 2,450 in June 1997 to IDR 17,000 in January 1998. As a consequence of these 
economic shocks, poverty and inflation rose substantially, many factories and businesses 
were closed and millions who lost their jobs in the formal sectors became unemployed or 
underemployed in the informal sectors (Dhanani, Islam and Chowdhury 2009). In 
September 1997, Indonesia’s government agreed to implement a rescue package imposed 
by the IMF which later hit Suharto’s patronage network and undermined the foundation 
of his regime (Crouch 2010: 23). Furthermore, the government’s decision to increase the 
fuel price in early May 1998 as part of the IMF programme, triggered mass protests lead 





student demonstration taking place at Trisakti University in Jakarta on 13 May 1998, 
massive riots ensued in the capital and other large cities, particularly in Java and Sumatra. 
For three days after these incidents, thousands of students along with civil organisations 
occupied the parliament building. In short, as described by Crouch (2010: 23), it was only 
when General Wiranto, the Commander in Chief of the armed forces at the time, 
conveyed his report to President Suharto concerning his inability to control the student 
protests, did the president decide to resign and hand over his power to vice president 
Habibie on 18 May 1998. 
 Scholars have mentioned that trade unions and workers had played a relatively 
minor part in the popular movement that brought down Suharto in May 1998 (Robison 
and Hadiz 2004; Heryanto and Hadiz 2005; Törnquist 2005). Although independent 
organising and labour protests had been on the rise for most of the 1990s (Ford 2005: 33), 
there were several conditions that caused the unions to play a minimal role in the ousting 
of Suharto in May 1998. One plausible explanation is that trade unions and workers were 
particularly “handicapped” given the large number of factory closures and work 
terminations in the formal sectors that had resulted from the financial crisis (Heryanto 
and Hadiz 2005: 265). Before 1997, unemployment rates were under four per cent, but 
they soon surged to around seven per cent at the end of 1998. In Indonesia, a one per cent 
rise in unemployment is equal to 400,000 people out of work (Dhanani, Islam and 
Chowdhury 2009). In addition, the manufacturing sector that employed the majority of 
formal workers declined by 10 per cent in 1998, which led to factory closures and work 
termination. 
A further explanation for the marginal role played by trade unions relates to the 
organisation of independent unions which were experiencing stagnation at that time, 
especially after the riots in front of the Indonesian Struggle Party (PDI) headquarters on 
27 July 1996, known as the Kudatuli incident.10 As noted by Botz (2001: 12), in the 
aftermath of the Kudatuli incident many pro-democracy activists and supporters, 
 
10 Kudatuli is an acronym for the “27 July riots”, which is also known in Indonesia as “Gloomy Saturday”. 
It was a riot involving thousands of people burning buildings and vehicles on several main streets in 
Jakarta. The riot was triggered after the military occupied the PDIP headquarters lead by Megawati and 
forcibly dissolved the free speech forum (mimbar bebas) held by several pro-democracy activists and 
Megawati die-hard supporters. At that time, the government did not recognise the results of the PDI 
congress in Medan which had elected Megawati as a chairman but supported the PDI’s leadership under 
Suryadi (formed by the government). During the riots, five people died, 149 were injured, and 136 people 





particularly from the People’s Democratic Party (PRD), were arrested by the military.11 
The arrest of Mukhtar Pakpahan, Dita Indah Sari and several other national labour leaders 
and pro-democracy activists in the aftermath of the undermined the labour movement in 
1998 (Botz 2001: 34).  
Mukhtar Pakpahan at that time was known not only as a labour lawyer but also 
the leader of the All Indonesian Labour Unions (SBSI), an independent union founded in 
1992. In 1993, he led a national strike which led to his detention and interrogation by the 
military (Pakpahan 2009: 12). In 1994, he also led a labour demonstration in the city of 
Medan, North Sumatra which led to riots and the arrest of 60 labour activists, himself 
included. He was imprisoned for ten months. Meanwhile, Dita Indah Sari was one of the 
founders of the PRD and leader of the PBBI, who were actively involved in advocating 
and organising factory workers. The PPBI and SBSI were the only two independent 
labour organisations that were actively involved in many labour strikes across Java in the 
mid-1990s (Botz 2001: 12). In early July 1996, Dita Indah Sari and two other PRD and 
PPBI activists - Mohammad Soleh and Coen Husein Pontoh - were detained by the 
military concerning allegations of their involvement in a labour protest involving around 
20,000 workers in the city of Surabaya. In late July 1996, after the Kudatuli incident, Dita 
Indah Sari and other 14 PRD and PPBI activists were imprisoned on charges of 
subversion (Botz 2001: 279). 
There were various types of popular movements that emerged in the final weeks 
before Suharto stepped down in May 1998. Unlike the student movement in Thailand, the 
Philippines, and South Korea, student groups in Indonesia in 1998 largely ruled out an 
alliance with unions and workers. As Aspinall (2004) and Crouch (2010) observed, there 
was a change in the purpose and pattern of the 1998 movement led by student activists. 
Demands for economic improvement, law enforcement, and the elimination of 
corruption, collusion and nepotism, gave way to spontaneous and unstructured 
 
11 At that time the PRD had not been recognised as a political party by the government. The PRD was 
originally an organisation called the Democratic People’s Unity founded by student activists, leaders of 
NGOs and artists who were involved in several cases of legal assistance for marginalised people and 
wanted a more democratic government. Since the mid-1990s, the PRD’s activists had been involved in 
various mass mobilisation against the New Order government, including worker protests such as those 
seen in Surabaya, Jakarta and Medan. The PRD was declared as a political party by Budiman Sujatmiko 
on 22 July 1996. In addition, the PRD was accused of trying to arouse communist ideology by the New 
Order government and was considered the mastermind of the 27 July riots which led to the murder of two 
leaders of this party. As well as this, four went missing, and the other 14 members were imprisoned. After 
the regime changed in 1998, the PRD was recognised by the government as a political party and became 






movements centred on a demand for Suharto’s resignation. Thus, confronted by a 
combination of genuine constraints posed by the detention of labour activists, rampant 
termination of work due to severe economic crises, and the lack of support from student 
groups, trade unions and workers were in a politically weakened position during the 
ousting of Suharto in May 1998. 
Labour Laws Reform and Organised Unions 
The downfall of President Suharto in May 1998 was followed by a series of political 
transformations that restored political freedoms and began to reform Indonesia’s legal 
system, including the labour laws. On 9 June 1998, within a month of his inauguration as 
the third Indonesian president, Habibie made his first international policy decision by 
ratifying ILO Convention Number87 on the Freedom of Association and Protection of 
the Right to Organise. This ratification complemented the ILO Convention Number98 on 
the Application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and to Bargain Collectively, 
which had been ratified during the Sukarno era on 15 July 1957 but had never been put 
into practice. A year later, on 7 June 1999, Habibie also ratified a further three 
fundamental ILO Conventions. These three conventions were ILO Convention Number 
105 on Abolition of Force Labour, ILO Convention Number 111 on Discrimination in 
Employment and Occupation, and ILO Convention Number 135 on the Minimum 
Working Age. The ratification of these conventions meant that Indonesia was the first 
Asian country to ratify all eight fundamental ILO Conventions (ILO 1999). 
  Habibie’s ratification of the ILO Conventions was “an expeditious way” to gain 
political support and legitimacy as well as to send a strong signal to the international 
community that the new government of Indonesia was seriously committed to the 
implementation of political reforms (Caraway 2004: 35). The decision was also 
inseparable from the denial of workers’ rights and the repressive nature of Indonesian 
industrial relations during the New Order era, which had been consistently criticised by 
the ILO and the International Confederation for Free Trade Unions (Isaac and Sitalaksmi 
2008: 44). In addition, Habibie also had no choice but to move in the direction of 
democratisation because he came to power as an “accidental” president who lacked strong 
political support “outside the discredited New Order regime” (Crouch 2010: 21). In his 
memoir, however, Habibie (2006: 57) confessed that personally he had been unhappy 





with freedom of the press, independent unions, the lifting of restrictions on the formation 
of new political parties, and the release of political prisoners.  
The ILO has played a significant role in the labour law reform process in 
Indonesia (Quinn 2003). Soon after Indonesia ratified the ILO Convention Number 87, 
the ILO’s Committee on the Application of Labour Core International Standards issued a 
strongly worded report warning the government of Indonesia to immediately reform its 
labour regulations (Caraway 2004: 37). At this time, the Habibie government was still 
operating Manpower Law Number 25/1997, a law that was rejected by trade unions 
immediately following its approval in September 1997 (Wirataman 2014: 44), and was 
heavily criticised by the ILO due to its violation of international labour standards (ILO 
1999).12 From 24 to 28 August 1998, the Indonesian government welcomed the ILO’s 
Direct Contacts Mission, which was composed of a group of experts to assist the 
government on the necessary measures to be taken on the legal and institutional reforms 
required to meet its obligations under ILO Convention Number 87 (ILO 1999: 8). After 
meetings with the ILO’s Direct Contact Mission, the Indonesian government agreed to 
conduct several immediate actions, such as delaying the operation of Manpower Law 
Number 25/1997 and preparing for reforms of its labour regulations (ILO 1999). Two 
months later, on 23 December 1998, the government of Indonesia and the ILO agreed to 
work on the Labour Law Reform Programme which was marked by the signing of a Letter 
of Intent between Fahmi Idris (Indonesia’s Minister of Manpower and Transmigration) 
and Iftikhar Ahmed (ILO Director for Indonesia) witnessed by president Habibie (ILO 
1998). Under these programmes, the government of Indonesia, assisted by the ILO, 
drafted three new labour laws that later were promulgated by parliament.13 These three 
new labour laws are known as Trade Unions Law Number 21/2000, Manpower Law 
Number 13/2003 and Industrial Relations Disputes Settlements Law Number 2/2004. 
Besides the ILO, it is important to note that labour reforms carried out by the 
Indonesian government were also part of the international design led by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Here, the Asian financial crisis that hit 
 
12   Manpower Law Number 25/1997 was enacted by President Suharto at the onset of the Asian Financial 
Crisis on 4 September 1997. This manpower law was criticised by trade unions due to its strict 
limitations on labour strikes, government control of union registration, and the introduction of contract 
labour system.   
13  Although the final decisions were in the hands of the Indonesian government, under the guise of technical 
assistance the ILO was allowed to be involved in the drafting process of new labour laws, which 
included having a direct input during the drafting process, both through the provision of detailed 





Indonesia in 1997 is an important factor that led the IMF and the World Bank to impose 
liberalisation measures on Indonesia’s economy, which later characterised the economies 
of most countries in this region. The financial crisis had undermined coalitions that 
opposed economic liberalisation but at the same time consolidated groups that support 
liberalisation (Crouch 2010: 56). As the first letter of intent with the IMF was signed by 
the Indonesian government on 31 October 1997, Indonesia’s economic recovery was tied 
by the IMF prescriptions.14 As part of the deal to receive financial loans, the government 
of Indonesia agreed to restructure its tax and monetary sectors, to pursue privatisation and 
trade liberalisation and to reform its legal system, including its labour laws.  
The IMF and the World Bank required Indonesia’s government to reform its 
labour laws as it was central to generating employment, improving the welfare and skills 
of workers, providing a stable environment for business, and to ensure that the new labour 
laws protect the rights of workers, including freedom of association and preserving a 
flexible labour market.15 In this regard, the reform of labour laws was designed to ensure 
that the establishment of three new labour laws created a balance between the application 
of labour market flexibility that supports economic liberalisation and the acceptance of 
core international labour standards required by ILO conventions (Quin 2003). In this 
sphere however, this combination is enforced differently as the IMF and the World Bank 
are well-known not for their support for the implementation of core labour standards but 
more for encouraging countries to implement flexible labour market policies (Caraway 
2010: 161). In addition, “the enforcement capacity of the IMF and the World Bank are 
far greater than the ILO” given that the former can cut off the loan imbursement and 
restrict the country from receiving financial support from other donor institutions 
(Caraway 2010: 160). 
Given that it was extensively practised by many countries in the mid-1980s, the 
policy to increase labour flexibility has “polarised industrial relations communities and 
created a rift between them” (Tjandraningsih and Nugroho 2008: 1). Those who support 
the policies that enhance labour market flexibility, particularly employers and 
economists, believe that it will create an effective work process by allowing employers 
more freedom in hiring, firing and managing the working day as well as attract more 
 
14  See Letter Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies (MEFP), Jakarta, Indonesia, 31 October 
1997. Available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/loi/103197.htm.  
15  See Indonesia and the IMF Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and 






investment and create new job opportunities. In contrast, trade unions and labour NGOs 
who strongly rejected this policy argued that the implementation of labour market 
flexibility will exacerbate workers’ social economic conditions and undermine the 
collective strength of the unions (Tjandraningsih and Nugroho 2010: 5). In the context of 
Indonesia, regulations related to labour market flexibility are adjusted according to the 
Indonesian labour market situation which is dominated by low skilled workers and still 
involves the government in its capacity as a regulator and labour inspector. As a result, 
Indonesia’s new labour laws are formulated in combination with neo-liberal labour 
policy, with provisions related to flexible labour markets (outsourcing and fixed-term 
contract systems) existing alongside protections such as minimum wage standards and 
the maintenance of tripartite cooperation between the government, employers and trade 
unions. 
The establishment of three new labour laws demonstrate the government’s 
commitment to carry out legal reforms, as required by the IMF and World Bank, although 
the existence of these new labour laws creates opportunities and challenges for both 
workers and employers (Amengual and Chirot 2016: 1065). The Trade Unions Law 
Number 21/2000 restricts government intervention in the formation of new trade unions, 
allows workers to use their rights to organise, and provides them with the basic 
democratic guarantee of collective power and collective bargaining.16 In the New Order 
era it was practically impossible to form independent unions, so the Trade Unions Law 
Number 21/2000 now allows any group of ten or more workers to form a new trade 
union.17 A minimum of five unions in five different workplaces might establish one 
federation, while three union federations in a region are eligible to form one confederation 
registered at national level.18 The law also protects union members against discrimination 
from employers and provides strong sanctions on employers who obstruct the 
establishment of a new union.19 In addition, the law designated the function of unions as 
the authorised bargaining agent in the formation of collective labour agreements at the 
shop floor level, the settlement of industrial disputes and the representation of workers in 
 
16  Both the terms Serikat Pekerja and Serikat Buruh are used in the Trade Unions Act Number 21/2000 
(literally written as Serikat Pekerja/Serikat Buruh), which reflects the differences between workers’ 
organisations as to the appropriate terminology. The use of the term Serikat Buruh was effectively 
outlawed during the Suharto era for having radical and communist connotations. In the post-
authoritarian era, many newly established unions prefer to use the term Serikat Pekerja to avoid radical 
imagery and negative connotations (Ford 2005). 
17  Government of Indonesia, Law Number21/2000 on Trade Unions, Article 5 [2]. 
18  Government of Indonesia, Law Number21/2000 on Trade Unions, Article 6 [1-2] and Article 7[1-2]. 





councils and institutions related to worker issues.20 In short, the law has given a legal 
basis for Indonesian trade unions to use their collective power to organise and to support 
their traditional objective of defending workers’ rights and interests. 
In present-day Indonesia, the number of trade unions has increased rapidly from 
only one federation in 1998 to 120 union federations and 14 union confederations in 2018 
(Ministry of Manpower 2018). Instead of strengthening or consolidating their collective 
power, the existence of the new trade union act is perceived by most trade union elites 
as a freedom to establish new unions, which causes serious problems of union 
fragmentation (Silaban 2014: 49). When disputes among union leaders in one 
organisation emerge or when new leaders replace the old leaders, the disgruntled leaders 
establish a new union by taking some of their supporters with them. The trade union 
elites are fishing in the same pond while the number of union members is decreasing. In 
2006, there were 1,237 trade unions on the shop floor level with 3,383,597 members 
registered in the Ministry of Manpower. By 2016, the number increased to 7,294 trade 
unions, but union membership decreased to a total 2,717,961 members.21 Although 
labour activists and union leaders generally recognised the need to unite their movement 
into one powerful and effective front, the acute problem of union fragmentation, in turn, 
contributed to the complexity of organising the labour movements in post-1998 
Indonesia.22 
In contrast to the Trade Unions Law Number 21/2000, whereby both trade unions 
and employers voiced minimal complaints in relation to its implementation, the 
Manpower Law Number 13/2003 is “contentious” (Amengual and Chirot 2016: 1057) 
and has become the “cornerstone of Indonesia’s labour legislation” (Manning 2010: 46). 
Of 193 articles stipulated in the Manpower Law Number 13/2003, 73 articles are highly 
debated and categorised as problematic clauses, particularly for both workers and 
employers (LIPI 2011: 9). These articles are concerned with minimum wage, severance 
payment and dismissal, strikes, fixed-term contracts and outsource working systems, and 
foreign workers. On the one hand, workers have generally benefited from the new 
formulation of minimum wages because the new manpower law uses decent living 
 
20   Government of Indonesia, Law Number21/2000 on Trade Unions, Article 25 [a-e]. 
21   Data on union membership in Indonesia is still debatable. Updated data on union membership is highly 
rely on the activity of the labour agency to carry out data collection and annual reports delivered by the 
trade union in each region.   
22   See Chapter Five for more comprehensive discussion about the problem of union fragmentation in post-





standards rather than previous measurements which used the index of minimum physical 
needs.23 Furthermore, dismissed workers are also relatively well protected because of the 
increase in the rates of severance and long-service payments. Conversely, the new 
manpower law also legalised the practice of fixed-term contracts and outsourcing that 
allow employers to recruit temporary workers based on company requirements.24 The 
practice of labour flexibility regulated in the new Manpower Law, particularly the 
outsourcing system, has transferred the basic rights attached to workers from companies 
where outsourcing workers are working for companies that supply labour.25 Here, the 
Manpower Law Number 13/2003 seems to be problematic in that the provision 
concerning hiring and firing tends to restrict employers from dismissing workers, 
although conversely it provides flexibility in terms of using fixed-term contracts and 
outsourcing workers. Apart from these problems, enforcement is weak, and employers 
routinely violate regulations regarding minimum wages, contracts and outsource working 
systems (Amengual and Chirot 2016: 1058). For instance, the minimum wage that should 
be a standard for minimum payment of salaries for less than one year working and single 
workers, in practice, has been implemented as the maximum wage, regardless of the 
length of work and status of the workers. Likewise, the implementation of outsourcing 
which should be limited only to non-core jobs, is practised in practically all types of work, 
including those jobs categorised as core jobs. In addition, to overcome the costs that must 
be incurred by the company as compensation for dismissal, contract workers are usually 
asked to resign and are then recruited again in the same position but with a working period 
of zero months (LIPI 2011: 45).26 
 During President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s leadership (2004-2014), the 
government had attempted several times to revise the Law Number 13 /2003 on 
Manpower, specifically to increase its flexibility. On 27 February 2006, President 
Yudhoyono released Presidential Instruction (Inpres) Number 3/2006 concerning the 
 
23  In 2015, President Jokowi issued Government Regulation Number 78/2015 which regulates the new 
formulation for the measurement of minimum wages. Under Government Regulation Number 78/2015, 
minimum wages are calculated based on indicators of economic growth and inflation. The issuance of 
Government Regulation Number 78/2015 is controversial because it is contrary to higher law that 
regulate minimum wages (Manpower Law Number 13/2003), so that in its implementation it is 
constantly rejected by the majority of trade unions. 
24  In practice, the implementation of flexible labour policy leads to the creation of different groups of 
workers in a company.  
25  See Government of Indonesia, Law Number 13/2003 on Manpower, Article 65 [6]. 
26  Employers may hire contract workers for up to three years (with a two-year contract and a one-year 
renewal). After the maximum contract period has ended, the employment status of contract workers will 
automatically transfer to that of permanent worker (Law Number 13/2003 on Manpower, Article 59 [4] 





Investment Recovery Policy Package which included a statement to revise the Law 
Number13/2003 on Manpower. The revision aimed to remove restrictions on the 
recruitment of workers on contracts and outsourcing practices in core business, to 
simplify restrictions concerning termination of employment and severance payment, to 
reformulate minimum wages, and to provide more flexible work permits for foreign 
workers. Prior to the issuance of this Presidential Instruction, several institutions such as 
Bappenas and Doing Business published reports stating that the rigidity of the rules in the 
Manpower Law Number 13/2003 could deter the future investment climate in Indonesia. 
In 2005, the government, under the coordination of vice-president office also appointed 
five-universities consortium to conduct research about Manpower Law Number 
13/2003.27 However, after massive labour protests and demonstrations in Jakarta during 
May-April 2006 (especially in Parliament, State Palace and Ministry of Manpower 
offices), the government’s attempt to undertake the amendment was cancelled (Antara 
News, 3 May 2006). In addition, at that time, the representatives of trade unions also 
boycotted their presence in the Tripartite Institution so that it was difficult for the 
government to negotiate its plan to revise (The Jakarta Post, 2 September 2006). In 2008, 
the Indonesian government again released a decision to revise the Manpower Law 
Number 13/2003 in response to the growing global economic crisis.28 At that time, 
attempts to revise the Manpower Law Number 13/2003 were carried out via a series of 
dialogues involving government representatives, employers and trade unions in the 
National Tripartite. However, until the deadline ahead of the 2009 presidential election, 
the plan met with failure.  
After being elected for his second term as president in 2009, Yudhoyono’s 
administration proposed revising the Manpower Law Number 13/2003 for the third time. 
In 2010, the National Tripartite, Commission IX DPR RI and Ministry of Manpower 
agreed to appoint the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) to conduct an independent 
study related to the revision of the Manpower Law Number 13/2003, exclusively specific 
articles which were considered controversial, such as minimum wage, severance pay and 
dismissal, fixed-term contracts, outsourcing, strikes, and foreign worker permits. The 
study was carried out by conducting focus group discussions (FGD) with groups of 
entrepreneurs and trade unions at national and regional levels, including FGD with 
 
27  These five-universities include: University of Indonesia, University of Gadjah Mada, University of 
Padjajaran, University of Airlangga and University of Hasanuddin.  





representation of unions of non-tripartite members and consultation with expertise from 
ILO and universities.29 Ahead of the People’s Representative Council (DPR) plenary 
session scheduled on 16 December 2011, trade unions in various cities in Indonesia 
protested and rejected the draft proposed by the government on the revision of the 
Manpower Law Number 13/2003.30 The proposed draft was considered by trade unions 
to be pro-entrepreneur, neglectful of the rights of workers, and no different from the 
previous proposal submitted by the government to the DPR on August 2006 (Sindo News, 
16 December 2011).31 On 16 December 2011, a draft of the revision of manpower law 
was rejected by the DPR in the plenary session with almost the same reasons that had 
been conveyed by trade unions and workers through street demonstrations (Antara News, 
16 December 2011).   
Problems related to the implementation of the labour laws have become 
increasingly complex, particularly since 2004, when the authority related to labour affairs 
was transferred to the district/local government under the decentralisation policy. Thus, 
much debate takes place at the district (local) level over labour issues. In the areas where 
organised unions and labour mobilisation are strong and well-consolidated, the minimum 
wage determination at the end of the year regularly emerges as a focal point for union-
government-employer contestation and frequently results in a dramatic increase. The 
minimum wages that have been set by the Wage Council can even change when the 
government is pressured by unions by way of demonstrations and protests.  
Workers mobilisation concerning minimum wages is not new in post-1998 
Indonesia, but it is growing in intensity, allowing the unions to win some victories. For 
instances, after a series of massive strikes and demonstrations in 2013, Jakarta and 
neighbouring districts experienced a large nominal of year-on-year wage increase. In 
 
29  The author also involved in this study as part of the research team member from LIPI. The result of the 
study, including LIPI’s recommendation for government’s plan to revise the Manpower Law 
No.13/2003, had been disseminated by LIPI from June to September 2011 in several meetings with 
union representations and entrepreneur groups in Jakarta, Surabaya, Batam, Makasar, and Balikpapan.  
30  In a meeting with Tripartite National members facilitated by LIPI on 30 Oktober-1 November 2011 in 
Hotel Lorin Bogor West Java, majority of Tripartite National members from trade union’s 
representations refused to involve in the formulation of position paper for the revision of Manpower 
Law Number 13/2003, instead they decided to take steps through political lobbies, including through 
engagement in electoral politics. This background later became one of the reasons and motivations for 
the author to carry out this research.  
31  At the same time, LIPI received many inquiries from trade unionists in relation to its research findings 
and recommendations submitted to the government. At that time there was growing concern among 
unionists that the government (Ministry of Manpower) ignored the recommendations that had been 






Jakarta, minimum wages increased by 47 per cent to 2.2 million IDR (US$227), in Bekasi 
by 40 per cent to 2.1 million IDR (US$221), in Bogor by 57 per cent to 2 million IDR 
(US$207), and in Subang by 57 per cent to 1.58 million IDR (US$164).  The problem 
relating to minimum wages became more compelling particularly in 2015, when the 
government released Government Regulation Number78/2015 concerning the new 
formulation of minimum wages. Under this regulation, the government replaced the 
previous formulation of minimum wages using decent living standards and based it on 
economic growth and inflation rates. In addition, Government Regulation Number 
78/2015 has also reduced the authority of the Wages Council and given full authority to 
the governor, regent and mayor to formulate the minimum wages annually. Consequently, 
issues related to minimum wages as well as the practice of flexible market are constantly 
a source of industrial conflict and have become the main obstacles in the implementation 
of labour regulations in contemporary Indonesia. 
Electoral Reforms and Political Unionism 
Electoral reform, broadly understood as the reformulation of electoral legislation to select 
government leaders and parliament members, has brought about a dramatic change in 
Indonesia’s political landscape. Although democratisation in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
involves old actors that survived the regime change, it is also accompanied by major 
changes in the political system in addition to political institutions. Given that the political 
regime changed in 1998, Indonesia has successfully conducted four consecutive 
democratic elections (1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014) involving numerous new political 
parties. Trade unions in Indonesia, as significant collective actors, have managed to 
engage in electoral contestation either by establishing labour-related parties or building 
political alliances with mainstream political parties. In this regard, democratisation in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia has not only created organised unions at industrial levels but 
also political unionism that provides meaningful channels and allies for unions to 
represent their political interests in formal politics. The following section reviews briefly 
the relationship between the electoral reforms and trade union experiences in electoral 
politics since Indonesia held its first multiparty elections in 1999. 
Indonesia’s Electoral Reforms  
Besides labour law reforms, a further remarkable political decision taken by Habibie 





electoral legislation, lifting the restrictions on the establishment of new political parties 
and ratifying new regulations concerning the composition and function of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaran Rakyat, MPR), the People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR) and the Regional People’s 
Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD). To follow up his 
decrees, Habibie agreed to hold an Extraordinary Assembly of the MPR in November 
1999, in which the MPR agreed to hold democratic elections on 7 June 1999.32  
Habibie’s decision to launch electoral reforms through a democratic election was 
crucial for Indonesia's new political order after the fall of the New Order regime in 1998. 
As noted by Crouch (2010: 43), democratisation “usually requires the drastic amendment 
of the old constitution or the drafting of a completely new one while existing electoral 
laws need to be overhauled”. Unlike in South Korea where economic reform, the rise of 
collective action of civil society organisations, affluence and prosperity led to demands 
for electoral reforms and democratisation in 1987 (Lee and Lim 2006: 307), however, 
democratic transition in post-1998 Indonesia was launched in “crises-ridden” conditions 
in which political institutions were still dominated by members of the old political 
forces.33 In these crisis-ridden conditions, “concern about national welfare, political 
stability and broad coalitions of political support tends to dominate” the decisions made 
by political elites, even if the reforms harmed the political interests of that political elite 
itself (Grindle and Thomas 1991, cited in Crouch 2010: 7).34  
These old elites had no option but to survive and to avoid the deepening of the 
political and economic crisis by adopting drastic reforms. Rather than disappear since the 
regime change, the politico-bureaucrats who occupied the state apparatus during the 
Suharto era have survived mainly due to the success of Suharto’s systematic policy of 
disorganising independent civil society groups and any form of political oppositions 
(Hadiz 2004; Törnquist 2004; Edwin 2005). They “have been able to reinvent themselves 
through new alliances and vehicles, much like they have, for example, in parts of post-
Communist Eastern Europe/Central Asia” (Hadiz 2004: 593). In addition, one particular 
 
32   Habibie’s three decrees were Law Number 2/1999 on Political Parties, Law Number 3/1999 on General 
Elections, and Law Number 4/1999 on the Composition and Function of the MPR, DPR and DPRD. 
33   During the democratic transition under President Habibie, the Golkar Party was still the largest party 
with 325 out of 500 seats in Parliament (DPR), while its military ally had 75 seats. The remaining two 
parties, the PPP and PDI, accounted for 89 and 11 seats respectively. 
34 Another category is “politics as usual reforms”, where “changes are considered desirable but the 
consequences of not acting are not considered threatening to the decision makers or the regime” (Grindle 





section of the elites- the military leadership- has retained and continued much of its 
influence in political system, thereby further reinforcing the idea that the old elites 
successfully survived in terms of the range of actors who participated and influenced the 
political reforms during the transition period.  
One of the major impacts of the electoral reforms carried out by Habibie at the 
beginning of his administration was the emergence of new political parties. Unlike the 
New Order which permitted only three parties to contest elections, the new electoral and 
political party laws enacted under Habibie’s administration allowed any political party 
that met the broad criteria to contest the 1999 elections.35 As a result, less than six months 
after he signed Law Number 2/1999 concerning Political Parties on 1 February 1999, 
there were around 180 political parties registered in the Ministry of Justice.36 This 
situation was inevitable given the strong pressure to open the tap for wider political 
participation especially by civil society groups that were previously oppressed under 
Suharto’s leadership. Nonetheless, the sudden increase of political parties raised concerns 
from various parties vis-à-vis the possibility of political instability, in the form of conflicts 
of interest and ideology, as transpired in the multi-party system during the Sukarno era 
between 1950-1959 (Subekti 2004: 249). At the end, of the 107 political parties registered 
during administrative qualification, 48 were qualified to participate in the 1999 election. 
Subekti (2004: 256) categorised these 48 political parties into three big groups: religious 
parties such as the Islamic Party, the Star Moon Party, the Ka’bah Party, the Catholic 
Democratic Party, and the National Christian Party; nationalist parties such as the 
Indonesia Democratic Struggle Party, the Functional Groups Party , the National Mandate 
Party, the National Awakening Party, and the Indonesian National Party; and 
pragmatically self-interested political parties such as the Indonsian Workers’ Party, the 
Fisherman and Farmer Party, and the People’s Economic Party. The emergence of Islamic 
parties and the old parties in the Sukarno era (such as the Murba Party, the Indonesian 
Nationalist Party and the Indonesian Islamic Party) in the 2009 elections, showed that 
they were still able to survive after 32 years of depoliticisation under the Suharto regime. 
The 1999 elections provided a foundation for more democratic elections in 
Indonesia. This condition can be seen from the approval of the amendment of the 1945 
 
35  One of the conditions for political parties to participate in the 1999 elections was to have a board of party 
representatives in half of the total number of provinces and in half of the total number of 
districts/municipals registered in each province (Article 39 of Law Number 2/1999 on Political Party). 
36  Article 2 of Law Number 2/1999 on Political Party stated that the formation of political parties can be 





Basic Constitution and the implementation of the second package of electoral reforms by 
elected members of parliament from the 1999 elections. Prior to the 2004 elections, 
parliament agreed to the provision of a new political party (Law Number 31/2002), a new 
electoral law with direct presidential elections (Law Number 23/2003), and the 
amendment of the Basic Constitution concerning parliamentary authority and the 
limitation of the president and vice president to two five-year terms.37 This attempt was 
“a landmark in the reform of Indonesia’s political institutions” (Crouch 2010: 35).  
According to Aspinall (2005: 119), “the elections of 2004 brought to an end the 
transition period in Indonesia’s politics that began in 1998”. The 2004 elections not only 
produced a president and vice president based on people’s choices, but also a more 
democratic election through the establishment of the electoral commission (KPU) with 
independent members from outside of the government and political parties.38 After the 
2004 elections, efforts to reform the electoral system in Indonesia were also carried out 
via the introduction of direct elections for the governor (province) and mayor/regent (city/ 
district) in 2005 along with the enactment of the second revised Law Number 32/2004 
concerning Regional Autonomy. 
In the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections, as have been practiced since the first-
multiparty election in 1999, a new electoral system was established but with more far-
reaching reforms. The electoral system changed from a closed-proportional to open-
proportional system. This new system effectively invalidated the closed party list system 
whereby the legislative candidates were elected in the order in which they were ranked 
on a party’s list of legislative candidates regardless of the numbers of votes they 
themselves had received. Instead, in the open proportional system the seats were to be 
allocated on the basis of the number of votes for the individual nominee. Consequently, 
each candidate has an equal chance to be elected regardless of his placement in the ballot 
list. This modification further changed electoral strategies conducted by political parties 
in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections, particularly relating to political campaigns and 
 
37   For example, “the President has the authority to submit the laws with the agreement of the DPR” was 
changed to “the President has the right to submit bills to the DPR” (see Article 5 Amendment of Basic 
Constitution 1945). 
38  Based on the evaluation of Freedom House (2009), since the 2004 elections, the score of Indonesia’s 
political rights and civil liberties consistently improved from 3.4 in 2004 to 2.3 in 2006. Previously, the 
score was 7.5 in 1997 and had improved to 4.4 in 1998. Freedom House uses a score of one for most 
free and seven for least free on each scale to measure the level of democratisation in each country. 
Furthermore, Indonesia has been categorised as a free country since 2006. In 2008, Indonesia’s political 
rights and civil liberties scores were the same as (2.3) other emerging democratic countries, such as 





the recruitment of legislative candidates (Ramdansyah 2009; Subekti 2015). Mass rallies, 
traditionally a prominent future of an election campaign, have been largely dropped and 
replaced by the adoption of voter-focused campaign activities (Ulla and Gwenael 2015: 
145). Each legislative candidate has their own constituent to focus on as well as the 
success team, and further increased the rivalry between candidates nominated by the same 
party (Ramdansyah 2009: 58). At the same time, political parties started to recruit non-
party cadres as legislative candidates to gain optimum votes from potential voters. These 
non-party cadres generally have strong political resources, either financial such as from 
businesses, or mass support such as from religious and community leaders or members 
of civil organisations such as trade unions (Detmann and Pepinsky 2017: 124).39 
Union Electoral Engagement 
Despite its minimum role in the popular movement that brought down the Suharto New 
Order regime in May 1998, trade union elites soon managed to engage in the first multi-
party election in 1999. They advanced in electoral politics using four different labour-
linked parties that formed in the initial years after the fall of Suharto. Muchtar Pakapahan, 
Imam Sudarwo, Saleh Said Harahap, Dedy Hamid, and Rasyidi were among those union 
elites who had embraced new opportunities for political engagement in the first multi-
party election in 1999 (Ford 2008: 68). With the exception of Mochtar Pakpahan, these 
elites came from different sections of the national leadership of the All-Indonesian Trade 
Unions (SPSI). They formed three separate labour parties: the Workers Solidarity Party 
(Partai Solidaritas Pekerja, PSP), the Indonesian Workers Party (Partai Pekerja Indonesia, 
PPI), and the All-Indonesian Workers Solidarity Party (Partai Solidaritas Seluruh Pekerja 
Indonesia, PSPSI).  
The participation of SPSI’s senior figures in the 1999 elections evoked suspicion of 
their true political motives, whilst their participation was opposed by many other union 
leaders and labour activists at that time (Törnquist 2004; Caraway 2008; Ford 2014). This 
negative reaction was widespread, including from within the SPSI itself.40 Among these 
 
39  As noted by Mietzner (2007: 239) in the 2004 elections, 39.8 per cent of all national elected parliament 
members had a background in business; while Detmann and Pepinsky (2017: 124) found that in 2014, 
56 per cent had a background in business. In addition, Detmann and Pepinsky (2017) also found that 
from 6606 legislative candidates running in 2014 legislative election, the fifth highest proportion came 
from private backgrounds (56.3 per cent), followed by academics (21.5 per cent), bureaucrats (15.9 per 
cent), parliament members/incumbent (14.4 per cent), and civil society actors (10.2 per cent). 
40   Interview with Syaiful DP, chairman of FSP KEP KSPI and one of the founders of KSPI Reformasi, 





dissidents were a group of unionists who formed the Federation of Indonesian Labour 
Unions (FSBI) in the late 1970s but then joined the SPSI in the 1980s and formed FSPSI 
Reformasi after the new trade unions law was enacted in 2000.  
As pointed out by Törnquist (2004: 388), in the immediate years after the fall of 
Suharto, various groups of progressive labour activists wanted to become as independent 
as possible from the state-controlled union (SPSI), old union bosses and their various 
external patrons. They remained opposed to forming alliances with political parties, 
including four labour-political parties that participated in the first multiparty election in 
1999 (Törnquist 2004: 389). “They did not see any relationship between struggles in the 
workplace and those over politics” (Törnquist 2004: 392). Moreover, the fact that there 
were Golkar Party loyalists among the parliament candidates claiming to represent labour 
aroused suspicions among labour activists that unions were being used as a political 
vehicle to keep the old guard of Suharto-era elites in power. For instance, the head advisor 
of the PSPSI was Ibnu Hartomo, the younger brother in-law of Suharto’s wife, Fatimah 
Tien Hartinah.  
In the 1999 election, suspicion and rejection from union leaders and workers were 
not only addressed to the SPSI figures who were known to be exceedingly close to the 
authorities during the New Order era - but also to reformist figures, such as Pakpahan, 
who opposed the New Order regime. While Pakpahan announced the establishment of a 
workers-based party which he named the National Labour Party (Partai Buruh Nasional, 
PBN), this announcement sparked protests and widespread rejection from labour activists 
and unionists, some of whom were from the SBSI itself. They questioned Pakpahan’s 
motives and even accused him of using workers and the labour movement for personal 
political reasons (Ford 2005: 202). Pakpahan acknowledged that his decision to establish 
a political party could be interpreted differently amidst unpredictable political 
conditions.41  
According to Pakpahan, the suspicion and rejection were based on the following 
facts. First, he was chosen to lead the SBSI, not to establish a new political party. The 
SBSI was initially established to focus its struggles on high profile issues such as union 
recognition and worker rights, to organise a strike when necessary and reject a direct 
political role for unions. It was also to fill four basic union principles that did not exist in 
the New Order era SPSI union. These four basic principles are democracy, non-
 





discrimination, solidarity, and independence. According to Pakpahan, the principle of 
independence was misunderstood by many trade unionists as well as workers.42 In the 
interview he suggested that: 
Independence does not mean that trade unions should not engage in 
formal politics. Alliances with other societal and political forces, 
including political parties, is necessary. However, in every alliance of 
this type, the question must be, which one is the independent party. 
The crucial issue is whether trade unions determine what programmes 
are to be implemented, or they risk being subservient to party 
politics.43  
 
Second, many labour activists and unionists in Indonesia were strongly influenced 
by the socio-economic definitions of trade unionism that were established and 
institutionalised throughout Suharto’s 32 years in power, when anti-political unionism 
rhetoric was rife. Simultaneously, however, particular labour activists worried about the 
emergence of pro-Golkar elites in the labour movement who were seeking political 
advantages amid the turmoil of the transition in 1998. Third, the main target of activists 
and protestors during the large-scale demonstrations in May 1998 was Suharto. When he 
was overthrown, divisions emerged among activists, particularly in relation to their 
political position in the transitional government under President B.J. Habibie. Fourth, and 
perhaps most significantly, Pakpahan’s initial political reason for forming the labour-
related party was to prevent the re-grouping of New Order elites after the fall of Suharto, 
principally from the Golkar Party and its alliances.44 In his own words, “the PBN was 
initially founded as a result of the political demands at that time, and the argument that 
evolved was that labour participation in politics was indispensable to Reformasi”.45  
In the 2004 legislative elections, the Social Democrat Labour Party (PBSD) was 
the only labour party among 24 political parties that passed the verification stage and was 
able to contest the election. This party is not a new labour party; it is the reconstruction 
of the Pakpahan’s PBN which failed to reach the two per cent electoral threshold in the 
1999 general elections. In contrast to the 1999 elections, where union cadres and labour 
activists dominated the parliamentary candidate nominations of the PBN, in the 2004 
election, the newly formed PBSD recruited candidates from different socio-economic 
 
42  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017. 
43  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017. 
44  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017 





backgrounds, for instance academics, religious figures, community leaders, and even 
candidates from the private sector. Although the PBSD attracted more votes than the PBN 
in the 1999 elections, it still failed to win seats in the national parliament. Nevertheless, 
in the local elections, the PBSD managed to gain 22 seats in various districts mostly in 
the North Sumatra where many of the founding members of PBSD came from. 
Table 2.1: Labour-related Parties’ Vote Gains in the 1999, 2004, and 2009 Legislative 
Elections 
1999 2004 2009 













Total 286,475  636,397  1,011,828 
% of Nat. Votes 0,31  0,56  0,97 
Source: Electoral Commission (KPU). 
Why did the PBSD in the 2004 elections and the Labour Party in the 2009 
elections failed to get significant votes, even to pass the parliamentary threshold? The 
reasons are complex. There were negative reactions from unions and workers that 
opposed the involvement of union elites in electoral politics, as well as intense and 
ongoing debates about the role of unions in electoral politics.46 However much of the 
problem lies with the parties themselves. They were perceived to represent the narrow 
interests of elites or their respective organisations rather than being a united party 
representing various trade unions (Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 2015: 1310). Moreover, 
the PBN (1999), PBSD (2004) and Labour Party (2009) have been considered to have 
poor political communication with union leaders, both from inside and outside of SBSI, 
and tends to be controlled by its founder, Muchtar Pakpahan.47 
Pakpahan, has his own views about the failure the Labour Party in the 2009 
elections. Given that the Indonesian working class were still inherently curious about 
supporting union activists in the elections and had little understanding of the union elite 
regarding the importance of the union-party alliance, anti-leftist sentiment was still 
prevalent in the 2009 elections. Pakpahan claims to regret that there were various efforts 
 
46 For a more comprehensive discussion on ongoing debates about the role of unions in the legislative 
elections see Chapter Three. 





to hamper the participation of the Labour Party in the 2009 elections, such as “anti-kafir” 
(non-Muslim) and “anti- leftist” campaigns which were directed against legislative 
candidates, political threats to voters who would join or attend the Labour Party 
campaigns, restrictions on air transportation access for Pakpahan to campaign 
(particularly in Papua), and fraud during votes recapitulation for the  Labour Party. 
In the 2009 general election, trade union engagement in electoral politics reached 
another significant milestone in the post-authoritarian era. Union elites did not only use 
labour political parties as a strategy to engage in electoral politics, they also started 
building political alliances with non-labour political parties.48 The implementation of an 
open proportional electoral system required popular candidates as vote-winners. Thus, 
several major political parties, such as the Golkar, PDIP, PAN, PKS, and Gerindra began 
approaching the central executive of major unions to establish political contracts under 
which union candidates were nominated in exchange for member’s votes (Ford 2014: 
344). For example, Said Iqbal, the president of FSPMI, was among unionists that began 
to participate in the 2009 legislative elections under non-labour parties. He ran for a 












48  Two labour-linked parties that participated in the 2009 elections were the Labour Party (PB) and the 
Indonesian Entrepreneur and Workers Party (Partai Pengusaha dan Pekerja Indonesia, PPPI). The 
Labour Party replaced the older two parties founded by Muchtar Pakpahan, the PBSD and the PBN, as 





Table 2.2: Union Legislative Candidates in National and Provincial Levels in the 







Irwan Abdullah FSPMI Vice-president of FSMPI PKS National 
Purwanto FSPMI Head of FSPMI East Java PKS National 
Bambang 
Wirahyoso 
SPN Former chairman of SPN PKS National 
Djoko Suryanto SPN Vice-chairman of SPN PBB National 
Baso Rukman SPN Head of SPN Central Java PKS National 
Tgk Syaiful Mar Aspek Head of Aspek DI Aceh PBB National 
Anggawira PB PGRI Head of PB PGRI West Java Gerindra National 
Rustan FSPMI Vice-president of FSPMI PDIP Provincial - West Java 
Toriyani FSPMI Member of FSPMI East Java PDIP Provincial - East Java 
Darmo Juwono FSPMI Head of FSPMI Riau Islands Hanura Provincial - Kepri 
Lilis Mahmudah SPN Vice-chairman of SPN PKS Provincial - Banten 
Soeparno SPN SPN Central Java PDIP Provincial - Central Java 
Siti Kahiroh SPN Head of SPN Jogyakarta PKB Provincial - Jogyakarta 
Fery Nurzali KEP KSPI Vice-chairman of KEP KSPI Gerindra National  
Idin Rosidin KSBSI Former leader at KSBSI Gerindra National 
Rekson Silaban KSBSI Former Chairman of KSBSI DPD National 
Source: Data from KSPSI, KSPI and KSBSI and Electoral Commission (KPU). 
In addition to union leaders, several well-known anti-Suharto activists with 
student, peasant and labour credentials during the Suharto era also came close to non-
labour parties to participate in the 2009 legislative elections, notably Dita Indah Sari and 
Budiman Sujatmiko. Dita Indah Sari is a law student from University of Indonesia who 
took the lead in organising several student demonstrations and labour protests in the last 
decade of the Suharto era (Botz 2001: 239). She was among 14 PRD activists who were 
detained by the military regime under Suharto after the Kudatuli incident in 1996 on 
charges of subversion (Botz 2001: 279). In 2003, she established a leftist-populist party, 
the People’s United Opposition Party (POPOR), supported by several former PRD 
activists as well as student, peasant and independent labour groups. However, the party 
was disqualified by the Ministry of Law and Human Rights and so failed to participate in 
the 2004 elections. In the 2009 elections, Dita was nominated as a national legislative 





to her nomination in the 2009 elections, she had actually tried to establish another new 
political party called the National Liberation Party of Unity (PAPERNAS). However, this 
party was constantly so opposed and harassed by religious groups and youth organisations 
that it eventually decided to disband.49 While Budiman Sujatmiko, having abandoned his 
party (PRD) that had raised his popularity, moved to the PDIP in 2008 and he was 
nominated as a national legislative candidate in the 2009 elections. The decision of these 
former leftist activists to join mainstream parties in the 2009 elections emphasizes the 
shift of mindset of labour activists in post-Suharto Indonesia toward electoral politics 
which tends to be pragmatic amidst the lasting anti-leftist sentiment and new political 
opportunities offered by electoral democracy. 
The strategy of some union elites to build political alliances with parties continued 
in the 2014 legislative elections. Several high-profile union leaders were nominated for 
national, provincial and local levels. Hence, when all 12 political parties started to 
approach union leaders to represent them as parliamentary nominees, many of the 
unionists were more open to the idea than they had been in the previous three general 
elections. At the confederation level, for example, the SPSI officially remained neutral in 
electoral politics, though did not prevent members from declaring their candidacy in the 
2014 legislative elections.50 Similarly, the KSBSI, despite disassociating itself from the 
Labour Party in the 2009 election, allowed its cadres to participate in the 2014 elections.51  
Of the 73 union candidates who run for legislative election in the 2014 elections, 
53 participated in local elections. This is a sharp increase compared to the 39 union 
candidates competing locally in the 2009 elections. The 53 union legislative candidates 
were spread across five districts and municipals in four provinces, with the majority being 
based in Java. The Bekasi and Serang districts dominated the number of nominations, 
with eight and six candidates respectively. These two districts are the main base of two 
progressive union federations under the KSPI, the FSPMI and SPN. A large number of 
union candidates competing at district levels is part of the union strategy to gradually 
place their best cadres in parliament, starting from the lowest level in the hope that 
 
49 As reported in Detiknews (29 March 2007), about 500 people from the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) 
and Betawi United Forum (FBR) gathered in front of Tugu Proklamasi in Central Jakarta to block and 
dissolve the declaration of Papernas that would be held on that day at 3pm. In this action, the protesters 
unfurled various banners which opposed the establishment of a new party by former PRD supporters, 
such as ‘Papernas = New Style of Communists, Disband and Destroy’; ‘Say No to New Style of 
Communism’; and ‘Get Rid of Communism’. 
50  Interview with Abdullah, chairman of FSP KEP SPSI, Jakarta 8 September 2016. 





someday they will be successful at provincial and national levels.52 This strategy has also 
been implemented by unions as part of a political learning by doing process to build 
political education among union members and workers in general.53 In this regard, leaders 
of Indonesia’s trade unions took a relatively different path compared to general unions in 
many countries which usually build political partisans based on common ideology or 
particular political interests (Lee 2011; Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010; 
Fairbrother 2015). This fact certainly raises questions regarding their political motives 
and the purpose of establishing a union-party alliance involving many political parties. 
This issue will be discussed further in the subsequent chapters including unions’ electoral 
strategies, the determinant factors that affect the success and the failure of unions’ 
participation in legislative elections, as well as the role of elected union elites in policy-
decision making. 
Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the development of trade union politics in post-1998 Indonesia. 
Particular attention is given to the impact of political reforms launched by new democratic 
governments since the collapse of the Suharto authoritarian regime in May 1998. This 
chapter has demonstrated that economic crises and demands to reform its legal system 
(particularly related to labour rights and democratic elections) during the first wave of 
democratic transition played a significant role in the development of Indonesia’s trade 
union politics.  International pressure from the ILO, IMF and World Bank played a key 
role in the design of three new labour laws that further contributed to the complexity of 
trade union development in post-1998 Indonesia. Indonesia’s trade unions face the same 
challenges as general unions in many countries whose labour markets are globally 
integrated, and unions are weakened due to the decreasing number of members. However, 
major changes in the new Trade Unions Law Number 21/2000 have created a new 
industrial environment in which workers can use their basic rights to organise, defend 
their interests through collective bargaining, optimise their collective mobilisation by way 
of massive labour demonstration and protests, and even put pressure on governments to 
halt policy that hinders workers’ interests. In some actual cases, such as in the 
 
52  Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 23 September 2016. 
53  Interviews with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016; Interview with Maxi 





determination of minimum wages, organised unions have managed to balance power 
relations between employer groups and the government. 
This chapter has also highlighted the crucial influence of the electoral reforms on 
the emergence of political unionism in post-1998 Indonesia. Democratic elections have 
given trade union leaders broader political opportunities to optimise their collective 
power and compete in electoral contestation. Several modes of electoral participation 
have been developed by Indonesia’s trade union elites, although structural and 
organisational challenges hindered their electoral performance.  In spite of their defeat, 
trade union elites in Indonesia understandably still need to learn how to build effective 
electoral strategies and to gain trust and the votes of their main electoral constituents: the 
workers. As will be shown in the subsequent chapters, the success of several union leaders 
elected as legislative members in the 2009 and 2014 local legislative elections provide 
valuable lessons for the future of trade union’s political and electoral engagement in 






















 Trade Union Electoral Legitimacy 
 
Introduction  
This chapter explores the debate that has emerged among trade unionists and labour 
activists concerning the engagement of trade union elites in electoral politics in post-
authoritarian Indonesia. It aims to address the following research question: why do trade 
union elites engage in electoral politics, and how do they seek to legitimise this 
engagement? There are three important reasons why attention to trade union electoral 
legitimacy is important for understanding trade union politics in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia. First, the dynamic of non-elite participation in electoral politics is still 
understudied, particularly concerning trade union elites (Nyman 2006; Beittinger-Lee 
2010; Choi 2011). Much of the attention paid to Indonesia’s electoral reform has been 
focused on the roles of the state, political parties and political elites (Dagg 2007; Ufen 
and Bunte 2009).  
Second, an analysis of how the trade unions interpret their role and function in 
electoral democracy is instrumental in understanding the impact of democratic reform on 
the Indonesian labour movement. Trade unions are popular organisations which represent 
the interests of a segment of society in its daily economic and political struggles. They 
have potential mass support, with members, sympathisers and organisational networks 
going beyond the limitations of ethnicity, religion and even national borders (Nyman 
2006: 67). As stated by mainstream political literature, democratisation cannot result in 
democracy itself without a balance of power between civil society element and the state, 
and among the classes within the society (Alagappa 2004; Beittinger-Lee 2010; Mietzner 
2014). With specific regard to the current political conditions in Indonesia, where acute 
imbalances are present in the power relations, civil society organisation such as organised 
labour are expected to play an important role in the effort to reign in the balance of power, 
to challenge elitism, to expand political representation and to mobilise urban workers 







The third reason for studying electoral legitimacy is historical. During Suharto’s 
thirty-two years in power, trade unions did not engage in genuine collective bargaining 
and were depoliticised. Under the single union policy, the All Indonesian Trade Union 
(SPSI) was introduced, just like any other functional group in the state’s corporatist 
structure, in order to maintain close institutional ties with the New Order electoral 
machine, the Golkar Party (Ford 2005; Hadiz 2010). Some scholars have noted this 
historical reason as one of the significant determinants that discouraged trade union elites 
in Indonesia from taking advantage of the political opportunities offered after the 1998 
reforms (Törnquist 2004; Hadiz 2010), maintaining the dominance of old union elites in 
organisational union structures, as well as the widespread emergence of business-based 
unions from legacy unions (Caraway 2008; Tjandra 2016). This condition was mirrored 
in the influence of the employers’ attitudes towards industrial relations, as they had tended 
to enjoy government protection and privilege during the New Order era. Although the 
new labour law guaranteed the rights of workers to establish independent unions, in 
practice, anti-union sentiment was still apparent in employers and later resulted in low 
numbers of workers taking up union membership (Ratna 2009; Caraway 2011; Juliawan 
2015). Despite these challenges, recent developments indicate that trade unions are not 
only orientated towards what would be expected of them in other democracies, such as 
collective bargaining, but are also trying to redefine their political role. Such a trend can 
be seen in the increasing involvement of trade union elites in the last two legislative 
elections. 
Contextualising the engagement of trade unions in post-New Order electoral 
politics has led to academic debates regarding the nature of civil society movements in 
Indonesia and the extent to which contemporary politics is dominated by oligarchic 
interests (Robison and Hadiz 2013; Juliawan 2014; Winters 2013; Caraway, Ford and 
Nugroho 2015). Some scholars such as Robison and Hadiz (2013) and Winters (2014) 
argue that political power is still in the hands of the same group of powerful actors who 
held it during the Suharto era. Democratisation will always be obstructed or even 
prevented as long as the structure of oligarchy remains in place (Winters 2014: 94). Thus, 
democratic reforms demanded by individuals or groups such as trade unions “can only be 
piecemeal” (Robison and Hadiz 2013: 54). On the other hand, some suggest that 
Indonesian politics is progressing because democratic institutions have been consolidated 
and the involvement of a wider range of actors is producing diverse political outcomes 





of the labour movement in Indonesia to engage in electoral politics is proof that the 
working class is an important political force that can have an impact on the Indonesian 
political landscape. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first provides the 
characteristics and typology of post-1998 Indonesian trade unions. It aims to provide 
background information related to the challenges faced by Indonesian trade unions in the 
new democracy, as well as the extent to which the development of union organisations 
and political conditions are influencing the political orientation of union elites. Two 
subsequent sections analyse the organisational and individual levels of union elites and 
how they are justified, and the political motives behind the candidacy of union elites in 
electoral politics. As my research examines local level elections in detail, it is necessary 
to assess these dynamics, establishing for instance, why the majority of union elites seek 
political careers, particularly at sub-national levels far from the country’s centre of power.   
Post-1998 Indonesian Trade Unions: Characteristics and Political Orientation 
The fall of Suharto in May 1998 signified not only regime change in Indonesia but also 
the birth of various civil organisations, including trade unions. Together with students, 
NGO activists, religious and community leaders, and other civil society groups, trade 
unions in Indonesia have not only fought for worker interests but also have managed to 
be part of the pro-democracy movement, fighting for political reforms and the 
improvements of Indonesia’s economic, social and political development (Nyman 2006; 
Mietzner 2013). The Indonesian labour movement post-1998 has taken many forms, from 
strengthening collective power in low level workplaces, to doing the same in local, 
provincial and national tripartite institutions; from lock-outs or strikes to street 
demonstrations; and from lawsuits to political lobbying and engagement in policy 
making-processes in parliamentary departments.  
Despite all the potential offered by the post-1998 political reforms, at least in the 
short to medium term, Indonesian trade unions are confronted by several challenges. The 
first is strengthening their collective bargaining power; the second is developing a 
consolidated movement; and the third is ensuring their interests are represented in policy-
making. These challenges, as will be discussed, raise concerns regarding the future 





Union’s Organisational Characteristics  
Discussion of labour organisation in post-1998 Indonesia is often characterised by the 
following three main features. First, most trade unions are vulnerable to fragmentation 
and elite factionalism, which has intensified in response to the recognition of the right to 
form independent unions (Törnquist 2007; Tjandraningsih 2007; Caraway 2015; Tjandra 
2016). Since the approval of ILO Convention Number 87 in 1998, and following the 
establishment of Trade Union Law Number 21/2000, dozens of new trade union 
federations have been registered in the Ministry of Manpower and hundreds of local 
unions have been created at plant level.54 The establishment of the new labour law in 2000 
provided Indonesian workers with the right to establish two kinds of workers’ 
organisations: trade unions both within and outside enterprises. It also provides workers 
with the right to establish three different levels of union organisation: confederations of 
unions, federations of unions, and shop floor-level trade unions. In addition, it does not 
forbid the establishment of new federations not affiliated with union confederations at the 
national level, nor the establishment of shop floor-level unions with no union federation.  
Second, trade unions have also taken many different forms, structures and 
orientations. Unions are established across political spectrum which is co-exist side by 
side. They have distinctive organisational orientations from “conservatives” who seeks to 
maintain good relationships with both the government and employers, to “moderates” 
who seek only membership and representation in workplaces, and “radicals”  who want 
real economic, social and political change (Botz, 2001: 166). A combination of the four 
different types commonly used to categorise unions also can be found in the post-1998 
Indonesian labour movement. They comprise: general unions, enterprise unions, craft 
unions, and industrial unions (Mizuno, Tjandraningsih and Herawati 2007: 17).  
 Third, the rights which unions aim to defend are exclusive, mostly revolving 
around workers’ welfare issues, such as the establishment of a minimum wage; the 
removal of the practices of outsourcing and unilateral termination of employment; the 
implementation of social security programs; and improvements in working conditions. 
Alliances with other civil organisations and other marginal groups, such as farming and 
fishing associations, are still underdeveloped. Even if there are efforts to build alliances 
with these interest groups, they are usually unsustainable and inherent in the labour 
 






movement (Tjandraningsih 2007: 6). However, recent observation of organised unions 
indicates a positive trend in their concern regarding public interests. Unions and workers 
have been actively involved in several national demonstrations against government 
policies, such as increases in fuel prices, reductions in electricity subsidies, the tax 
amnesty scheme, corruption, and coastal reclamation.55  Since the last decade, trade 
unions in several regions have also established regional links by building inter-union 
alliances. As noted by Tjandra (2016: 134), there were at least fifteen regional union 
alliances established across four provinces on the island of Java in 2012. Most of these 
were established in union-dense industrial areas. They were established as part of the 
unions’ new strategy to strengthen their bargaining position collectively at the local level, 
particularly when dealing with local government authorities, when they may be making 
demands regarding the same issue. This new trend of inter-union alliances and wider 
networks has been developed due to the closeness of their core labour issues and the 
strength of communication and trust between union elites, which is often inherited at the 
local level.  It is also related to the failure of national union leadership to work with unions 
at the local level due to the ineffectiveness of peak organisations in performing their 
umbrella duties (Tjandra 2016: 129).    
Union’s Political Orientation 
Despite the increasing trend of union elite candidacies in the 2009 and 2014 legislative 
elections, including the appearance of several union alliances to support candidacies in 
both presidential (2014) and local elections (2017), it is difficult to determine precisely 
the current situation of trade unions’ political orientation. Currently, there is no updated 
precise analysis of trade union in Indonesia related to this issue. Mizuno, Tjandraningsih 
and Herawati (Akatiga) published a directory of Indonesian trade unions in 2007. This 
publication provides information about the profile of 90 trade unions, such as their 
historical backgrounds, structures, programs, recruitment systems, funding, relationships 
with NGOs and international institutions, and views on key labour issues (such as the 
freedom to organise, wages, working systems, strikes, industrial courts, political interest, 
and labour laws).  
 
55  See for example, Reuters, 29 September 2016, “Thousands of workers against tax amnesty”; Koran 
Perjuangan, 31 May 2017, “Apa yang Salah jika KSPI Memperjuangkan Isu Guru, Korupsi, 
Penggusuran, dan Reklamasi”? (What’s wrong if KSPSI is protesting against issues related to teachers, 





           Below is a brief description of trade union political orientation based on interviews 
with several trade unionists in confederations and federations and at plant level during 
my fieldwork from August 2016 to January 2017, as well as information from the few 
related studies available. It aims not only to provide analysis related to union 
legitimisation regarding engagement in electoral politics but also to provide background 
information related to the analysis in the sub-sections that follow.   
Based on political orientation, post-1998 Indonesian trade can be divided into five 
different categories. The first is the legacy unions. Caraway (2008: 1372) defines legacy 
unions as “state backed unions inherited from the previous non-democratic regime”. Their 
existence in post-authoritarian government mostly depends on “retaining state support” 
and “holding on to existing members”, not developing new organising” (Caraway 2008; 
1373-75). In post-authoritarian Indonesia, legacy unions are associated with the 
Confederation of All-Indonesian Workers’ Unions (KSPSI). 
The KSPSI was registered as a confederation in 2002 and supported by 17 sectoral 
sections of the union federations. The KSPSI is a continuation of the SPSI, which 
restructured in 1998 following internal conflict between two groups within the FSPSI 
body. The FSPSI was established in 1973 and was the only single union recognised under 
an exclusionary model of corporation adapted during Suharto regime (1968-1998). Its 
establishment was part of Suharto’s political strategy to disband the powerful 
Communist-linked unions and to force the remaining non-Communist ones into a single 
union (Hadiz 1997; Ford 2009). At the beginning of its establishment, the KSPSI claimed 
to have 4.8 million members spread across 31 provinces, 432 districts and municipalities, 
and 13,655 companies/factories (Pusdatin 2017).  
Like the legacy unions in Mexico and Russia, the KSPSI survived after the regime 
change in 1998 and has continued to hold on to power due to its privileges and inherited 
institutional and legal advantages over other new unions (Caraway 2008: 1378). Among 
KSPSI’s inherited advantages are: its high level of membership, which is due to its 
monopoly during the Suharto era; office facilities provided by the government; and its 
position in the union’s tripartite bodies at national, provincial and district levels.  
Another factor that helps KSPSI to maintain its privileged position is the 
“feebleness of competitors”, which are fragmented into many competing union 





not be separated from its political character, which means it maintains organisational 
proximity to political parties, and has the support of the government. Since 1998, the 
KSPSI has successfully developed its political links with several well-established 
political parties, such as Golkar and the PDIP. Two former leaders of the KSPSI were 
appointed as ministers in the Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and Megawati Sukarno 
Putri (2001-2004) administrations respectively: Bomer Pasaribu and Jacob Nuwawea as 
Minister of Manpower and Transmigration. This achievement contributed to the survival 
of the KSPSI and led to the continuation of its dominance after the transition period 
(Caraway 2008: 1380-83).56  
Since 2012, the KSPSI has been split between two leaders: Yoris Raweyai and 
Andi Gani both claimed legal leadership. Andi Gani was a former leader of the Union 
Federation of Workers of Finance and Banking (Fokuba), a union federation under the 
KSPSI, and has a close relationship with the PDIP. His position in the KSPSI and 
relationship with the PDIP are inseparable from the influence of his father, Jacob 
Nuwawea. Since being active in the union in the 2000s, he has been regenerated by 
Nuwawea as a potential leader of the KSPSI.57 Yoris Raweyai is an old Golkar cadre who 
was deliberately placed in office to bring the direction of the KSPSI closer to the Golkar 
Party.58 This fact further reinforces the general view that the KSPSI is still a ‘yellow 
union’, although institutionally it has taken a neutral stance in electoral politics.59  
The second type is unions established by ex-SPSI members. The SPSI’s 
dominance in post-1998 Indonesia has been challenged many times, not only over a case 
involving its double stewardship, but also in the defection of its cadres to establish new 
trade unions. Supported by the American Center for International Labour Solidarity 
(ACIL), on 6 October 1998 – following the resignation of Suharto in May of that year – 
11 out of 13 sectoral unions under the SPSI declared a new union called ‘SPSI 
Reformasi’. The founders of the SPSI Reformasi were SPSI dissidents who wanted to 
 
56  For instance, during his service as Minister of Manpower and Transmigration under the Megawati 
administration, Nowaweya did not resign or step down from his position as the president of the KSPSI. 
With his power in the government and union, he protected the KSPSI by claiming the properties 
provided the previous government as organisational assets of KSPSI and by delaying the union 
membership reverification process that mean the KSPSI could claim to be the biggest union 
confederation, giving the KSPSI stronger representation in tripartite bodies and wage councils (Caraway 
2008: 1382).  
57   Interview with union leaders (names withheld), Jakarta 20 September 2016. 
58   Interview with union leaders (names withheld), Jakarta 20 September 2016.  
59   Interview with Abdullah, chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI, Jakarta September 2016. The term of yellow 
union is a reference to the symbolic colour of the Golkar Party, Suharto’s political machine during the 





reform the organisation, mainly to distance it from the shadow of the Golkar party and 
the influence of some of its elites who had founded new political parties to participate in 
the 1999 elections.60  
In its development, the SPSI Reformasi became the forerunner to the 
establishment of the KSPI in 2002. In 2007, the KSPI changed its name from “Congress” 
to “Confederation”, after achieving membership of the International Trade Union 
Confederation (ITUC). At present, the KSPI represents 239,000 workers from 12 union 
federations. This figure places the KSPI as the second largest union confederation in post-
1998 Indonesia, after the legacy union- the KSPSI (Pusdatin 2017). Following its second 
congress in February 2008, the KSPI declared it would develop its political strategy by 
establishing political party alliances and nominating its elites in the legislative elections. 
In the 2014 elections, the KSPI was recorded as the most active union confederation in 
political movements, especially in the nomination of its elites in legislative elections. The 
KSPI was also involved in the 2014 presidential election, supporting the nomination of 
Prabowo Subianto and in several regional leader elections (Pilkada) in 2017, such as in 
the DKI Jakarta (Anis-Sandi) and Bekasi districts (Obon-Bambang).  
The third type of post-1998 Indonesian trade union is the revived union, linked to 
the Indonesian Confederation of Prosperous Worker Trade Unions (KSBSI). The KSBSI 
is an independent union, established in 1992, that was suppressed and banned during the 
New Order authoritarian regime, but which survived after 1998. Although positioned as 
a dissident union opposed to the New Order regime, the KSBSI was not left-wing, more 
aligned with moderate social democratic unionism.61 The existence of the KSBSI in post-
1998 Indonesia is inseparable from its founding figure, Muchtar Pakpahan, who in the 
1999, 2004 and 2009 elections developed it to engage in electoral politics through the 
establishment of labour-related parties. The National Labour Party (PBN) for instance, 
established by Pakpahan in 1999, was designed to work with mainstream opposition 
parties such as the PDIP and the National Awakening Party (PKB). By proposing such 
an alliance, Pakpahan intended to place the PBN as part of the mainstream opposition 
against the Golkar Party and Habibie government.62 However, as discussed in Chapter 
Two, the PBN failed to gain any legislative seats at the national level.  
 
60  Interview with Syaiful DP, chairman of FSP KEP KSPI and one of the founders of KSPI Reformasi, 
Jakarta 23 September 2016. 
61  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017.  





As it developed, the nature of the political unionism of the KSBSI - the third largest 
confederation in Indonesia - also changed its political position in 2015.63 Under the 
leadership of Mudofir Hamid (2015-present), the KSBSI officially declared that it would 
take a neutral position in electoral politics, although in practice, this did not prevent its 
leaders and members from engaging in legislative candidacy.64 In an interview, Mudofir 
explained that the involvement of the KSBSI in electoral politics had weakened the 
organisation as it had caused divisions among union leaders in the federations and among 
members at the grassroots level. In addition, the decision to actively engage in electoral 
politics was part of top-down pressure from the national leadership, which he argued was 
no longer appropriate in the spirit of democracy. Mudofir’s decision to take the KSBSI 
away from its original political path caused Pakpahan to withdraw his support of it and 
to later decide to establish a rival union using its old name: the SBSI. Moreover, other 
cadres who were not included in either in the KSBSI led by Mudofir, or the Pakpahan’s 
SBSI, chose to establish another new independent union called SBSI 1992, which was 
led by Sri Sunarti, the former general secretary of the KSBSI during Pakpahan’s 
leadership (1999-2010). 
The fourth type is NGO-supported unions. As noted by Edwin (2003) and Ford 
(2008), labour NGOs played vital roles in the establishment and organisation of the labour 
movement late in the New Order era and during Indonesia’s democratic transition (1998-
2004). Their presence was inseparable from the role of international donors in supporting 
democratisation in Indonesia through financial aid and the development of civil society 
organisations (Ford 2008). Unions in this category mostly focused only on organising 
workers at the grassroots level, especially in factories, and refused to build political links 
with parties or to engage in electoral politics. This trait is closely related to the basic 
character of the ideology inherent in the work of NGOs, which generally take a neutral 
position or are independent with regard to political interests. Many union leaders in this 
category decided to establish new unions, as they were demanding more authority from 
their supported labour NGOs. There were also some unions which ceased functioning, as 
their supporting NGOs stopped operating or changed their main priority to other sectors 
of the community.   
 
63 Based on data from Ministry of Manpower 2017, the KSBSI has 250.000 members from 9 union 
federations.  





The Congress of Indonesia Unions Alliance (KASBI) is one example of a union 
confederation which was established by unions and labour NGOs in 2003 and has 
continued to operate.65 However, since the KASBI decided to work with political parties 
in the 2004 legislative elections, several unions which were initially involved in its 
establishment have left, for instance: the Indonesian Trade Unions Alliance (GSBI) and 
the Malang Democratic Union (SBDM). However, unlike most unions, the KASBI 
refused to work with mainstream political parties and preferred to build alternative 
political parties supported by unions, workers and other civil society organisations 
(Santoso and Parto 2016: 120).66 
The fifth type is unions established by political parties. Although the strategy of 
engaging in electoral politics is still a matter for debate among union leaders, this stance 
does not preclude the establishment of trade unions initiated and established by political 
parties. One example of a trade union in this category is the Justice Trade Union (SPK). 
The SPK was established in 1999 by mosque activists in factories in the Jakarta and Bogor 
areas and by lecturers who were also sympathisers and administrators of the Justice Party 
in 1999, which later became the Welfare and Justice Party (PKS) in the 2004 legislative 
elections. The SPK founders, Marty Agung and Edy Zanur, were also known for their 
involvement in the establishment of the PKS during the 2004 elections. These two figures 
also played an important role in establishing a political link between the PKS and other 
trade unions such as the FSPMI and SPN, including the nomination of union leaders in 
the 2004, 2009 and 2014 legislative elections. At present, Marty Agung - who is a national 
parliament member representing the PKS - is still listed as a general advisor to the SPK.  
Another example of a union supported by a political party is the Confederation of 
Indonesian Muslim Trade Unions (the Sarbumusi). The Sarbumusi is a trade union with 
a long history of post-independence union political movements (1955-1968) and was 
founded by labour activists and Nahdatul Ulama (NU) administrators to support the NU 
Party in the 1995 elections. In addition to fighting for the interests of NU workers and 
citizens, the Sarbumusi was established as part of the NU strategy to combat the spread 
of communist ideology by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which at that time was 
 
65   KASBI was established on 14-17 Mach 2003, following an-inter union meeting at the end of 2002 which 
was attended by 16 independent unions that made up the Inter-city Workers’ Alliance (Jaringan Buruh 
Antar Kota, JBAK).    
66   For comprehensive description about the history, ideology and politics of KASBI see “Buku Panduan 
Serikat Buruh Gerakan Buruh Indonesia dan Internasional: Sejarah, Politik dan Ideologi” published by 





supported by the largest union, the Central Organisation of Indonesian Labourers 
(SOBSI). After 1998, the Sarbumusi declared itself to be a union confederation and 
positioned itself as part an autonomous organisation under the NU - the largest Muslim 
organisation in Indonesia. Organisationally, although both the NU and Sarbumusi stated 
that they were not affiliated with any particular political parties, the political strategies of 
these two organisations could not distinguished from those of the PKB, considering most 
of its members and leaders were founders, administrators, and supporters of the PKB.  
The sixth category is non-affiliated unions, consisting of independent unions that 
have no affiliation with particular confederations or federations. As mentioned 
previously, Labour Law Number 21/2000 allows the establishment of trade unions under 
both confederation and federation structures and of non-affiliated unions that have no 
links to higher level union groups. Included in this category are plant-level unions and 
occupational-based unions that are not affiliated with union federations. The latest 
available data at the time of writing this thesis, published by the Ministry of Manpower 
(2012), shows that there were 2,465 non-affiliated unions located at the enterprise level, 
which constituted the second largest after the legacy unions - the KSPSI (6,779 unions). 
Most of the non-affiliated unions have no political links and take a neutral position in 
electoral politics.  
The discussion above reveals that the organisational character and political 
orientation of post-1998 Indonesian trade unions vary and have evolved dynamically. 
Their development has not only been determined by political reforms and ongoing socio-
economic changes but has also been influenced by the existence of labour NGOs activists, 
politicians, the role of overseas labour organisations, and the interests of unions leaders, 
which can split unions apart, as in the case of the KSBSI discussed above. Scholars have 
used these characteristics and dynamics to partly explain unions’ weaknesses, as well as 
the complex picture of the post-1998 Indonesian labour movement (Ford 2003; Mizuno, 
Tjandraningsih and Herawati 2007; Silaban 2009). In this regard, some scholars have 
pointed out that the dominance of legacy unions and the problems of union fragmentation 
have undoubtedly contributed to the labour movement’s ongoing weakness (Caraway 
2008; Hadiz 2010). Others stressed the challenges faced by Indonesian trade unions in 
relation to their attempt to build political links with parties, despites all the conditions that 
have benefited trade unions and the opportunities offered by democratisation. On this 
basis, Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008: 253) argued that “[the labour movement] may not grow 





understand the current union elite’s perspective on their engagement in electoral contests 
and the reasons that legitimise their decision. This will be analysed below.  
Union Justification to Engage in Electoral Politics 
One of the fiercest debates related to union participation in Indonesia’s electoral politics 
is that among trade union elites regarding the proper function of trade unions themselves. 
A large proportion of trade unions reject the idea of supporting political parties as well as 
union nomination in electoral politics and prefer instead to focus on traditional trade union 
activities. What might be considered more progressive union groups take the opposite 
position, considering electoral politics to be part of an effective mechanism through 
which trade unions can increase their ability to influence in particular, policy-making in 
general and industrial relations in specific sectors. These two contradictory positions are 
affecting the electoral performances of unions, as evidenced by the electoral records of 
union candidates since their first electoral engagement in the 1999 elections. 
According to Ford (2005, 2014), the rejection of political unionism by some trade 
unionists has been strongly influenced by the legacy of the New Order era, where the 
authoritarian regime has successfully controlled the attitude of workers and trade 
unionists toward political unionism. The New Order’s single union, the SPSI, was 
primarily an instrument of power rather than a representative body for unions and workers 
(Ford 2005:200). The SPSI was enforced, just like any other functional groups in the 
state’s corporatist structure, to maintain close institutional ties to the New Order electoral 
machine, the Golkar Party (Ford 2005, Mietzner 2013). Using the enforcement of the 
ideology of Pancasila, a Sanskrit word which translates as five principles, for 
encapsulating the idea of a kind of social partnership and deliberation to reach a 
consensus, the New Order regime argued that “trade unions must be renovated to support 
achievement of national development goals and to prevent repeating the politicization of 
union’s interests by political parties such as what happened in the post-Independence 
period” (Ford 2005: 198). The doctrine of socio-economic definitions of trade unionism 
which were strictly imposed for almost 32 years seemed to have survived and been 
adopted by the unions. Consequently, workers lost their political identity as well as their 






Experiences from elsewhere suggest that the debate over whether trade union need 
to enter politics or not does not occur only in young democratic countries, such as 
Indonesia, but is also found in many countries which have a long history of its labour 
movements. In Europe and the United States, this phenomenon happened in the opening 
stages of the development of trade unions in these countries, as part of the labour 
movements of the early nineteenth century. For instance, in Britain, the Trade Union 
Congress (TUC) initiated the establishment of the Labour Party. In its development, the 
Labour Party in Britain has “grown out of the bowels of the TUC” and has been 
instrumental in shaping policies related to working class interests in the country they soon 
came to dominate it (Marks 1989: 3). In the United States, most trade unions, such as the 
American Federation of Labour, kept their distance from national politics. However, since 
the late nineteenth century several progressive unions such as the United Mine Workers 
and the Print Workers’ Unions were actively involved in politics at the state and local 
levels (Marks 1989: 3). In Germany, the union-party alliance was the other way around. 
In the 1860s, most unions were created by political parties for expressly political 
purposes, and their orientation also followed party interests. However, from the 1890s 
onwards, when the relaxation of state repression gave broader opportunities to trade 
unions to choose their movement, they established their own national organisation and 
emphasised their political independence from the Social Democratic party, rapidly 
increasing their membership (Marks 1989: 3). By 1906, when the Free Unions had grown 
in size and strength, they became more confident in their ability to form their own political 
party, and this then brought them to the centre of the political stage (Marks 1989: 4).  
The trade unionists interviewed for this study openly acknowledged a range of 
shortcomings which have hampered the effectiveness of union engagement in electoral 
politics. They attributed these shortcomings both to the problems that characterise the 
current labour movement and to the challenges that it is facing. The issues most often 
mentioned were elites and organisational egoism and rivalry; labour political identity; the 
New Order legacy; fragmentation; organisational capacity; suspicion and co-optation; 
and the problems related to financial politics and the dominance of oligarchies. However, 
trade union interpretations of political activism and their role seem to be mostly 
influenced by their background, convictions, organisational orientation and strategies, as 
well as their understanding of the importance of union involvement in formal politics 





explanatory overview of two different positions of union elites regarding the needs for 
trade unions to engage in electoral politics.  
Views of the Proponent Elites 
In the opinion of most union elites who support union engagement in electoral politics, 
entry into the arena of electoral politics is part of the unions’ new strategy to secure a 
place at decision-making tables in order to fight for worker interests and political agendas. 
The presence of unionists in the parliament could limit the domination of legislative 
bodies and government agencies by capitalist elites and business-politicians. It is also part 
of unions’ short-term strategy to solve the stagnation faced by political parties in 
providing legislative candidates who understand labour issues and have high levels of 
integrity and commitment to fighting for workers’ interests. In the long run, this is 
intended to improve the quality of the labour movement; to educate and enhance workers 
political consciousness; and to develop the embryo of an alternative labour party 
supported by trade unions and their members.  
Words and phrases that are often used by proponent elites to describe the 
importance of trade union engagement in electoral politics have included “important”, 
“necessary”, “inseparable” and “demands”.  In the view of Iwan Kusmawan, a member 
of the executive board of the KSPI and the chairman of the SPN, trade union engagement 
in electoral politics is not merely intended to place union cadres in legislative institutions, 
but is also a necessary strategy to strengthen collective union power.67 He stressed that 
the struggle through negotiation in the factory and demonstration on the street is highly 
necessary in every labour movement, particularly to optimise their function as pressure 
groups. However, to increase the bargaining position of trade union, that strategy is 
assumed to be ineffective when there is no effort to get involved in the formal politics 
directly.68  
In another argument, Maxia Ellia, former vice-president of the FSPMI stated that 
the defeat of the Labour Party and the lack of support from workers for the majority of 
union candidates in the previous elections should not be viewed as failures.69 However, 
part of the process of developing workers’ political consciousness and political 
experimentation is for union leaders to engage in electoral democracy. In his opinion, it 
 
67  Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016.  
68  Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016. 





is not surprising that some trade union elites had little sense of how to mobilise their 
members or that the workers proved so difficult to mobilise in electoral politics, as they 
had been told for so long by an authoritarian regime that the political sphere does not 
concern them.70 
When asked how they deal with the fact that the democratic system is being 
exclusively dominated by oligarchic, political and bureaucratic elites, most of the 
proponent elites interviewed in this study argued that trade unions are different from 
political parties, but both are needed in a democratic system. According to Nicolas, trade 
union elites turned-politicians belong to both arenas, falling between the union and the 
party.71 However, they are different from career politicians as they are members of 
specific popular groups, not free individuals. They have been selected to be members of 
parliament because they have been nominated by trade unions and have an identity as 
representative of a labour group. Therefore, the possibility for elected candidates from 
trade unions to be controlled by their constituents is higher than that of career politicians 
from political parties.  
Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI and founder of the Labour Party, argued 
that the relationship between trade unions and formal politics is inseparable, as regulating 
industrial relations involves political issues.72 In the view of Pakpahan, “if a trade union 
desires a significant achievement in their struggle, they must adopt political programs 
into their movement”.73 In other words, there must be a forum which can be used to 
represent the labour movement in formal politics, either through the establishment of a 
labour-related party or the attendance of members of parliament from trade unions. In the 
interview, Pakpahan was convinced that: 
 
The fall of Suharto in 1998 brought a fundamental change in the workers 
struggle to improve their welfare, the recognition of human rights, anti-
discrimination law enforcement, social justice and democracy. 
Unfortunately, the importance of union independence is often 
misunderstood by many trade unionists as well as workers. Independence 
doesn’t mean that trade unions should not engage in formal politics. On the 
contrary, alliances with other societal and political forces, including 
political parties, is necessary. Trade unions cannot be separated from 
politics, including political parties. However, in every alliance of this kind, 
 
70  Interview with Maxi Ellia, former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 6 October 2016. 
71  Interview with Nicholas, chairman of SBSI North Sumatra, Medan 26 November 2016.  
72  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017. 





the question must be, which one is the independent party. The crucial issue 
is whether trade unions will determine what programs are to be 
implemented, or whether they will be subservient to party politics.74  
 
At the local level, the need for unions and workers to become involved in local 
electoral politics can be interpreted as part of a political experiment and a form of 
democracy in the spirit of the implementation of local autonomy policy. A union’s 
political engagement is established based on similarities in the issues being fought for, 
similar locations as the basis for movement, and the intensity of communication among 
union elites in similar sectors and occupations. As Obon Tabroni explained:  
In the decentralisation era, the desire of unions to be involved actively in 
electoral politics is increasing, considering that the opportunity to take part 
in policy making and to influence labour policies at the local level is also 
widely open. I never stop encouraging them (union leaders and workers) to 
work together as we have a great potential to enter parliament and influence 
policy-making.75  
Other views were driven by the fact that labour issues are often politicised by 
political elites during electoral campaigns but are often ignored by the government and 
elected parliament members when negotiating their interests after elections have ended. 
As stated by one union candidate interviewed:  
Before, I viewed politics to be dirty. Politics  was an issue for the politicians 
in parliament, while the union only handled the factory. After getting a 
political education, I realised that we also need to engage in politics, so it 
is not always used as a political commodity of political elites.76   
There has been a question mark among trade unionists over whether union elites 
who turn to politics will be able to bring about significant changes in the interest of their 
supporting group, since they could easily be co-opted by oligarchic, political and 
bureaucratic elites. Like other civil society activists who join formal politics, Nyumarno 
understood that assumption. However, when he became politician, he gained much better 
grasp of political lobbies and the complexity of the political process. In his interview, he 
talked about how he would lobby parliamentarians one by one, to approve the submission 
of draft local regulations on manpower.77 For Nyumarno, therefore, fighting in formal 
 
74  Interview with Muchtar Pakpahan, president of SBSI, Jakarta 16 January 2017.  
75  Interview with Obon Tabroni, former head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 22 January 2017.  
76  Interview with Aji, legislative candidate and FSPMI union leader in Bekasi, Jakarta 22 September 
2016.  
77  Interview with Nyumarno, parliament member in Bekasi district and former union leader, Bekasi 28 





politics means playing two roles at once: as politician and representative of workers in 
parliament. 
The labour NGOs, such as the TURC and Omah Tani, have played significant 
roles in building political awareness among trade unionists and workers (Tjandra 2016; 
Mahsun 2018). They not only provide unions with economic and political education 
(Ekopol) but also support union engagement in electoral politics. Their support includes: 
political training for union administrators; compiling the political programs of labour 
movements in the region; designing political campaigns during the 2014 legislative 
elections.  In an interview, Handoko Wibowo, the founder of Omah Tani, explained that 
in his “Ecopol school” union leaders and workers not only learn about organisational 
management and current issues related to workers’ interests, but also about their 
important role in building alternative political movements.78 “During their 3 to 5 days 
here, they (union leaders and workers) not only learn from people who have experience 
in mobilising mass movements, but also from activists and former political prisoners 
during the Suharto era (including former dissidents and leftist supporters who were sent 
to Buru island), so that they will have strong idealism and understand the consequences 
of struggling in the political arena”.79 
The Opponent Elites 
The relationship between trade unions and political parties always causes contradiction 
and debate. A union elite’s decision to engage in electoral politics is not only affected by 
structural factors but is also determined by the extent to which they have adopted the most 
 
78  Interview with Handoko Wibowo, founder of Omah Tani, Pekalongan 20 January 2017.  Omah Tani 
was founded in 1998 by Handoko and other human rights activists mostly university graduates from the 
city of Jogjakarta. Initially, Omah Tani was an organisation known as the Struggle Forum of Batang 
Farmers (FPBB) and consisted of 34 farmer organisations in the Batang district. Over time, the FPBB 
expanded its affiliation to fishermen’s groups and changed its name to the Forum of Associations of 
Farmers and Fishers in Batang and Pekalongan (FPBB). The FPBB’s activities mainly focused on 
providing legal advocacy for farmers and fishers groups in Batang and Pekalongan who were 
experiencing land conflict with the state and private sectors. In 2009, under the leadership of Handoko 
Wibowo, the organisation changed its name to Omah Tani and launched Farmer Go Politics movement 
which then successfully placed nine members out of ten village head elections in three sub-districts in 
the Batang regency. In the 2011 local elections, as part of the same movement and supported by its 34 
local affiliates, Omah Tani played a crucial role in the candidacy of Yoyok Riyo Sudibyo in the local 
election (Pilkada); was later elected as Bupati Batang (2012-2017). Beside being a lawyer, Handoko 
Wibowo also known as a Chinese descendant who had been involved in human rights activist since the 
Suharto era, has strong civil society network links with human rights and anti-corruption NGOs, such 
as the Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (Kontras), the Indonesian Law Aid 
Foundation, the Transparency for International Indonesia movement, the Indonesian Corruption Watch, 
and the Demos. In 2015, Handoko won the Yat Thiam Hiem award – a prestigious human rights award 
in Indonesia given by the Yat Thiam Hiem Foundation and Center for Human Rights to people who 
contribute to human rights issues.   





appropriate attitude and action in organising their movement. In this context, the freedom 
of association and protection to organise in a new Indonesia’s democracy tends to be 
interpreted differently by union elites, according to whether they support or refuse the 
union’s engagement in electoral politics. Despite the fact that some unions still refuse to 
become involved in politics, it does not mean that they do not have political orientations 
when fighting in the interest of workers. In the words of one union federation leader 
interviewed for this thesis: “The spirit to fight in formal politics already exists, but the 
response depends on the growing situation”.80 Other union elites argue that unions’ 
neutrality in politics is part of their opposition strategy to maintain union autonomy. In 
the view of one union elite member: “If we agreed to collaborate with political parties 
which currently existed, it would mean that we were betraying our cause to work with 
parties that we have criticised”.81 
There are three main reasons given by several trade union elites to legitimise 
remaining independent of political parties. The first is to preserve the unity of their 
members. This view is based on the reality that there are workers who have various 
political choices which are greatly affected by their different religious, ethnic, and 
historical identities. As explained by a union leader:  
Our members have various social and political origins, from NU, 
Muhammadiyah, Christian, Islam, Batak, Javanese, etc. If we force them 
to follow our decision or ask them to choose union candidates from 
political parties which are different from what they want, will they still vote 
them? If we force them, we worry that it will ruin our organisational 
solidarity.82  
The second reason is related to political awareness among workers. According to 
union elites in this group, to make workers aware of politics, the first aspect to build is 
their political awareness through political education. A respondent stressed that “some of 
the union elites want to carry out ‘chilli sauce politics’ which means once people have 
eaten it, they want to immediately feel the taste”.83 Another elite member disagreed over 
whether labour has significant potential votes for union candidacy. In the interview he 
argued that: 
 
80  Interview with a union leader (name withheld), Jakarta 25 September 2016.  
81  Interview with a union leader (name withheld), Jakarta 28 September 2016.  
82  Interview with a union leader (name withheld), Jakarta 27 September 2016. 





During street demonstrations, tens of thousands of workers are willing to 
join and they are easily mobilised by union leaders, since the issue they are 
fighting for is easily understood and familiar in their daily life. However, 
when talking about politics, it takes more effort for them to understand 
what politics is? And unfortunately the labourers in Indonesia are not as 
good at doing this as those in Western countries, whose political education 
is well established.84  
The third reason is related to union priority. Most union elites in this group 
recognise that the key issue for the union at this stage must be to strengthen its collective 
bargaining for genuine labour union agreement with companies in order to be able to 
begin to raise wages and improve the condition of workers. They argue that during 
Suharto’s 32 years reign, the state’s official union federation, the SPSI - which was the 
only legally recognised trade union- did not engage in genuine collective bargaining and 
contract negotiation. Therefore, with the freedom of association and the right to organise 
that have been granted, trade unions oriented toward collective bargaining have emerged 
as a dominant form of such organisations. According to a union leader in this group, “the 
current priority of union movement should be to increase their membership and 
strengthen their bargaining position in the factory, so that the union can make maximum 
contributions to negotiating beneficial work agreements for its members”.85  
The fourth is related to the existence of political decisions at the national level 
(confederations) which often run contrary to the wishes of union officials at the 
federation, local and factory levels. This condition then arouses suspicion among 
opposing union leaders that their leaders have utilised trade union for the benefit of their 
political interests. For example, the KSPI’s decision to build political cooperation with 
the Gerindra party in the 2014 elections conflicted greatly with leaders at the federation 
level as it did under the leadership of Yoris Raweyai, who provides support for the Golkar 
party.  
Based on the discussion above, it can be said that the labour union elites have 
different understandings related to their need to engage in electoral politics. It seems that 
the relationship between unions and political parties always contains contradictions and 
areas of debate.  On the one hand, trade unions are different to political parties. Their 
main goal is to fight for member and organisational interests, while the main goal of 
 
84  Interview with a union leader (name withheld), Jakarta 28 September 2016.  





political parties is to gain legitimacy and power from votes in a general election. Both 
have different orientations, but both are needed to build a democratic government. On the 
other hand, attempts to protect and improve working conditions and workers’ economic 
situation are strongly influenced by the presence of regulations imposed by legislative 
institutions. Therefore, a duality of purposes is common in union movements, because 
unions must balance their members’ interests and the requirements of national 
development.  
Union Candidates and the Question of Motives 
Winning a seat in a legislative election not only offers a great deal of political power but 
also enhanced social status in recognition of a winner’s success and prestige, as well as 
various material rewards and financial benefits. Party officials are now recruiting popular 
figures from trade unions and high-profile members of NGO-sponsored unions to 
compete as parliamentary candidates in several worker-dense districts in Java and 
Sumatra, to act as political fixers or vote mobilisers (Ford 2014: 344). New potential 
candidates and canvassers are also being approached, including popular figures such as 
local community leaders, religious leaders, artists, academics, and even ordinary citizens 
who do not have any significant economic power and political experience. This trend has 
been emerging since the 2009 legislative elections, when the first open proportional 
representation electoral system was adopted, and a significant number of popular figures 
from civil society organisations and ordinary candidates competed in local elections 
(Heryanto 2010; Aspinall and Mietzner 2014).86 
The emergence of newcomers in local elections has created a large pool of 
candidates that are more locally rooted and more broadly based, represent a plurality of 
political interests, and are less militarised than during the Suharto era (Törnquist 2008; 
Choi 2014). This trend has challenged the characterisation of political elites as predatory 
figures nurtured by the New Order regime (Buehler and Tan 2007; Winters 2014; Poczter 
and Pepinsky 2016). Furthermore, this trend has caused competition to  intensify among 
parliamentary candidates, particularly in local electoral contests. Despite this seemingly 
 
86  For example, Heryanto (2010) observed the nomination of ordinary citizens in the 2009 legislative 
elections. They included becak (rickshaw) driver Abdul Wahid from the United Development Party 
(PPP) in Tegal, street vendor Erni Wahyuni from the Star Reformation Party (PBR) in Samarinda, 
vehicle washer Joko Prihatin from the National Mandate Party (PAN) in Kudus, public parking 
assistance Sukardji from Renewal Democracy Party (PPD) in Ponorogo, ojek driver (motorcycle taxi) 





positive development, some studies find that the patrimonial and oligarchic tendencies in 
Indonesia’s post-Suharto polity remain strong. It can be seen from the practice of money 
politics, which has become more flagrant and widespread in elections (Choi 2011; 
Aspinall and Mietzner 2014; Aspinall and Sukmajati 2015). Outright vote-buying is 
increasingly vulgarly blatant, with candidates organising success teams to distribute cash 
to voters in the days before an election, as it is known in Indonesian as serangan fajar, 
the dawn attack (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014: 355).  
The negative aspects of elections in Indonesia have, to some extent, perpetuated 
public cynicism and suspicions regarding the candidates’ political motives, purposes and 
goals (Heryanto 2010; Choi 2015). As pointed out by Heryanto (2010: 184), the 
emergence of a large pool of political newcomers has had two opposing effects on society. 
On one side, it seems to “contradict widespread reports about the widespread apathy 
among the general population”. On the other, it has “confirmed people’s cynical suspicion 
that something other than genuine motives in a political or moral cause must have been 
driving so many newcomer candidates to join local electoral contest” (Heryanto 2010: 
186-87). 
Relatively few studies have examined what motivates newcomer candidates to 
participate in local elections in post-Suharto Indonesia. Choi’s (2015) study of political 
newcomers in Pontianak, West Kalimantan Province, argues that electoral reforms have 
given a broader political opportunity for newcomers in local politics, but this 
development does not necessarily indicate a level of democratic maturity. She draws her 
conclusion based on the finding that “the new local elites are by no means immune to the 
institutional features of old-style politics as they treat electoral politics as a means to build 
a political career and to nurture and exploit patronage networks” (Choi 2015: 367).  
Another example is a study conducted by Mietzner (2013) on the involvement of 
newcomers who are civil society activists, in post-1998 formal politics. Looking at the 
activists’ backgrounds and political motivation, he found three different types of civil 
society activists who joined formal politics. The first is career-oriented elites who view 
“civil society activism as an early but necessary stage of their path to entering formal 
politics”. The second is politically interested individual activists from the New Order era 
who moved into formal politics as soon as they found political opportunities, following 
the regime change. The third is reformist activists who joined formal politics as they are 





oligarchic elites who dominate the economic and political system (Mietzner 2013: 42-
43).  
From his study, Mietzner (2013: 46) concluded that the presence of civil society 
activists in formal politics has “provided a counterweight to the influence of oligarchic 
interests in Indonesia’s new democracy” as they “have avoided the dilemmatic trap 
between regime co-optation and fundamental opposition”. These civil society activists 
are benefitting from regime change and turn to politic because they view democracy as 
“deficient but overall worth defending” (Mietzner 2013: 47). However, Mietzner (2013) 
does not deny that despite some of the success stories of activists who have joined formal 
politics in Indonesia’s post-1998 democracy, there are some former activists who not only 
failed to have used their new political role to fight for their causes, but were co-opted by 
the pragmatism and corruption of Indonesian mainstream politics. These activists turned 
politicians have exploited their position in parties, parliament, and government to “collect 
funds to seek higher political office and pay for extravagant lifestyles” (Mietzner 2013: 
42). 
It is generally understood that the involvement of civil society activists, including 
trade unions, in electoral politics has improved the quality of democracy and the process 
of democratic consolidation and decentralisation in post-New Order Indonesia (Diamond 
1999; Nyman 2006; Beittinger-Lee 2010). This situation could stimulate political 
participation by other civil society groups and help to strengthen the legitimacy of 
democratic government (Beittinger-Lee 2010: 33). Nevertheless, most civil society 
leaders tend to remain outside the formal political institutions and instead exercise an 
informal influence on the political process (Choi 2014: 386). However, those who have 
begun to make their presence felt in the Indonesian political arena often face criticisms 
based on the suspicion that they are just pursuing power for their own interests, and in 
some cases may have turned against their former colleagues and causes (Mietzner 2012: 
30). Trade union elites certainly face this dilemma. Since their first engagement in 
electoral politics in 1999, they have faced criticism from the trade unions themselves, as 
well as labour activists and workers (Törnquist 2008; Hadiz 2010; Juliawan 2011; Ford 
2014). In addition, the fact that the nomination of unionists in the 2009 and 2014 
legislative elections was scattered across various parties also seems to add to people’s 
suspicions about the nomination of trade union elites in electoral contests. Unlike trade 
unionists in South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil, who have specific partisan politics, with 





2015), the majority of union elites in Indonesia follow the general trends of populist 
leaders, with personal latitude to establish direct relationships with various distinctive 
political parties and heterogeneous masses, by addressing their specific identity as 
unionists.  
To analyse the political dilemma facing union leaders, I will focus on what 
advanced political opportunities can mean among trade union candidates, and I will 
attempt to better understand the union candidates’ backgrounds, motives and reasons for 
running parliamentary seats in electoral contest. As stated by some scholars, the study of 
elites provides a useful analysis for addressing a range of political concerns. These 
include: leadership and authority; legitimacy and hierarchy; political identity and power 
relations; social structures and social change; ideology and consciousness (Shore and 
Nugent 2002; Bottomore 2006; Fairbrother 2015).  
Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010) and Fairbrother (2015) in their studies 
on trade union configuration between politics and political parties highlighted that the 
purpose of a trade union is to pursue objectives that reflect its identity and ideology. The 
different types of purposes or motives have a strong impact on the way in which trade 
unions determine and pursue their mode of political struggles (Fairbrother 2015: 567). 
Hence, “trade union elites” is the term used to refer to those who occupy influential 
positions and roles in the important spheres of labour organisation and worker interests. 
They are the group whose “political capital” positions place them above their fellow 
ordinary workers (Marks 1989: 45). They are what Glee (1993: 4) called “the means of 
orientation whose decisions crucially shape what happens to workers”. In line with Marks 
(1989) and Glee (1993), Shore and Nuggen (2002: 4) stated that “the concept of elites 
suggests qualities of agency, exclusivity, and power”. According to Shore and Nugent 
(2002: 4), elites are the “makers and shakers” whose roles “positions them above their 
fellow citizens” and their “decisions crucially shape what happens in the wider societies”. 
Trade union elites thus can be defined as a “functional group” who for various reasons, 
have high status in a labour organisation (Bottomore 1993: 7) and “represent a way of 
conceiving power” (Marcus 1987: 10) by dominating the development of ideas and 
interests of their fellow workers and organisational orientation.  
My interview data based on 16 union legislative candidates in Bekasi, Serang and 
Medan reveals a strong relation between the motives of union candidates to engage in 





the union candidates who were nominated by their home organisation under a union-party 
alliance seem to have strong motives for competing in electoral politics to realise a 
political cause or organisational agenda.87 In this case, union officials choose their best 
union cadres, who will have been considered to have a strong commitment to workers’ 
organisations and be widely known by workers. They will have been selected by trade 
unions and entrusted to fight along sides some political parties in parliament, on behalf 
of the party and trade union. Meanwhile, those who run independently tend to have a 
broad range of motives, but also seem to have a common interest. That is, they regard 
competing in the election as an instrument for gaining social mobility, social recognition, 
material rewards and a political career. Here, what I refer to as independent candidates 
means those union elites who run individually as legislative candidates on a platform 
based on their desires and efforts, without any support from unions, either because they 
were proposed personally by their party, or besides being union leaders, they have also 
been active in local branches of political parties. The electoral performance of 16 union 




















Table 3.1: Trade Union’s Legislative Candidates 
 
Name Position in Trade Union Political 
Party 
Electorate Year of 
electoral 
Votes Result 
Nyumarno Head of advocacy PUK SPMK FSPMI 
PT Kimco- Lipo Motor Indonesia. 
Head of advocacy SPAI FSPMI 
Member of LBH FSPMI West Java 
PDIP Bekasi  2014 6,092 Elected 
Nurdin Muhidin Head of PUK FSPMI PT Hitachi Power  
Head of Eijip, Delta and Hyundai’ 
workers’ forum. 
Member of wage council, Bekasi  
PAN Bekasi  2014 10,981 Elected 
Aji Head of PUK FSPMI PT.NSK Bearing  
Member of wage council, Bekasi 
Member of LBH FSPMI West Java 
PAN Bekasi 2014 2,293 Failed 
Rustan Head of PUK SPL FSPMI PDIP Provincial 2014 34,688 Failed 
Sahat B.Butar Vice-chairman of FSP KEP KSPI  Gerindra Bekasi 2014 412 Failed 
Ferry Nuzzarli Vice-chairman of FSP KEP SPSI  Gerindra  National 2014 11,031 Failed 
Argo Priyo 
Sujatmiko 
Secretary FSP KEP Serang 
Coordinator for Politics and HAM FSBS 
PMB Serang 2009 467 Failed 
Rahmat Suryadi Secretary DPC SPN Serang PPP Serang 2009 356 Failed 
Intan Dewi Secretary DPD SPN Banten PAN Serang 2014 400 Failed 
Mingu Saragih Head of FSPMI North Sumatra Province PDIP Provincial 2014 5,736 Failed 
Zainal Abidin Head of SPN DPD Banten Province Hanura Serang 2014 2,115 Elected 
Adhadi Romli Head of DPW FSPMI Banten Province PDIP Serang 2014 1,345 Failed  
Napitupulu Head of SBSI 1992 Medan  Gerindra Provincial 2014 689 Failed 
Juliaman 
Damanik 
Secretary of Labour Party in Medan, 
Head of SPSI in Medan 
Labour 
Party 
Medan  2009 1,050 Failed 
Muchtar 
Pakpahan  
Member of SBSI Medan Labour 
Party 
National 2009 12,476 Failed 
Fernando 
Tobing 
Head of Labour Party in Medan, 
member of SBSI Medan  
Labour 
Party 
Medan 2009 251 Failed 
Source: Raw data taken from trade union organisations and unpublished document from General Electoral 
Commission, 2016.  
Most trade union candidates interviewed for this thesis generally claim that their 
motive to compete in electoral politics is to represent the voice of the workers and to 
defend their interests. They also share the view that their participation is part of a new 
strategy which makes it more likely for them to engage directly in formal negotiations 
and policymaking mechanisms. However, different answers were given when the 
fundamental question: “What was your primary motive to be a parliament candidate”? 
was modified by narrowing it down with follow-up questions such as: “Why did you 
become interested in running as a legislative candidate”? “What made you convince that 
you would get votes from workers in the election”? and “What made you feel confident 
that you could fight for the benefits of workers through formal politics”? Based on the 
interviews, I was able to distinguish between three groups of parliamentary candidates 
with union credentials that participated in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections. I refer 








The Political Challengers 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001: 24) defined political challengers as “politically 
disadvantaged groups engaged in sustained collective action to secure their claims”. In a 
democratic election, they typically mobilise participants to publicise their cause and to 
gain support and influence, more than by mobilising financial resources. In this study, I 
refer to certain union elite candidates as political challengers because they have chosen a 
different way to most other legislative candidates in order to compete in legislative 
elections. There are three main reasons for this. First, they will have committed to refusing 
the practice of vote-buying or money politics during political campaigns88. This political 
commitment will be part of the trade union’s efforts to promote a clean political campaign 
and to build political awareness, especially among union members89. Such conditions, 
obviously, run contrary to the common knowledge that money politics is inevitable and 
still plays a dominant role in every electoral contestation in post-1998 Indonesia (Aspinall 
and Sukmajati 2015: 2).  
Second, most trade union candidates in this category are relying solely on 
obtaining votes from  workers, yet there is no guarantee that  workers will vote for them. 
Third, their engagement in electoral politics is part of a new strategy and a new 
experiment. Some of the candidates may have decided to vie for political power through 
electoral contests as they have been driven by frustration regarding major political actors, 
including party politics. They appear to be motivated to get involved in electoral politics 
because they recognised the strategic importance of electoral politics for their roles, 
particularly in evolving from their traditional forms of negotiation and, street mobilisation 
to being legally suited to following a more formal channel with direct involvement in the 
policy-making process. Fourth, many of the union’s candidates are not locally born or 
raised (putra asli daerah), but in many cases, ethnic and religious identities have always 
been the most effective way of seeking voter support in electoral competition in 
Indonesia. 
 Among members of this group of political challengers is Nyumarno, a unionist 
from FSPMI who ran for a parliamentary seat in Bekasi District in the 2014 legislative 
elections. His decision to engage in local politics was driven by the frustration of his 
 
88   In the interviews, most candidates expressed their difficulty in dealing with voters' demands for money 
politics. See Chapter Five for a more comprehensive discussion of this issue.  
89  Interview with Kahar.S. Cahyono, former secretary of Aliansi Serikat Pekerja Serikat Buruh Serang 
(2009-2010), vice-president of DPP FPMI and member of KSPI executive board, Jakarta 22 December 





repeated experiences in negotiating particular labour issues with government officials and 
parliament members in his district, where he perceived he was having minimal impact. In 
the interview, Nyumarno pointed out that the issue of labour is often politicised by the 
candidates in every election, but subsequently the fate of workers tends to be forgotten.90 
He also stated that Bekasi, as one of the biggest industrial centres in Indonesia, should 
have parliament members who rise organically from the labour force. His main reason 
for standing in the election was also driven by the fact that entrepreneurs and former 
bureaucrats have long dominated parliament. In the interview, he stated that “if a union 
chooses to be outside parliament, it is hard to expect the presence of pro-labour 
government policy”.91  
 According to Nyumarno, labour support was essential during his candidacy. His 
dedication and experience so far in the unions is clear evidence and shows his serious 
commitment to continuing to represent workers. For example, when nominated as a 
parliamentary candidate he was serving as a head of advocacy for the Various Industry 
Workers’ Union (SPAI) of FSPMI. He was also active in several civil society 
organisations such as the Ampera Foundation, Organisation of Bekasi’ Society 
Movement towards Prosperity, and was a member of the legal aid agency of FSPMI West 
Java. In 2010, Nyumarno was one of the figures in the plant level union who successfully 
won a lawsuit in the bankruptcy court in a layoff case on which he worked.92 The judges 
concurred with the union claims and obliged the company in question to pay salaries and 
social security benefits which had not been paid for two years. After obtaining his 
bachelor’s degree in Law and intensive interaction with a senior politician from the PDIP, 
he ultimately decided to run for a seat in the local parliament in Bekasi district. He is one 
example of a unionist who was successfully elected in 2014. He explains that political 
representation enabled him to bring the agenda of workers into the formal political 
arena93.  
Another example of political challenger is Aji Prijo Sujatmiko who participated in 
the 2009 legislative elections in Serang district, Banten province. Before his nomination 
he was a political and human rights coordinator for the Serang Unions Forum (FSBS), an 
independent union in Serang focused on conducting research and advocacy for local 
 
90  Interview with Nyumarno, parliament member in Bekasi district, Bekasi 28 September 2016. 
91  Interview with Nyumarno, parliament member in Bekasi district, Bekasi 28 September 2016. 
92  Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 





unions. Sujatmiko’s decision to run as a parliamentary candidate was based on his 
consistent frustration over poor labour policies issued by the local government.94 It was 
at this time that the local government issued Local Regulation Number 7/2009 on 
employment, which was considered to be merely a product of copying and pasting of Law 
Number 13/2003 on Manpower. He felt that the production of poor policy was inseparable 
from the incompetence of parliamentarians on the main issues faced by workers, and he 
claimed that support from workers and unions was his main political capital to compete 
in electoral politics. His commitment to prioritising the interests of workers was 
manifested in a political contract between himself and the unions, which supported his 
nomination. Despite failing to be elected, he maintains his stance that trade unions should 
be actively engaged in politics. 
The case of Nurdin Muhidin in another example of a union candidate who pursued 
political power out of personal interest. He is a unionist candidate who was successfully 
elected in Bekasi in the 2014 elections. Before he was elected as a member of parliament, 
he was one of the most popular union leaders of FSPMI and was head of the Workers-
Communication Forum in three industrial zones in Bekasi district (Hyundai, Delta and 
Ejip). He was also a member of the regional wages council in Bekasi district. He is a 
powerful operator, is known among the workers of Bekasi as the “king of the 
microphone” and is often called “Nurdin Toa” because of his frequent participation in the 
street labour demonstrations.95 For instance, on 25 November 2015 he was arrested and 
detained for eight hours, along with five union leaders, on illegal demonstration charges. 
In the interview, he insisted that his main motives to run for parliament have never 
changed, even after he was elected as a member of parliament. He made clear his 
commitment to keep fighting for the interests of workers and contributing more 
significantly to the policy-making process. When asked for evidence,he mentioned his 
strategic role as a chairman of the special committee of labour regulation in Commission 
IV DPRD Bekasi district, providing direct supervision in factories that have committed 
industrial violations, and the provision of complaints hotlines for workers to report 
violations of labour regulations.96   
 
94   Interview with Sujatmiko, union’s legislative candidate from FSP KEP in the 2009 elections, Serang 16 
December 2016. 
95   Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 29 September 2016. 






The Political Carriers  
In contrast to the group I refer to as political challengers, there is a second group that 
might be called political careerists, consisting of union candidates who view union 
activism as a necessary stage of their socialisation as politicians and are motivated to seek 
their fortune in electoral politics to launch their political careers. Included in this category 
are the candidates who have benefited from their position in unions, society, and the 
private sector and have used their close relationship with a political party as a springboard 
to a career in politics. Most union candidates from this group tend to form their own 
success team to mobilise voters and use their own money to campaign. They are not only 
active as trade union officials but also registered as administrators of a political party at 
the local level or engaged in a party’s auxiliary organisations. When campaigning in 
workers’ residences, they use their position as union administrators, and beyond that they 
use the attributes of personality, kinship relations, and ethnic and religious identities to 
seek voter support. Some of them experienced defeat in electoral contestation, some were 
elected in the 2009 legislative elections, and most persisted in their attempts to be elected 
in the 2014 legislative elections as well as now campaigning for the next 2019 elections.   
Among members of this group, is Zainal Abidin, a senior trade union leader from 
the DPW SPN Banten Province. He is one of the very few unionists who have been 
involved in three elections since 2004 and has been elected twice as a legislative member 
at the same level in the 2004 and 2014 elections. Besides having a position as vice 
chairman of a regional branch (DPD) of SPN Banten province, he is also vice-chairman 
of the local branch (DPC) of the Hanura Party in Serang district. His involvement with 
political activities began when his colleague at PSP SPN PT Nikomas and a chairman of 
the United Local Party (Partai Persatuan Daerah, PPD) - a new political party established 
in 2003 - invited him to run as a legislative candidate in the 2004 elections. His first 
attempt was successful, and he was elected as the only legislative member from the PPD 
Party in parliament office at Serang district for 2004-2009.  
Motivated to pursue a higher political position, in the 2009 election Abidin ran for 
a provincial parliamentary seat but failed to gain significant votes. This failure did not, 
however, dampen his ambition to have a career in formal politics. With his experiences 
in the 2004 and 2009 legislative elections, Abidin ran for third time as a legislative 
candidate at the district level in the 2014 legislative elections, this time under different 





from the Suharto era, General Wiranto. In the interview, he stated that he was motivated 
to pursue a career as a politician as he felt he had spent long enough working in a factory 
and representing workers at the union.97 He also admitted that he was motivated to run for 
a legislative seat as he had more advantages as a native with an adequate formal education 
background and supportive political situation, as the Banten province had just formed in 
2002. He argued that his current position as member of parliament means that he is not 
only representing workers but also society as a whole. However, he maintains his close 
relationship with unionists and workers in Serang district to sustain his access to political 
power and other connections.  
Another example of a politically ambitious unionist keen to advance his political 
career is Adhadi Romli, a former national FSPMI leader and member of the local 
parliament in Serang district (2009-2014). Prior to being a legislative candidate in the 
2009 elections, Romli was the head of DPW FSPMI Banten Province. As a union leader, 
he was often involved in workers’ advocacy activities, dealing with industrial disputes, 
as well as organising labour across Banten province. He confirmed that his position as 
union leader at the provincial level had given him valuable experience and contributed 
greatly to his confidence in competing in an electoral contest. Supported by his labour 
networks and success team, Romli was successfully elected as a legislative member in 
the Serang 2009 legislative elections. In the interview, he stated that he was first 
motivated to take part in the electoral contest as he was convinced that he had significant 
potential resources to do so. In his view, starting a political career at the local level is the 
most strategic way, considering that political learning is a gradual process and cannot be 
instantaneous. During his time as a legislative member in Serang district (2009-2014), 
Romli succeeded in occupying various strategic positions in the parliamentary structure, 
including being elected as chairman of Commission I in charge of local budgeting. In the 
2014 legislative elections, he re-ran as a legislative candidate, but failed to gain sufficient 
votes to be elected. Since 2017, he has been serving as head of the PDIP DPC Serang 
branch and is preparing to nominate himself as a legislative candidate in the 2019 
legislative elections. Besides being active in party management at the local level, Romli 
also runs a law firm that deals with cases related to industrial disputes experienced by 




97  Interview with Zainal Abidin, vice-chairman of DPD SPN in Banten province and legislative member 





The Political Opportunists 
 
The third category is political opportunists, referring to the union legislative candidates 
who follow the rules of the democratic game, but were motivated to seek their fortunes 
in the 2014 legislative nominations for their own personal advantage. Their candidacy 
can be said to be ‘instant politics’ and they tend to rely on personalities with populist 
characteristics in order to mobilise and gain sufficient vote support. Included in this 
category are union elite candidates who were motivated by the idea of gaining social 
recognition; being a legislative candidate can increase one's social status in the 
community. Furthermore, union legislative candidates that fall into this category tend to 
run their candidacies individually or without organisational support from their home 
union organisations, instead using their organisational position to attract workers. As 
most are short of financial resources, union candidates in this category often rely on 
individual and kinship networks to attract potential voters during political campaigns. 
Additionally, they are mostly nominated for local level elections, either by new political 
parties or middle-level political parties that have no solid structure, as well as by 
sympathisers at grassroots level. In other words, they are recruited as legislative 
candidates not only as a vote-getter for political parties, but also to fulfil administrative 
requirements for political parties to participate in local elections. 
 In an interview, a legislative candidate in this category admitted that from the 
beginning he felt unconfident about competing in the 2014 legislative elections. A few 
days prior to the deadline of legislative candidacy registration in August 2013, he was 
offered a place on his party’s legislative candidate list by local branch’s party leader, who 
believed him to have the potential to gain significant support, particularly from union 
members and workers in general. Moreover, the electoral area offered was a labour-
intensive residential area and as a union activist he was quite a well-known figure in his 
residential area. He also stressed that the administrative requirements to register as a 
legislative candidate were also simple - only involving filling out several forms - so there 
was no reason for him to reject the offer. In practice, however, he realised that the union 
could not provide sufficient organisational support and material resources, and that his 
party was new and lacked consolidation, which made him less enthusiastic to continue 
his political campaign. In the interview, he did not object to the term “instant candidate” 
but disagreed that he had pursued nomination to raise his social prestige. He admitted that 





mobilisation for political campaigns. His total votes were very minimal, far below even 
the average votes cast for other legislative candidates in his electorate. Based on his 
experiences in the 2014 legislative elections, he suggested that it would be difficult for 
union elites to make successful gains in an electoral contestation without organisational 
support from the unions and members, sufficient financial resources, and solid support 
from a success team and the party machine at the grassroots level.98    
 From the examples discussed above, it can be seen that trade union elites are 
engaging in electoral politics with a variety of political motives, which in these particular 
cases go beyond tradition unions’ goals in order to succeed in the electoral competition. 
While there are union elites who continue to present challenges to electoral democracy 
and are motivated to strengthen their commitment and leadership to promote political 
changes, other are attempting to engage in electoral contests in order to gain material 
benefit for their personal agendas and tend to be influenced by elites in the process. This 
implies that although political reforms in post-1998 Indonesia have provided wider 
political opportunities for trade union elites to engage in electoral politics, this 
development does not always guarantee that it will be followed by increased political 
maturity among those elites. The union legislative candidates are by no means immune 
to the institutional features of pragmatic and populist-oriented politicians who dominate 
contemporary Indonesia’s political life and who tend to treat electoral contests as a means 




This chapter has discussed the legitimacy of trade union elites’ engagement in electoral 
politics. It seems that the freedom of association and protection to organise in the new 
Indonesian democracy tends to be interpreted differently by trade union elites: those who 
support and those who are against union’s engagement in electoral politics. Moreover, 
union elites’ decisions to engage in electoral politics are not only affected by the 
opportunities given by structural factors but are also determined by the extent to which 
they have adopted the most appropriate attitudes and actions in organising their 
movement. 
 





Some trade union leaders have expressed optimism and confidence about the 
future of the involvement of trade unions in formal politics. These union elites seem to 
have successfully avoided the problem of being co-opted by the oligarchic regime and 
the continuing inter-union rivalry and union fragmentation. In their view, union 
engagement in electoral politics is not only part of the exercising of their new political 
strategy but is also an important process in which they can use the opportunities offered 
by the democratic system to develop their movements and to fight for their interests in a 
more formal way. The other union elites who refused to engage in electoral politics are 
continuing to bide their time. They consider that in order to function as an interest group 
or pressure group acting in the interests of their members, remaining independent of 
political parties is essential, particularly as the Indonesian oligarchy remains strong.  
 The cases presented in this chapter reflect how the socio-political changes that 
have taken place in Indonesia since 1998 have effectively provided wider political 
opportunities to union elites to engage in electoral democracy. It also paints a picture of 
how union candidates in local electoral settings have benefited from post-Suharto 
democratic reforms. Given the fact that the labour movement is still in its infancy, the 
success of some union leaders in the 2014 legislative elections in gaining seats in 
legislative office is an important achievement. It also provides a broader analysis and 
review the role of non-elites in contemporary Indonesian politics where some scholars 
remain pessimistic, as the democratic system has been exclusively run by oligarchic, 
political and bureaucratic elites. Finally, the findings presented in this chapter could 
provide an important corrective to the dominant streams in political science writing on 
















Trade Union Electoral Strategy 
 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the types of electoral strategies used by unions to mobilise their 
base and core constituencies. Learning from the defeat of labour-linked parties in the 1999 
and 2004 elections and driven by the fact that direct approaches to politics such as street 
demonstrations are not always feasible, several progressive union leaders began to modify 
their strategy by engaging in electoral politics. Despite the existing complex 
organisational and political constraints on trade unions engaging in electoral politics, 
democratic reforms in Indonesia since 1998 have increasingly given broader political 
opportunities for union elites to engage in electoral democracy. In the 2009 legislative 
elections, for instance, eight trade union leaders from the Federation of Metal Workers 
Unions (FSPMI) in the industrial city of Batam attempted to participate in the local 
election under the union-parties alliance. Meanwhile in Serang district, two labour 
organisations formed an inter-union alliance to support the nomination of nine union 
leaders in local, provincial and national legislative elections. 
The involvement of trade union elites in electoral politics continued in the 2014 
legislative elections. Several trade unions, particularly in the industrial centres of Java 
and Sumatra, had learned from previous experiences and attempted to apply different 
strategies that entailed running union groups in legislative election races at local, 
provincial and national level. Some trade unions established campaign teams (usually 
called “success teams” or tim sukses) with members who were completely outside of the 
party structure. The other union candidates adopted a meet-the-voters style campaign 
rather than holding large open-air party campaigns. A few of the strategies were 
successful, with union candidates being elected as members of parliament in specific 
union-dense districts, such as in Bekasi and Serang. At this point, when several well-
established political parties started to approach union leaders to represent them as 
parliamentary nominees, trade unionists seemed much more open to the idea of trade 
union engagement with electoral politics compared to the early 2000s (Mietzner 2013: 
208). By the time of the 2014 legislative elections, the question was no longer whether 





establishing labour-related parties or by running union candidates for legislative tickets 
by forming alliances with different political parties. 
As observed by Heryanto (2010), Aspinall (2014) and Choi (2016), the presence 
of newcomers competing for parliamentary seats in the 2009 and 2014 elections was 
striking compared to the previous two elections in 1999 and 2004. Decentralisation and 
the open proportional system have brought far greater opportunities for political 
participation not only by society leaders and social organisation actors, including union 
leaders, but also by ordinary citizens with little or no meaningful material resources and 
political experience (Heryanto 2010; Choi 2016). Through the open-list system, voters in 
a district or municipal area can vote either for the party or an individual candidate. The 
number of seats that each party wins in each electoral area in a local election is in 
proportion to the combined votes for the party and all its individual candidates in that 
electoral area. The candidate with the highest individual votes on the party list can 
subsequently claim the party’s seat at the local level. 
In post-authoritarian Indonesia, the proliferation of political parties means that up 
to 550 candidates are competing for 50 seats (at most) in each local election (district or 
municipal level). Even the well-established parties usually win no more than two or three 
seats in each local electoral area. In addition, there are usually five or six local electoral 
areas in each district or municipality. This new system creates strong incentives for 
individual candidates to devote their resources and strategies to campaigning 
individually, rather than for their party. As a consequence of this new electoral system, 
the competition to gain votes has become stronger, not only between candidates from 
different political parties, but also between fellow candidates from the same party.  
Electoral strategy is not only concerned with numbers and targets, it is also about 
the process and the objectives that need to be achieved (Subekti 2015: 45). Thus, the 
process and the outcomes of trade union engagement in electoral politics presents a 
significant challenge, especially given the entrenched and dominant role that political 
elites have so far played in Indonesia’s electoral democracy, effectively excluding non-
elite actors from participation (Ford 2009: 341). As democratic consolidation requires the 
participation of various groups in society, the engagement of trade union elites in electoral 
politics is significant not only with regard to our understanding of the development of 
trade union politics, but also for broader analyses of contemporary Indonesian politics. 





consolidation is whether democracy is extended to groups that were formerly excluded 
or marginalised during an authoritarian regime. 
Ford (2014), Juliawan (2014), and Caraway, Ford and Nugroho (2015) have 
conducted initial research regarding trade union engagement in Indonesia’s electoral 
politics. Specifically, they studied the establishment of political alliances between trade 
union elites and political parties in the 2009 legislative elections.  For instance, Ford 
(2014) conducted research in the industrial city of Batam, where the local branch of the 
FSPMI set up a purpose-specific structure to promote the political interests of its members 
in successive local executive and legislative elections. Ford (2014: 356) argued that 
despite the ultimate failure of the union’s electoral experiment in Batam, the FSPMI and 
party alliances, as well as union willingness to engage in electoral politics has challenged 
accounts that seek to brush aside potential to encourage greater grassroots participation 
in Indonesia’s electoral politics. 
Juliawan (2014) conducted research on the political partnership between the 
National Trade Union (SPN) and the Justice and Welfare Party (PKS) in Semarang and 
Demak districts, Central Java province in the 2009 legislative elections. Juliawan (2014: 
46) argued that the failure of union leaders to mobilise members to follow union direction, 
and the absence of political partners in the form of genuinely labour-oriented political 
parties, were the main factors related to the defeat of union candidates in the 2009 
legislative elections. Furthermore, he concluded that the union and labour activists may 
have been relatively effective in organising street demonstrations, but unions attempting 
to mobilise their members into electoral politics still face an “uphill battle” in the near 
future of democratic Indonesia (Juliawan 2014: 39). 
This chapter analyses new types of union electoral strategies that have been 
overlooked in previous works related to union electoral engagement in the 2009 and 2014 
legislative elections. I examine the evolution of trade union electoral strategy through a 
close examination of three case studies that reveal different types of worker mobilisation 
conducted by trade union elites in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections, including union 
candidates who won seats in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections. I argue that union 
involvement in electoral politics is part of the experiential process to: develop their 
activism; maximise their role in defending worker interests; strengthen their collective 
bargaining power; adjust to the opportunities and challenges that come with 





trade unions for the mobilisation of workers are important aspects; nevertheless, factors 
such as the track record and personal ability of union candidates in using and maximising 
their own political resources are also crucial in determining their success in any election, 
particularly in a local election.  
The first strategy I examine is the effort to mobilise union members to support 
their candidates regardless of the political party supporting them. This strategy can be 
seen in the FSPMI’s ‘Labour Go Politics’ movement in Bekasi in the 2014 legislative 
elections. The second strategy is the inter-union alliance of two labour organisations 
under the Labour Vote Labour movement in Serang in the 2009 legislative elections. 
Through this strategy, the two largest labour organisations in Serang endeavoured to 
mobilise union members, regardless of the origin of their organisations, to support the 
nomination of union candidates in the elections. The third strategy is the nomination of 
union officers as legislative candidates through partnership with political parties or 
individuals joining political parties in the 2009 and 2014 elections. These union elites did 
not represent their home union organisation as they competed in the electoral contest 
without organisational support (as their union organisation took a neutral position 
regarding electoral politics), but undoubtedly, they wanted to gain vote support from the 
union membership. Regarding this strategy, I use a study case of the SPN, who 
encouraged their cadres to engage in the 2014 elections, although officially the union kept 
its distance from political parties. 
The Labour Go Politics Movement in Bekasi 
The Labour Go Politics (buruh go politik) movement was initiated by the FSPMI to 
promote their cadres running for legislative office in the 2014 legislative elections. It is 
part of the FSPMI’s new strategy to engage actively in electoral politics and to achieve 
its mission to build a democratic, free, representative, and independent union, to bring 
about social welfare and justice for workers and society in general.99 Unlike in previous 
elections, the FSPMI’s role as an organisation was dominant, particularly in designing 
winning plans and building alliances with political parties. Through the Labour Go 
Politics movement, the FSPMI used its organisational structure to: select and nominate 
candidates; organise and finance political campaigns; mobilise volunteers and union 
 
99  Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. The vision and mission 





members; conduct political negotiations with political parties.100 In the 2009 legislative 
elections, by contrast, the role of individual elites was very strong, and they tended to 
work alone, lacking support from organisational structures and networks.101 It seems that 
the FSPMI had learned from the previous strategy and their failure in 2009 legislative 
elections, where none of their candidates won legislative seats.  
At the second national annual meeting of the All Indonesian Union Confederation 
(KSPI) in 2014, the second largest union confederation - of which the FSPMI a member 
- the Labour Go Politics campaign was promoted not only as supporting legislative 
candidates from the FSPMI, but also 70 other candidates from eight union federations 
under the KSPI.102 The majority of these candidates competed in district and municipal 
elections concentrated in the principal industrial centres in Indonesia, such as Bekasi, 
Bogor, Tangerang, Serang, Semarang, Gresik, Medan, and Batam. In its development, 
the Labour Go Politics campaign was not only aiming to promote FSPMI and KSPI cadres 
but was used as a strategy to build political awareness and political education for workers 
and union leaders.103 
The involvement of trade union elites in local elections was not a new 
phenomenon and is not the exception in Bekasi. In the 2009 legislative elections, the 
names of several union elites and labour activists had been listed as legislative candidates 
in some electorate areas in Bekasi, either nominated by two labour-linked parties or by 
means of the individuals joining political parties.104 These individual candidates did not 
represent their trade unions but had undoubtedly wished to gain votes from workers and 
union members. Nevertheless, none of the candidates successfully won any legislative 
seats.  
At that time, most union leaders were less enthusiastic about participating in 
electoral politics as well as supporting their colleagues running for parliamentary seats 
(Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 2015: 1299). The majority of union leaders believed that 
union engagement in electoral politics was still premature as the union needed more time 
to prepare and to educate members about its importance (Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 
 
100  Interview with Sobar Gunandar, secretary of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016.  
101  Interview with Maxie Elia, labour activist and former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 23 August 2016. 
102  Data collected from KSPI Press Release on 3 April 2014 and unpublished report from the SPN. 
103  Interview with Supriyatno, head of PC FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
104  For instance, there were three FSPMI cadres who ran for legislative office in Bekasi district in the 2009 
elections: Jefri Herlian under the Democratic Nationhood Party, Miranti under the Indonesian Justice 





2015: 1292). Other unionists recognised the need for unions to participate in formal 
politics but feared that it could: distract unionists from their main union’s duties; cause 
internal conflict and endanger solidarity among members; tear the union apart through 
varying political affiliations (Caraway, Ford, Nugroho 2015: 1304).  
Similar views regarding the involvement of trade unions in the 2014 legislative 
elections were identified in my fieldwork in Bekasi, particularly in those who had so far 
refused the idea of union engagement in electoral politics, such as those discussed earlier 
in Chapter Three. Nevertheless, what was new in Bekasi’s 2014 legislative elections was 
the nomination of trade union cadres as legislative candidates from the FSPMI - under 
the Labour Go Politics movement - through several different parties. Moreover, unions 
and workers who had previously abstained from electoral politics were fully immersed in 
the process as campaign teams, volunteers and supporters of their union candidates.  
Bekasi has its own privileges compared to other electoral areas in Indonesia. Since 
industrial expansion began in the 1990s, Bekasi has not only developed the largest 
industrial estate in Southeast Asia, but it is also well-known as a barometer of the labour 
movement in Indonesia (Mufakir 2014; Tjandra 2017). It is home to more than 1.3 million 
workers and is the principal base of the two biggest union federations in Indonesia, the 
FSP KEP SPSI and FSPMI. These two union federations have taken the lead among 
unions in the labour movement (Mufakir 2014). In 2011, the FSPMI and SPSI and various 
local unions formed an alliance, specifically the Bekasi Workers on the Move Alliance 
(Aliansi Buruh Bekasi Bergerak), which subsequently organised several huge 
demonstrations and successfully lobbied for minimum wage increases in Bekasi.105 The 
unions in Bekasi have also been effective in curbing the widespread practice of 
outsourcing or employing workers on illegal third-party contracts via a labour movement 
termed “factory raid” or “gerebek pabrik” (Mufakhir 2014: 102). Both models instigated 
by this movement were then followed by other unions in several industrial centres in 
Indonesia, who also carried out labour demonstrations related to wage increases and the 
abolition of outsourcing practices. It was reported that in 2012 roughly 24,000 workers 
from around 60 companies that had formerly outsourced workers had been re-employed 
 
105  From 2001 to 2010, the minimum wage in Bekasi increased by an average of 9 per cent annually despite 
an average of approximately 8 per cent annual inflation. From 2011-2014, the minimum wage in Bekasi 
increased by an average of 23 per cent per year with an average inflation rate of almost 6 per cent (BPS 





on permanent contracts due to union actions through factory raid in Bekasi (Mufakhir 
2014: 106).  
As part of their effort to build an alternative political movement, the success of 
unions in consolidating their collective actions, such as strikes and labour demonstrations, 
then gave union leaders in Bekasi the confidence to take part in the 2014 legislative 
elections.106 In this context, organisational support given by labour NGOs such as the 
Trade Union Rights Centre (TURC) and the Omah Tani are also important to note, 
because they had a strategic role in building the confidence of union elites to engage in 
the 2014 legislative elections. These two NGOs contributed mainly by providing 
organisational advocacy and political education to union elites and their members, 
particularly in Bekasi.107 In addition, the number of union elites who ran for legislative 
office in Bekasi was the highest compared to other electoral areas in Indonesia. Of the 80 
trade unionists who participated in the 2014 legislative elections across Indonesia, 15 
competed in Bekasi electoral areas.108 
The FSPMI was founded in 1999 after it broke away from the FSPSI (an official 
union federation from the Suharto period), and at the time of its formation enjoyed the 
support of important international actors, including the ILO and many Global Union 
Federation members (Broadbent and Ford 2008: 2). In 2014, the FSPMI had 213,456 
members, and roughly half worked in Bekasi.109 As a union federation, the FSPMI 
incorporates six trade unions spread over 1,153 factories in 12 provinces and 50 districts 
and cities across Indonesia.110 It operates primarily in the automotive, electronics and 
electrical industries, along with a smaller division in shipbuilding and maritime services, 
transportation, and various other industries that include metals, pharmaceuticals and 
chemicals. Compared to other union federations, which commonly rely on branch-




106  Interview with Sobar Gunandar, secretary of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
107  Interview with Maxie Ellia, former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 23 August 2016. 
108  Based on data compilation from the KSPI, KSBSI and KSPSI.  
109  Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi, 30 September 2016. 
110  As reported in the third FSPMI annual leaders meeting in Jakarta 12-13 February 2014. 





The FSPMI is not the largest union federation; nonetheless, it is arguably the most 
well-organised, influential, and fastest growing union federation in Indonesia today (Ford 
2008; Tjandra 2017; Lane 2018). Over the last decade, the FSPMI has also taken the lead 
among trade unions in the labour movement, either as the initiator or leader of several 
movements. For instance, the formation of the Action Committee for Social Security 
(KAJS) in 2010, and the national labour demonstration in 2012, where the initial 
formation and action was led by the FSPMI’s leaders.112 
The FSPMI has four organisational tools to support its programs: the Garda Metal, 
Koran Perdjoeangan, legal aid, and a centre for training and education. The Garda Metal 
(Metal Battalion), is well-known for its militancy and is the spearhead of every FSPMI’s 
demonstration. Wearing a black-and-red para-military style uniform, hundreds of the 
Garda Metal are always positioned on the front line of street demonstrations carried out 
by the KSPI/FSPMI.113 Between 2010 and 2014 members of the Garda Metal were among 
thousands of FSPMI members who obtained Ekopol programs, including courses 
facilitated by Omah Tani.114 Several members of the Garda Metal were also union leaders 
at factory level, leading more militant action and strengthening solidarity, including 
during the political campaign in the 2014 legislative elections, by offering voluntary 
support.115 This meant that the FSPMI had a well-trained and educated spearhead 
formation, able to provide leadership at national, regional and the factory level, as well 
as voluntary supporters for worker mobilisation. 
In addition, while most of the union federations are still renting houses or shop 
houses for secretarial operations, the FSPMI has an impressive three-story building as its 
head office in addition to branches in several areas such as Bekasi and Batam. The 
existence of decent buildings and a secretariat have supported the FSPMI in its various 
activities, including education and training for union administrators and inter-union 
consolidation across sectors and factories. In contrast, other unions are burdened with the 
 
112 The KAJS is a civil organisation formed by dozens of national trade unionists and labour NGOs, and 
student and professional groups, after a meeting of unions in Jakarta on 8 March 2010 facilitated by the 
FSPMI. It was established to push for the implementation of social security reforms by merging all 
supporting groups into one action committee. The committee was led by the presidium, consisting of 
nine leaders of union federations and labour NGOs; On 3 October 2012, the FSPMI led a national labour 
demonstration that was conducted simultaneously in 22 provinces and involved around two million 
workers (Tempo, 3 October 2012). 
113  Personal observation on labour demonstrations organised by the KSPI/FSPMI in Jakarta 26 November 
2016.  
114  Interview with Handoko Wibowo, leader of Omah Tani, Pekalongan 20 January 2017. 





cost of renting and limit their activities, with their funds mainly collected from 
membership fees.116 These advantages have empowered the FSMPI, enabling it to take a 
proactive role both with their affiliated unions and their members and on the national 
stage with other union federations (Broadbent and Ford 2008: 26).  
Of the 15 union candidates who competed in Bekasi’s 2014 election, nine 
candidates were FSPMI cadres. Initially, the selection process of union candidates from 
the FSPMI in Bekasi was planned to be by means of pemilihan raya or an internal election 
involving all FSPMI members in Bekasi. However, the plan was not implemented due to 
limited time and to avoid disunity among members, as the internal election had raised 
organisational concerns about further negative impacts on union leaders and members at 
factory level.117 As explained by Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, the internal election 
plan could actually break the concentration and consolidation efforts of union leaders and 
workers at the factory level, because the Labour Go Politics movement supports union 
candidates based on electoral area, rather than who represents each sector in the 
FSPMI.118 
The nine legislative candidates in Bekasi belonging to the FSPMI were chosen 
based on several criteria that had been agreed upon internally by the organisation. They 
had served as members of executive boards at the branch level, or had been, or were, 
leading the union at the factory level. Furthermore, they had been members of wage 
councils at the local level, so they understood issues related to wages and labour issues. 
The nine FSPMI candidates were assumed to be popular candidates who could attract 
potential voters from outside FSMPI members and to be committed, honest and capable 
leaders, so they could gain workers’ trust.  In addition, the nine FSPMI candidates agreed 
not to engage in money politics. The “No Money Politics” principle was part of the 
FSPMI's efforts to improve political education for workers and communities, and end 
campaign by rotten politicians, and was carried out by several election monitoring 
networks in the 2014 elections.119 
  
 
116  Based on my personal observation at union office at FSPMI Bekasi, KEP KSPSI, KEP KSPI, SPN, SP 
LEM KSPSI, SBSI Medan and informal communication with the administrators during my fieldwork 
in Bekasi, Serang, Medan and Jakarta, August 2016-January 2017.  
117  Interview with Sobar Gunandar, secretary of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016.  
118  Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016.  





In the 2014 legislative elections, nine cadres of the FSPMI in Bekasi ran for 
legislative office, with five different parties rather than one party. This decision was part 
of the FSPMI’s strategy to overcome internal resistance to the notion of political 
partnership by maintaining distance from any single political party.120 Political parties are 
a means for the FSPMI to facilitate its entry into parliament without undermining its 
organisational independence. A further reason was that by placing their cadres with more 
than one political party, the FSPMI would have a greater opportunity to deploy their 
candidates in several different electoral areas in Bekasi.121 The participation of the FSPMI 
in the 2014 election can also be regarded as a new experimental strategy in electoral 
politics and as a step toward building its own political party in the future.122 The financial, 
structural and legal barriers to establishing and sustaining a political party in Indonesia 
are high, so the union had little choice in the 2014 legislative elections but to place union 
leaders as candidates in existing parties (Hoban 2014; Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 2015: 
7).123 
Negotiations with political parties at the district level were conducted by the 
branch leaders of FSPMI Bekasi by offering a benefit which a party cadre or a new 
candidate would not possess, that is the strength of voting blocs represented by the size 
of union membership. As stated by Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010: 324), trade 
unions and political parties are mutually dependent organisations. However, in terms of 
representation and membership both are different. According to Marks (1989: 5) political 
parties attempt to participate in elections by aggregating the political interests of their 
supporters, which encourages them to create broad-based organisations. Party 
membership is floating because it is determined largely by the political system in which 
it operates. By contrast, trade unions have a different membership profile; for example, 
one which is sectorial and composed of numerous organisations encompassing workers 
in specific industries or occupations. 
 
120 Interview with Maxie Elia, former vice-president of FSPMI 2012-2016, 23 August 2016. 
121 Interview with Supriyatno, head of PC FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
122 Interview with Maxie Elia, former vice-president of FSPMI 2012-2016, Jakarta 23 August 2016. At the 
time of my field research, several leaders of union confederations and federations (including the FSPMI) 
were drawing up programmes for the formation of new political parties that planned to participate in 
the 2019 legislative elections. One strategy being considered was to merge with the Pakpahan’s Labour 
Party, which had failed to contest the 2014 election. Interview with Ferry Nurzali, KSPSI, Jakarta, 8 
September 2016 and Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN and member of the formator team of the 
establishment alternative Labour Party, Jakarta, 1 October 2016. 





In relation to the twelve political parties that participated in legislative elections 
in 2014, only five accepted the FSPMI offer. These five parties were PAN, PKS, PDIP, 
the United Development Party (PPP), and The Justice and Unity Party (PKP). According 
to the head of the FSPMI Bekasi, several political parties rejected the partnership they 
offered due to their concerns over competition for votes between party cadres and union 
candidates.124 Meanwhile, the refusal of certain political parties to nominate union cadres 
was greatly determined by the party’s decision to prioritise candidates from internal 
cadres and their disagreement with the FSPMI strategy to nominate their cadres for 
different parties.125 This indicates that political parties recognise the strength of the bloc 
voting that the union claimed, and that to accept or reject the strategy being built by the 
FSPMI, particularly in Bekasi, is now an important consideration for them. 
For its political campaigns, the FSPMI in Bekasi formed success teams to target 
potential voters, both in factories and worker residences. The success team’s members 
were FSPMI officers at branch, sector and factory levels, who were unpaid voluntary 
recruits. The structure of success teams is such that more members are recruited at the 
lower levels. The upper level consisted of a success team working at district and 
municipal levels, acting as a campaign coordinator for nine candidates from the FSPMI 
who competed in the 2014 legislative elections in Bekasi. The second (or middle) layer 
is a success team formed on the basis of electoral areas divided into four groups: the core 
team, the sub-district coordinator (korcam), the village coordinator (kordes), and the field 
coordinator (korlap). The third (or low) level is a success team formed at the factory level 
specifically to promote a certain union candidate based on their electoral area. They 
campaigned in the factory canteen during meal times, used union meetings to assist with 
campaigning, visited commuter pickup points where workers usually congregate to wait 
for their transport home, and utilised union offices in the factory as campaign centres to 
attract workers and introduce union candidates.126  
For district level elections, the FSPMI placed five union cadres in five out of six 
electorate areas (dapil) in the district of Bekasi. While at the municipal electoral level, 
the FSPMI only placed two of its cadres in two of the five electoral areas in the city of 
Bekasi. This strategy was implemented to avoid competition between union candidates 
 
124 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
125  Interviews with Jalika, parliament member in Bekasi district, Bekasi 25 September 2016; interview with 
Abay, parliament member in Bekasi district, Bekasi 25 September 2016. 





so that they could achieve maximum votes from workers in each electoral area they 
represented. Thus, it is apparent that the FSPMI learned from their electoral experience 
in 2009, particularly in the Batam and Serang districts, where running multiple candidates 
in the same electoral area would have divided the concentration of votes from their 
members. They also seem to have understood the potential distribution of votes in the 
eleven electoral areas in Bekasi. Out of twelve electoral areas in Bekasi (six at district 
level and six at municipal level), the FSPMI only nominated their candidates for seven 
electoral areas, which they calculated those most likely to allow them to gain potential 
votes. 
The open campaigns were conducted centrally, at district and municipal levels, 
centrally, at PT Kepsonic, a factory belonging to a Korean investor that had been 
abandoned due to a bankruptcy case. At this factory during the campaign days, no 
political parties’ flags were flying, just those of the FSPMI and the KSPI.127 The nine 
FSPMI candidates in Bekasi were displayed on the same posters and banners with the 
logo and name of the six parties that had nominated the union candidates. The same 
templates of posters and banners were also used by the FSPMI to promote its legislative 
candidates on social media, such as Facebook and YouTube. One message was presented 
in the form of a short video on the FSPMI website urging workers to vote only on the 
basis of the names of union legislative candidates in the ballot, not according to the 
symbols of the political parties attached to them, although under Law Number 8/2012 on 
Legislative Elections voters are allowed to vote for either. This sort of campaign led to 
protests from several local political party officials, as they argued that the FSPMI had 
misconducted the campaign process.128  
In an interview, one local party official questioned the political motives of the 
unions in relation to their campaign strategy, as well as the purpose of building a political 
alliance that it ignored the role of political party in the campaign.129 In addition, the 
FSPMI is deemed to exclude or equalise the existence of the platforms of each political 
party and to undermine the atmosphere of the campaign, as is usually run by candidates 
from most political parties.130 Consequently, the campaign process ran separately, with 
 
127 Personal observation of FSPMI political campaign at PT Kepsonic, Bekasi 22 March 2014.  
128 Separated interviews with PDIP, PAN and PKS party officers, Bekasi 23-25 September 2016. 
129 Interview with Iwan, member of success team of PDIP Bekasi branch, Bekasi 25 September 2016. 





different success teams representing the unions, and local political party officials deciding 
to campaign on behalf of candidates other than those put forward by the union.  
In the case of PT Kepsonic, political campaign activities included introducing 
profiles and the serial number of union candidates on the ballot, as well as explanations 
on how to vote and fold the ballot paper, all to a soundtrack of popular dangdut music 
and thematic worker’s songs. The political promises and speeches of the union 
campaigners that were generally related to labour issues that also often raised during 
labour demonstrations, such as minimum wage formulation, the abolition of outsourcing 
practices, health insurance and pensions, hospitals for workers, labour regulations, 
unilateral layoffs, and the importance of workers as a political class. At the core of this 
strategy, in the spirit of the Go Politics campaign, the unions sought to persuade as many 
of their members and families as possible to vote for their own officials. This situation 
was evident in their campaign taglines written on posters, banners and shirts, such as: 
“Workers Go Politics, from Factory to Public”, “Remember 9 April 2014, it is the Time 
for Labour to Vote Labour”, “Labour Go Politics Will Fight for Workers’ Prosperity”.131  
Campaigns in each electoral area (sub-districts) were conducted by mobilising the 
FSPMI members to support the Labour Go Politics campaign. The mobilisation of 
workers was enabled through mass rallies (pawai), using motorcycle parades and open-
topped vehicles equipped with loud speakers and supported by the establishment of 
volunteer posts in several houses belonging to FSPMI members.132 Certain FSPMI’s 
candidates preferred to adopt a meet-the-people or blusukan-style campaign to meet their 
constituents and seek support in their specific electoral areas.133 They did not rely solely 
on FSPMI officials as a success team but also recruited volunteers from local 
organisations, for instance youth groups (karang taruna), farmer groups, religious and 
community leaders such as ustadz, and the leaders of household and neighbourhood 
groups (RT and RW). The blusukan-style campaign was popularised by Joko Widodo, 
the current Indonesian President during his campaign for the governorship of Jakarta in 
2012. In the blusukan-style campaign, a candidate meets directly with their constituents 
to introduce themselves and to explain their programmes, predominantly by undertaking 
door-to-door visits to people’s homes, and visiting traditional markets, villages and small-
 
131 Personal observation of FSPMI political campaign at PT Kepsonic, Bekasi 22 March 2014.   
132 Direct observation at a campaign day in Bekasi district on 23 March 2014.  
133 The word “blusukan” originated from a Javanese word which means walk into every corner of a new 






scale streets to meet potential voters. The candidates also attended community events, 
such as religious prayers (pengajian), arisan, community service (kerja bakti), and others. 
In Western democracies, this method of campaigning is sometimes referred to as “retail 
politics” (Arifianto et al. 2015: 56). 
In an interview with Nyumarno, the FSPMI’s legislative candidate at dapil six in 
Bekasi, who was nominated by the PDIP, he admitted that his blusukan strategy was not 
onlu inspired by Jokowi's campaign style but he regarded it as the most effective method 
for legislative candidates like him - who had extremely limited financial ability - to reach 
out to voters and gain support on election day. Moreover, he stated that he needed to meet 
potential voters as much as possible, because he does not originate from Bekasi and his 
constituents were relatively diverse, consisting not only of workers in the manufacturing 
sectors but also informal workers such as farmers, traders and workers in the service 
industry.134 The same opinion was also conveyed by Aji, the FSPMI’s legislative 
candidate in dapil three in Bekasi district, representing the PKPI, who stated that the open 
proportional electoral system had not only caused disagreements among candidates - who 
become increasingly competitive - but voters have also become smarter and are more 
likely to support candidates they know. 
It is not easy for electoral newcomers such as union cadres to obtain significant 
support amid vote-buying practices, money politics and the strong political influence of 
the oligarchy or so-called “old players” in Indonesian politics (Aspinall and Mietzner 
2014: 32). In the interviews, I asked several FSPMI officials and legislative candidates to 
give their own assessment of the Labour Go Politics campaign. Most concluded that apart 
from union fragmentation problems, a lack of political education for workers and 
technical obstacles, one other major obstacle was the challenge of changing voter habits 
when they were up against vote-buying and money politics. At the grassroots level, 
money politics and vote-buying is commonly known by various terms, such as: cendol 
money, cigarette money, pulsa money, and envelope money. This is the practice of 
candidates giving money, gifts of various sorts, and donations which would benefit 
communities, to their constituents. In addition to the old elites and the dominance of 
business-politicians it can be seen in the existence of many former legislators in Bekasi 
District who were re-elected in the 2014 legislative election.  
 






Concerning the fifty candidates elected in the 2014 legislative elections in Bekasi 
District, fifteen were members of parliament who were re-elected for the second time, 
while five were elected for the third time.135 This demonstrates the strong presence of old 
players in the context of local politics in Bekasi, which is also well-known as one of the 
strongest base areas of the Golkar Party, the ruling party during Suharto’s era. In the 2004 
and 2009 legislative elections, the votes and seats gained by the Golkar Party in the Bekasi 
district parliament came second after the PKS (2004) and the Democratic Party (2009). 
While in the 2014 elections, the Golkar Party succeeded in becoming the winning party, 
with the total number of votes they received reaching 23 per cent (ten seats in the Bekasi 
district parliament office). 
Regarding the Labour Go Politics campaign, in the end, two of the nine candidates 
from FSPMI Bekasi managed to gain district parliamentary seats (DPRD II). These were 
Nurdin Muhidin, who ran with the PAN, and Nyumarno who ran with the PDIP. Both 
were elected after receiving surplus votes, as they managed to collect the largest 
proportion of votes among other legislative candidates from their respective parties. As 
newcomers, the votes they won were impressive. Nurdin’s votes were the highest among 
the 57 legislative candidates from the PAN in the district of Bekasi. In comparison with 
nine elected candidates from the same electoral area, he ranked number three, below the 
votes of Iip Bustomi (16,143 votes) from the Democrat Party and Jejen Sayuti (11,004 
votes) from the PDIP. These two names are not only well-known business-politician 
figures in Bekasi but are also recorded as having been re-elected three times as members 
of parliament in the district of Bekasi since the 2004 legislative elections.  
As for Nyumarno, he managed to collect the second highest number of votes 
among eight candidates from the PDIP who competed together in the dapil six district of 
Bekasi. The greatest number of votes for PDIP candidate in this electoral area were 
obtained by Yudhi Darmansyah, who is the son of a senior politician from the PDIP and 
was elected as the youngest candidate among the 50 elected legislative members in the 
2014 legislative elections in Bekasi. Among the elected candidates in the dapil six District 
of Bekasi, the votes cast for Nyumarno placed him in fifth position out of eight elected 
candidates. He managed to outperform two popular politicians and former members of 
the district of Bekasi parliament in 2009-2014, specifically H. Abay Subarna (5,841 
 
135 The five politicians in Bekasi district who were elected for a third time in the 2004, 2009 and 2014 
elections are: Aep Sjaiful Rohman (PDIP), Zaenuddin (PKS), Syamsul (PKS), Jejen Sayuti (PDIP) and 





votes) from the Democrat Party and Yayah Ratnasari (5,092 votes) from the PDIP. See 
Table 4.1 below for a full breakdown of the electoral results for nine FSPMI candidates 
in Bekasi.  
Table 4.1: The 2014 Election Results for Nine FSPMI Candidates under the Labour Go 


















Iswan Abdullah PKS National 9/9 27,426 234,477 4/9 
Rustan PDIP Provincial 2/6 34,688 252,432 4/6 
Nurdin Muhidin* PAN District/1 8/9 10,981 22,905 1/9 
Suparno  PKPI District/2 2/6 3,961 4,980 1/6 
Aji PAN District/3 8/8 2,293 20,513 3/8 
Susanto PKP District/5 1/5 2,217 3,001 1/5 
Nyumarno* PDIP District/6 6/8 6,092 41,704 2/8 
Hendi Suhendi PPP Municipal/4 10/10 1,013 8,780 5/10 
Masrul Jambak PKPI Municipal/5 3/9 603 2,992 3/9 
Source:  Raw data drawn from unpublished document issued by the Electoral Commission (KPU).  
*Elected as legislative members in Bekasi district for the period of 2014-2019. 
Examining the track records and personal capacity of Nurdin and Nyumarno, we 
can recognise that they deserved to be elected in Bekasi’s 2014 election. Nurdin is known 
as a great orator not only at every labour demonstration in Bekasi but also at the national 
level (Jakarta). Compared to other candidates, he is well-known by workers in Bekasi. 136 
He has been a union leader not only at factory level but also at a branch level, and 
furthermore, he has even been a labour representative in the Bekasi wage council, the 
body which determines minimum wages for workers in the industrial zones of Bekasi 
district. At the time of becoming a member of the wage council in Bekasi district, he 
managed to fight for minimum wage increases of up to 23 per cent.137 During the Labour 
Go Politics campaign, he not only relied on campaigning in front of factories and 
 
136 Interview with Maxie Elia, former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta, 23 August 2016. 
137 This increase was recorded as the highest in Bekasi since the new minimum wage policy was established 





mobilising workers in mass campaigns, he also campaigned creatively, utilising social 
media, such as YouTube and Facebook.138 
As for Nyumarno, he has more political experience than other FSPMI candidates 
in Bekasi. Besides being FSPMI’s official and labour advocate, he worked in the 
parliament office as an expert member of staff’ (staff ahli) for Rieke Diyah Pitaloka, a 
well-known national legislator from the PDIP. He was also Pitaloka’s campaign 
coordinator for the Bekasi area during her run for Governor of West Java Province in 
February 2013. This experience and the political networks he has built were invaluable 
political resources, contributing to his success in the 2014 legislative elections in Bekasi 
(Hoban 2014; Tjandra 2017). In the interview, he claimed that he was allocated as the 
legislative candidate in the most challenging electoral area, seeing as most of the voters 
were non-union members such as farmers, traders and workers in informal sectors. This 
fact has forced him to look for strategies other than those outlined by the FSPMI success 
team, for instance the recruitment of non-labour volunteers and the blusukan-style 
campaign.139 
 Family background was also believed to play a significant role in the success of 
the two FSPMI cadres in Bekasi.140 In relation to the nine FSPMI candidates, Nurdin is 
the only native (ethnic Sundanese) of Bekasi, whereas Nyumarno benefited from the 
position of his father-in-law, who is a prominent public figure in his electoral area.141 
Both elected candidates had significant support not only from workers but also other 
societies who were not union members.142 This situation seems to be different compared 
with other union candidates who are highly dependent on support from workers, 
especially FSPMI members. Nevertheless, Nurdin and Nyumarno were successful in their 
political experimentation under the Labour Go Politics campaign, by entering the local 
parliament office in Bekasi district. Their achievement could inspire for countless other 
unionists and labour activists elsewhere in the country to get involved in electoral politics. 
They educated the local union leaders concerning the potential benefits of strategic and 
 
138 One of his campaigns on YouTube has been seen by more than 1700 viewers since its release on 20 
March 2014. See this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I4u1lNZRd8c (Accessed 12 August 
2017). 
139  Interview with Nyumarno, member of local parliament and former union leader in Bekasi, 28 September 
2016. 
140 Interview with Handoko, founder and leader of Omah Tani, Pekalongan 20 January 2016.  
141  Votes for Nyumarno were predominantly cast by voters from the Wanareja and Sidomukti villages, two 
places where his father in law and his wife’s family are living. Interview with Saman, member of success 
team for Nyumarno in Wanareja village, Bekasi 29 September 2016.  





active participation in formal politics, not just on wage-setting and other areas of 
industrial relations policy, but on broader issues that affect workers, like health and 
education policies. This optimism was at least visible at the time of their inauguration 
with the presence of thousands of workers and a “command car” parade, complete with 
loudspeakers that were used to lead the workers during the demonstration and attracting 
plenty of attention from the public and coverage by the mass media during their 
inauguration.143  
Having examined the way in which the FSPMI’s leaders built their electoral 
strategy in the 2014 legislative elections, it can be said that the FSPMI have successfully 
learned from their experience and failure in the 2009 legislative elections. Lacking 
political experimentations in mobilising members for electoral contestation, the FSPMI 
has strengthened its political movement through the strategy called the Labour Go politics 
movement. This strategy provides a counter-argument to the notion that Indonesian 
unions are politically insignificant. The way FSPMI leaders have established the 
movement and mobilised its collective resources has been a crucial determinant in the 
success of FSPMI gaining seats for its two officials to seat in the local parliament of 
Bekasi; however, they alone are not a sufficient explanation of the FSMPI’s increased 
political capacity in contesting legislative elections. The other main factors that can be 
derived are the organisational capacity to revitalise its movement, political support from 
labour organisations outside the unions, and Bekasi being the most union-dense area in 
Indonesia.  
 The FSPMI has successfully developed its capacity as a union federation through 
revitalisation of its economic and political functions, including a willingness to adopt new 
electoral strategies. This attempt is impossible to achieve without the support of union 
leadership, human resources, finances, and solidarity of union leaders from national to 
factory levels, including militant and voluntary success teams at the grassroots level. In 
contrast to the nomination of union leaders from other unions, which has tended to lean 
towards individuals, the FSPMI as a union organisation has been directly involved in 
designing and developing union-party alliances, especially in local elections.  
 
 
143 Personal observation during the inauguration of elected parliament member in Bekasi district on 8 





In addition to serving as the main base for FSPMI membership, as in the case of 
Bekasi, the socio-political characteristics of the labour movement in this region are also 
central to explaining the success of Labour Go Politics movement in the 2014 legislative 
elections. Since large scale construction of industrial estates in Bekasi began in the early 
2000s, this region has been become the main barometer of the Indonesian labour 
movement. Trade union membership have been building in this region since the 
establishment of new trade union law in 2000 and has been followed by a significant 
increase in industrial conflicts and the escalation of labour mobilisations, such as labour 
strikes and street demonstrations. Because of its proximity to Jakarta - the capital city of 
Indonesia - almost all of the ideas for national labour demonstrations came from unions 
and workers in Bekasi. Thus, a feature of politics in Bekasi, including trade union politics, 
is often the large extent to which it reflects the national situation. This situation has not 
only contributed to the formation of fairly solid loyalty among workers in this area - one 
of the important conditions for successful in electoral contestation - but has also facilitated 
union leaders to mobilise their members in elections.  
The Labour Vote Labour Movement in Serang 
The Labour Vote Labour movement was a strategy pursued by the inter-union alliance in 
Serang district, Banten province to support nine trade union elites who ran for legislative 
seats via five different parties in the 2009 legislative elections. The movement was 
initiated by several leaders from two labour organisations, specifically Serang’s Labour 
Solidarity Forum (FSBS) and Serang’s Trade Unions Alliance (ASPSB). The movement 
was declared in Cikande on 15 December 2008 at the FSBS annual meeting. During this 
period, unlike the central offices of most unions, which had difficulties in uniting the 
leaders and primarily took a firm stance against involvement in electoral politics, most 
union leaders in Serang were relatively enthusiastic about supporting their candidates in 
the election.144  
According to Saukani, the head of the DPD SPN Banten province, the situation is 
strongly influenced by the rapidly growing labour movement in Serang District, which is 
indicated by the absence of generational gaps between union officials and the balance of 
strength between each union that emerged in the late 1990s.145 As stated by Tornquist 
 
144 Interview with Kahar Cahyono, former FSBS officials and one of initiators of the Labour Vote Labour 
movement in Serang, Jakarta 19 December 2016. 





(2004: 388), elite factionalism regularly emerges in a union which is dominated by an 
“old boss” who tends to strive to maintain their position and influence in the union. 
Further, Rokhani (2009: 224), argued that competition for union membership and union 
elites’ lack of willingness to accept innovative ideas could be reasons why it is difficult 
to unite the labour movement in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
According to Kahar, former coordinator of the FSBS, the decision to form the 
Labour Vote Labour movement in Serang was motivated by at least two considerations. 
The first was to address the decision of some union elites, previously proposed by some 
political parties, to be nominated as legislative candidates. The FSBS and ASPBS, as the 
largest inter-union organisation in Serang, felt a need to form a more organised movement 
so that the possibility of union candidates being elected would be greater than fighting 
alone. In addition, several union candidates who were supported by the Labour Vote 
Labour movement were FSBS and ASPSB officials.  
The second was related to the increasing frustration of trade unionists, owing to a 
lack of supervision and legal action against various labour violations regulated by Law 
Number 13/2003 concerning Manpower. Their disappointment intensified when at the 
end of their term, Serang districts parliament members approved a local government 
proposal on the enactment of Local Regulation Number 7/2009 related to employment, 
which the union believed to be highly problematic. Local Regulation Number 7/2009 was 
believed by the FSBS and ASPSB to result from a lack of concern by parliament members 
regarding labour issues at the local level, as it merely copied most articles regulated by 
Labour Law Number 13/2013. This subsequently led each of the union elites in the FSBS 
and ASPSB in Serang to collectively encourage and support candidates from unions in 
the 2009 elections.146 
The Labour Vote Labour movement in Serang was not the only union movement 
to engage in electoral politics during this period. Similar movements also emerged in 
several other industrial areas in Indonesia, such as in Tangerang, Batam, Medan, 
Semarang and Demak. However, what distinguishes the movement in Serang District 
from other areas was the existence of several trade unions which formed an inter-union 
alliance to support union candidates in legislative elections. Furthermore, in other regions, 
each union worked by forming a partnership with certain political parties. For instance, 
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the SPN Tangerang branch formed a partnership with the PKS to support the nomination 
of its cadre, Siti Istikhoroh. In Batam, the FSPMI nominated its ten cadres through five 
different parties, while in Medan, the Indonesian Free Labour Union (Serikat Buruh 
Merdeka Indonesia, SBMI) supported its five officials, who competed in the Deli Serdang 
and the Medan municipal parliament via the Labour Party. 
The FSBS and the ASPSB are two labour organisations designed to function as a 
medium for the channelling of union aspirations and building solidarity among workers. 
Both originate from one organisation as most of the FSBS officials are ASPSB members 
and vice versa. The FSBS was founded on 11 September 2002 by several labour NGO 
activists and union leaders in Serang district.  
The existence of labour NGO activists in the establishment of the FSBS in Serang 
confirms the importance of the contribution of NGOs to the establishment of a non-union 
labour organisation in Indonesia, particularly at the end of the New Order and the first 
wave of the reformation era. Initially, the FSBS was formed as a communication forum 
among union leaders in Serang District. Its main activity was to conduct union meetings 
to share experiences and discuss solutions concerning several labour issues, such as 
violence against labour activists committed by hired thugs, unpaid salaries and unilateral 
dismissal. During its development, FSBS activities expanded, including providing 
mediation between unions, employers and the government; educating union cadres; and 
mobilising unions and workers in labour demonstrations.  
In order to avoid resembling unions, and to maintain neutrality and prevent inter-
union conflicts, in 2004 some leaders of the FSBS formed a new organisation, the ASPSB. 
Thus, the activities of the two organisations were divided and each had distinct functions 
and objectives. The FSBS functioned as an organisation engaged in empowerment, 
education and training for union cadres, and conducted research related to labour issues. 
The ASPSB in Serang functioned as a pressure organisation which had the purpose of 
mobilising unions and their members in labour demonstrations, and mediating workers’ 
interests with policy makers. 
In the Labour Vote Labour movement, the FSBS and the ASPSB Serang acted 
with an ad hoc structure designed to coordinate campaigns promoting union candidates 
and channel the political aspirations of their members in the context of the legislative 





elected, activists within these two organisations established success teams and volunteers 
to identify potential voters domiciled in Serang, to form a communication network among 
union leaders in factories, and to campaign among their members for support. They even 
planned different agendas and work programmes for selected candidates (somewhat 
optimistically) at both district and municipal levels in the event of them taking seats in 
parliament.147 
Choices of political party and electoral area were negotiated by each candidate 
prior to the Labour Vote Labour movement being declared; i.e. four months before 
election day. Consequently, some candidates supported by this movement inevitably 
competed in the same electoral area. For instance, Aryo Sujatmiko and Ngatri registered 
in Serang district 2 and Rahmat Suryadi and Halimi registered in Serang municipality 4 
(see Table 4.2). Despite the need to ensure that trade unionists who wished to run under 
the Labour Vote Labour movement would get support from the inter-union alliance, it 
also implied that the FSBS and the ASBS as campaign coordinators did not have the 
power to prevent unaligned union elites from running. Additionally, of the nine union 
candidates supported in the Labour Vote Labour movement, there were also a few former 
union elites who competed at the district and municipal levels. They ran individually, 
either under certain mainstream parties or two related labour parties (the Labour Party 
and the Indonesian Entrepreneur and Workers Party), and included Sanusi and Purbo 
Asmoro, who were former members of SPN Serang and ran with PAN, and Adhadi 
Romli, who was the former head of the DPW FSPMI, Banten province and nominated by 
the PDIP. 
As in other industrial centres such as Batam, Tangerang, Medan, Semarang and 
Demak, none of the union candidates supported by the Labour Vote Labour movement in 
the Serang election won a ticket to the parliament office in the 2009 legislative elections. 
The results were disappointing, even if they were not completely below the union’s 
expectation.148 For example, Argo Priyo Sujatmiko attracted only a third of the votes 
gained by the elected candidate in his electoral area. Halimi and Ripi Uripno Aji, who 
were union branch leaders at a district level, also failed to command a considerable 
number of votes. Not even the national and regional union officials who ran for national 
 
147 Interview with Kahar Cahyono, former FSBS officials and one of initiator of the Labour Vote Labour 
movement in Serang, Jakarta 19 December 2016. 
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and provincial level positions could secure enough votes to get elected. The combined 
votes cast for the three union candidates who ran at the district level was not even half of 
the number required for a candidate to be elected.  
 
Table 4.2: The 2009 Election Results for Nine Union Candidates under the Labour Vote 











votes in the 
electorate 







PAN National/1 7 out of 7 1,932 10,379 4 out of 7 
Hafuri 
Yahya 
PAN Provincial/1 9 out of 
11 
2000 44,456 5 out of 11 
Puji Santoso PMB Provincial/1  1,004 2,811 1 out of 4 
Argo Priyo 
Sujatmiko 
PAN District/2 6 out of 7 348 4,422 4 out of 7 
Ngatri  PMB District/2 1 out of 1 43 113 1 out of 1 
Isbandi 
Anggono 
PAN District/3 7 out of 8 313 7,328 6 out of 8 
Rahmat 
Suryadi 
PPP Municipal/4 2 out of 6 400 3,715 3 out of 6 
Halimi PKP Municipal/4 1 out of 1 24 50 1 out of 1 
Ripi Uripno 
Aji 
PKS Municipal/4 2 out of 5 118 2,138 5 out of 5 
Source: Raw data drawn from unpublished document issued by the Electoral Commission (KPU).  
 
Several questions emerged about the overall performance of trade union 
candidates and their defeat in the election. One labour NGO activist interviewed for this 
thesis blamed the strategy conducted by unions, which was too focused on gaining votes 
from workers, particularly union members.149 Further, as he observed, the political 
campaign work undertaken by the FSBS and ASPSB was more focused at the level of 
union leaders and had minimal impact at the grassroots level, such as in local 
neighbourhoods and the narrow alleys where workers usually live. Another labour NGO 
argued that the idea of engaging in electoral politics was only understood by the union 
elite, because they were only interested in gaining political power. At the grassroots level, 
most of the workers still failed to understand the relationship between the elections and 
the role of the unions in politics.150 As one informant argued: 
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Many workers came during the union campaign, but not all the workers who 
attended the campaign intended to hear a political speech from union 
candidates. Many came just to follow their friends or to be entertained because 
they were already bored with their routine and repetitive work in the factory. 
These facts can also be observed when workers participated in labour 
demonstrations. Moreover, not all the workers who lived in Serang had a 
Serang ID card (Kartu Tanda Penduduk, KTP). Even if they had a KTP of 
Serang, it did not guarantee that they would choose union cadres. This was 
because for most workers, the election means just “nyoblos” [to brush off the 
election]. Also, they frequently did not know what effect it would have on 
them. So, judging from the experience of the 2009 elections [and 2014 
elections], the union’s participation in the elections still only appears in the 
ideas and the interests of the union elite at the senior level, while at the 
grassroots not much has changed.151 
In an interview with Kahar, who was part of the success team for the FSBS 
candidates, gave his own assessment of the defeat. It supposedly boiled down to the lack 
of financial resources to support the campaign, the immaturity of workers associated with 
the political class, and the strength of the influence of money politics from wealthy 
candidates. He also argued that party affiliation was a significant factor in determining 
whether union candidates gained a significant number of votes. Concerning the five 
political parties that became the political vehicles of unions in the 2009 legislative 
elections in Serang, the total votes collected were not more than 4 per cent. This is a far 
cry from the total votes of other political parties, such as the PDIP and Golkar, which 
achieved 6.7 per cent and 17.1 per cent respectively. The PMB and PKP, which are the 
new parties and political vehicle for three out of nine union candidates, attracted only 0.4 
per cent and 0.3 per cent respectively at the district level. 
The strategy of multiple union candidates with different parties running in the 
same constituency divided workers’ votes and obviously confused the constituents, 
especially the union members.152 If the union elites had been able to agree to campaign 
together but delegate responsibility for each electoral area to a single union candidate, 
they could have maximised trade union candidates’ chances of being elected. 
Additionally, they could also have run multi-party trade union tickets at the district 
election level by nominating single union candidates with various affiliated parties in each 
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electoral area. Therefore, the union could have had the opportunity to allocate its members 
in several areas, as well as to maintain its political neutrality. 
The failure of the Labour Vote Labour movement in the 2009 legislative elections 
made union elites in Serang use individual partnerships with political parties to contest 
the 2014 legislative elections. This strategy was chosen because in reality the union elites 
who were successfully elected in the 2009 election were precisely those who were not 
supported by the Labour Vote Labour movement. In this regard, the attempt to build a 
united-front involving different unions in Serang seems only sensible as an idea among 
elites, but difficult to implement in the context of creating a more consolidated strategy. 
This constraint is particularly related to attempts to gain political support from workers 
of different unions, and the lack of organisational capacity such as the KPSBS and ASPSB 
to build partisan politics directly with well-established political parties. Moreover, the 
majority of union elites in Serang who competed in the 2014 elections were not only 
union officials but also party’s cadres or party administrators who had their own political 
motivations and strategies to gain labour support and other potential voters in their 
electoral areas. 
Individual Partnerships with Political Parties 
Another form of trade union political strategy in the nomination of unionists as legislative 
candidates is via individual partnerships between union elites and certain political parties. 
Through this strategy, the union elites compete in elections by joining certain political 
parties, though they generally do not receive support from their home union organisation. 
However, as unionists, they wish to gain votes from the union membership as well as the 
public. According to my findings, most of these candidates viewed their engagement in 
electoral politics as a necessary stage to launch their political careers. These candidates 
have benefited from their positions in unions and society and used their close relationships 
with party officials to succeed in electoral politics.  
Heryanto (2010: 190) referred to this category of legislative candidates as “lone 
campaigners” who believed that anyone could run in the election, regardless of their 
financial and political resources, and moreover, that campaigning could be undertaken on 
an individual basis, sometimes without the presence of organised supporters. Heryanto 
(2010: 190) has argued that the increasing trend of newcomers and individual 





the new electoral system. The establishment of the new electoral system for the 2009 
elections led many people to “the illusion that all citizens are politically equal in 
elections” and they believed that they had a chance to be elected regardless of their 
political and financial resources (Heryanto 2010: 191). However, the expansion of new 
media and popular culture must have played a significant role in stimulating people to 
contest elections. He argued that new digital media and technology is both “socialising 
and alienating” which means it has increased people’s knowledge in some areas but 
disempowered them in others (Heryanto 2010: 191). 
Apart from the absence of a labour-related party, this strategy was conducted by 
most of the union elites that participated in the 2014 legislative elections. Hence, it can 
be ascertained that 43 out of 80 trade union officials who competed in the 2014 election 
ran for legislative tickets using this strategy. The FSP KEP KSPSI, the SBSI 1992 and 
the FSP KEP KSPI are three examples of trade unions at the federation level that have 
officially remained neutral in electoral politics, even though some of their union officials 
were nominated by political parties in the 2014 legislative elections.153 For example, Fery 
Nurzali, the vice-chairman of the FSP KEP SPSI and member of the executive board of 
the KSPSI, ran as a national legislative candidate with the Gerindra Party. Sahat 
Butarbutar, member of the executive board of the FSP KEP KSPI, ran for local parliament 
office candidate under the Gerindra Party. The chairman of the SBSI 1992 in the Medan 
branch, Julian Napitupulu, was nominated for the Medan Municipal Parliament by the 
Gerindra Party. Apart from their positions as union officials, a few were also active in 
politics, having become party officials at the branch level (DPD) or had even been 
involved in campaign teams with certain political parties in the gubernatorial, mayoral or 
regency elections. This background, coupled with the proximity of a political party, has 
provided union elites with greater opportunities to use their personal abilities to lobby 
party leaders for parliamentary tickets in the election. 
In comparison to other unions, unionists from the SPN comprised the greatest number of 
individuals who ran for parliament in the 2014 election. Of the 43 unionists who ran 
individually in the 2014 legislative elections, 15 were the SPN officials. They were 
nominated by several political parties, in national, provincial and local elections (see 
Table 4.3). The involvement of SPN elites in electoral politics is not a new phenomenon, 
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because since the 2004 legislative elections several of its elites have been involved in 
contesting parliamentary seats. For instance, Bambang Wirahyoso, the national chairman 
of SPN, challenged as a legislative candidate for the PKS in West Java province, and 
Sunaryo, the chairman of SPN’s Tangerang branch office, was nominated by the PAN for 
Banten provincial parliament. 
The SPN is one of the few trade union federations that from its establishment in 
2003 perceived electoral politics as a strategic way for unions to become involved in 
policy-making.154 The decision to engage in electoral politics was officially declared at 
their second national congress in 2005. In the 2009 legislative elections, the SPN 
established a political partnership with one of the Islamic parties, the PKS. At that time, 
several SPN leaders at the national level already had close relationships with PKS leaders. 
In addition, the PKS was the only political party that offered the SPN a real chance to 
nominate its cadres. However, the SPN’s political affiliation with PKS is not permanent, 
to avoid co-optation of the union by the political party and appreciating that it would draw 
criticism from its organisational circles.155 According to Iwan Kusmawan, the chairman 
of the SPN, it is necessary to work with political parties if the union wants to engage in 
“practical politics”, and one possible way to achieve this  would be to run union 
candidates in the elections through established political parties.156 Fundamentally, 
political parties provide the only means for unionists to engage in electoral contestation, 
and therefore, increasing the number of union candidates meant convincing political 
parties to place union cadres on their electoral lists.   
In the 2014 legislative elections, the SPN attempted a new engagement strategy: 
giving free options to their cadres to run as individual candidates. Through this strategy, 
all decisions, from negotiations with political parties to the determination of electoral 
areas, to campaign activities and the establishment of success teams, are handed over to 
union candidates. The SPN through its national, provincial and local management boards 
still has a responsibility to mobilise and facilitate its candidates by organising events 
during the campaign period. This was drawn up by the SPN as its principal political target, 
to place as many union cadres in legislative office as possible, regardless of the political 
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party which nominates them. In addition, as a political vehicle, the existing political 
parties have no distinctive programmes that distinguish them from each other. The 
experience and failure of the 2009 legislative elections has also provided a lesson for the 
SPN, especially since none of its cadres won any parliamentary seats. Furthermore, 
limiting the partnership to only one political party is also considered an ineffective 
strategy, because the number of nominated cadres is dependent on the decisions of 
political parties, including the determination of the electoral area and ticket position in 
the ballot. For instance, in the 2009 legislative elections, the SPN Branch in Tangerang 
proposed six SPN cadres for nomination as legislative candidates with its affiliated party, 
the PKS; however, the party only accepted one ticket.157 
As newcomers and outsiders, it is difficult for union candidates to gain full support 
during political campaigns by relying on a party. In an election where multiple candidates 
from the same party compete to attract voters from the same electorate, the candidates 
who hold power in the local party (typically the executive board of the party) usually 
dominate the party machinery and use it to support their candidacy (Aspinall 2015: 102).  
Hence, “the party machine itself is a site of contestation” between outsiders and party 
cadres (Aspinall 2015: 102). Frequently, this situation has turned into a personal 
campaign for party elites and forced other non-party candidates to develop their own 
means of support. However, this fact had been anticipated by some union candidates 
interviewed in this study, so that they were surprised if they lacked support from the party 
during their campaigns.158 Despite limited financial ability, this situation caused the union 
candidates to be creative in organising their campaign strategy, including the formation 
of a campaign team. 
To attract significant potential votes, union candidates who ran individually used 
their personal networks and preferred to conduct individual meetings. Other union 
candidates targeted members by attending various union activities and lobbying their 
leaders to support their candidacy. Some union candidates who have strong traditional 
family structures (such as marga) formed family teams to support their legislative 
candidacy. They believed that the open-list system has changed the way that voters view 
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their political representatives. However, this new system has also changed the way voters 
respond to their legislative candidates. Voters are more pragmatic, challenging candidates 
by asking for more concrete benefits (cash or goods) in exchange for their votes, as other 
legislative candidates and their success teams also approach them.159 Thus, it can be 
understood that most union candidates who ran individually preferred a meet-the-people 
style of campaigning to holding large open-air party campaigns. In addition to large costs, 
open-air campaigning is considered ineffective, because the open-list system competition 
between candidates is increasingly stringent and voters tend to vote for candidates that 
they already know or those with a popular touch (Simandjuntak 2012; Aspinall 2014; 
Choi 2016). Therefore, relying on such a strategy is challenging for union candidates, 
especially in large electoral constituencies where a union candidate with limited financial 
support could not possibly visit every community in a sub-district, or at least not regularly 
enough to build the personal rapport that voters value so much. 
Some union elites with modest financial ability have established success teams 
staffed by between 5 to 20 people. As in many other places, the success teams have a 
pyramidal structure depending on union candidates’ financial capacity and the size of the 
constituency (sub-district, village, polling booth, and neighbourhood communities). A 
union candidate interviewed in this research stated that he was supported by a 20 person 
team, consisting of 5 unionist fellows from his home organisation and 15 people from his 
networks of community-level groups such as religious groups, an ethnic-based group and 
women’s groups.160 His campaign teams are charged with recruiting as many supporters 
as possible, mostly people within their networks; for instance their organisation members, 
relatives, neighbours, and friends. However, with regard to his success team, he stressed 
that 20 people was still far from enough to cover all six sub-districts, with 16 villages in 
his electorate area. He admitted that he has spent just over 300 million rupiah 
(US$20,000) from his own pocket for his candidacy and all the money has been spent on 
campaign promotional material (such as t-shirts, posters, banners and gifts), fees, fuel, 
food and drink, arranging meetings, and other sundry costs. Therefore, it can be said that 
union candidates who were involved in the 2014 elections by joining individual political 
parties are no different from party cadres or other newcomers, especially if the strategies 
they applied are no different to those of other candidates. 
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Table 4.3: The 2014 Election Results for SPN’s Legislative Candidates 
 
Name of Candidate Political 
Party 





Votes in the 
Candidate’s 
Constituency 
Ranking in the 
Electorate among 
Candidates from 
the Same Party  
Akhmad Zaini PKB Bogor district 1/9 1,616 20,657 2/9 
Iwan Kusmawan PKS Bogor district/3 6/8 3,566 24,337 4/8 
Lucky Hendarsyah Hanura Bogor municipal 2/8 134 3,766 5/8 
Zulkifli Pohan Nasdem Bogor municipal 4/8 259 3,210 5/8 
Suradi Nasdem Bekasi district 5/7 321 6,573 6/7 
Intan Dewi PAN Serang district 7/9 336 15,421 6/9 
Saeful Nufus Hanura Serang district 4/8 61 4,679 6/8 
Zaenal Abidin Hanura Serang district 1/10 2,115 10,760 1/10 
Hera Iskandar Nasdem Sukabumi district 3/9 3,003 11,303 1/9 
Ali Sholeh Hanura Pekalongan 
district 
7/9 493 4,041 2/9 
Maryana Hanura Sidoarjo district 6/8 2,201 12,421 7,8 
Kusmen PDIP Tuban district 9/11 1,650 14,321 7/11 
Dede Kamaludin Nasdem Sumedang district 6/8 528 9,765 7/8 
Budi Sumardi PAN Sukabumi district 6/7 678 7,654 5/7 
Source: the SPN and raw data drawn from an unpublished document issued by the Electoral Commission 
(KPU).  
 
  Most of the union candidates who ran individually in the 2014 elections were 
nominated by mid- to low-level parties and new parties such as the PKS, Hanura, Nasdem, 
PBB and PKPI. As Table 4.3 illustrates, of the 14 SPN cadres who ran individually in the 
2014 legislative elections, only three were nominated by well-established parties, for 
example the PDIP and PAN. In terms of ticket position, the SPN cadres were generally 
assigned mid- to low- ranking positions for a party ticket on the ballot. Even national 
leaders who were long-term union cadres, such as Iwan Kusmawan, were positioned well 
down the list. Although obtaining a party ticket is no longer a deciding factor in winning 
a seat through the open proportional system, it indicates that they did not have a serious 
chance of being elected. Moreover, data from Table 4.3 also reveals that most union 
candidates who ran individually in the 2014 legislative elections gained less than one-
third of the total votes of political parties in each union’s electoral area. At this point, it 
can be said that union candidates who ran individually for legislative tickets in the 2014 









Implications for Trade Union Politics 
The three case studies in this chapter show that democratic reforms in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia have provided trade unionists with greater opportunities to present an 
alternative form of political power via their engagement in electoral politics. Amid the 
dominance of business-politicians and old elites, such as those found in Bekasi, who often 
use electoral democracy to maintain their existence and political power for their own ends 
(Hadiz 2010; Aspinall and Mietzner 2014; Choi 2016), the increased involvement of trade 
unionists in elections has given an initial impression of success in relation to the political 
empowerment of civil society organisations in Indonesia. As democracy in Indonesia is 
still progressing, this development is certainly a positive indicator of the potential future 
progress of its democracy. As stated by Diamond (1999) and Beittinger-Lee (2010), the 
active participation of civil society groups in electoral democracy is a necessary step for 
the development of democracy itself and is needed to reshape and fulfil the demands and 
challenges for the next phase; the consolidation of democracy. Furthermore, Diamond 
(1999: 127) also stated that among the numerous functions of civil society in promoting 
democracy, preventing authoritarianism and stimulating people’s political participation 
is fundamental. Pluralist and vibrant civil society organisations can help to launch crucial 
reforms and stimulate people to participate in politics, and above all, elections. Therefore, 
the engagement of unionists in electoral politics should be considered a necessary step 
for increasing the quality of democratisation, because “no functioning, participatory 
democracy with an accountable government is conceivable without a vibrant civil 
society” (Beittinger-Lee 2010: 31). 
The trade unions in Indonesia have considerable potential as an alternative new 
political force outside the mainstream political party elites that have been instrumental in 
Indonesia’s political system. As part of a growing civil society organisation, Indonesia’s 
trade unions have material power that can be used politically due to the potential number 
of members across industrial sectors, as well as their networks and organisational 
structures at all levels, from national, provincial, and local, right down to the shop floor 
(Isaac and Sitalaksmi 2008; Silaban 2009; Wulandari 2009). Compared to political 
parties, which are characterised by open memberships, trade unions have a more binding 
membership, given that members and union officials have the same interests and needs, 
including organisational responsibilities that must be carried out between themselves 





as a minimum wage, social security, and labour regulations, are an integral part of 
political policy and so it possible for them to promote such issues in formal politics 
(Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010). In relation to local autonomy and highly 
competitive elections, winning local elections potentially has more to offer in union-dense 
localities, as Indonesia’s union membership is geographically concentrated, particularly 
in the industrial centres in the Java and Sumatra. 
The three case studies discussed in this chapter reveal several important 
implications for future trade union politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The first is 
that: union membership, organisational structure and networks are instrumental in 
building more organised trade unions, but they may not be enough when it comes to 
electoral politics. In the context of establishing an effective labour movement through 
strengthening the functions of trade unions as pressure groups - such as strikes and street 
demonstrations - this still only occurs within relatively controlled conditions, particularly 
with regard to the function and the role of union elites. Due to sharing similar issues and 
interests, such as the need for wage increases and the implementation of social security 
programs, workers can be mobilised by their union elites to take to the streets to 
demonstrate their demands. In contrast, in the context of electoral contestation, the ability 
of trade unions to influence workers’ decisions to follow the union line is limited and 
influenced by many factors that cannot be entirely controlled by the union elites. As a 
political process therefore, electoral engagement clearly requires unions to build effective 
political mobilisation and appropriate participation and interconnection of union elites 
and their members, especially regarding what to fight for through their involvement in 
electoral politics.  
Second, the wider political spaces offered by Indonesia’s electoral democracy for 
newcomers to engage in electoral contestation is not in line with the way in which workers 
and other constituents respond to union legislative candidates. This is clear from the low 
votes obtained by most union candidates, including trade union elites who were 
nominated by labour-related parties in the 2009 legislative elections. It seems that the 
benefits of struggling to enter the realm of policy-making by competing in electoral 
politics are obvious to the union elites, but most workers appear to either lack trust in 
union candidates or have failed to understand their political identify and role.162 Even 
union candidates that are widely known and have good reputations among workers, for 
 





instance Muchtar Pakpahan, Said Iqbal, Iwan Kusmawan, and Joko Heryanto, are not 
very successful in electoral contests. This indicates that relying on popular figure is not 
enough for unionists to gain optimum vote support from union members as well as other 
section of society.   
Third, strengthening members’ loyalty and gaining trust from workers are crucial 
for unionists in electoral contest. As stated by Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008: 232), trade 
unions in most countries, including Indonesia, have three important roles in fighting for 
the interests of their organisations and their members. First, to propose pro-union and pro-
labour legislation that will maintain their existence. Second, to push through collective 
bargaining via bilateral action with employers to establish and administer a set of common 
roles for workers and employers. Third, to fight for collective voice in political matters, 
directly or indirectly. In Indonesia, the implementation of these three union roles will be 
interlinked with several contemporary principal labour issues, such as: the demand for 
minimum wage increases; elimination of outsourcing; control of foreign workers; 
rejection of Government Regulation Number 78/2015 on the formulation of minimum 
wage; unilateral layoffs; union busting; the revision of Labour Law Number 13/2003. In 
the context of electoral politics, the extent to which trade unions will have the capacity to 
carry out what is considered their core roles will clearly influence members’ loyalty and 
whether they follow union direction in the election. As argued by Suwignyo (2008) and 
Juliawan (2014), the loyalty of union members to their elites is not only determined by 
voluntary and contractual relationships, but also derives from the elites’ ability to 
convince workers to fight for and solve their labour problems.  The fact that the problems 
faced by workers have not been resolved by the unions could explain why they tend to 
respond negatively to union-affiliated legislative candidates.163  
The experience of several reformist activists who were successfully elected in the 
2014 legislative elections serve as a good lesson learned for future union engagement in 
legislative elections. Among of these activists is Budiman Sujatmiko, a national 
legislative member of the PDIP in 2014-2019. When he ran as a national legislative 
candidate in the 2014 legislative elections, he offered three programmes to his 
constituencies, which he stressed were created to form political consensus between 
 
163 Isaac and Sitalaksmi (2008: 244) have categorised the collective bargaining activities of unions at 
national and industrial levels, as well as the extent of their joint consultation activities, as low. The only 





himself and potential voters on the problems in society and the solutions required.164 
These three programmes were to establish an aspirational house, to settle land conflict 
cases, and to propose the establishment of Village Law (RUU Desa). The first and second 
programmes were part of the political concessions between himself and potential voters 
regarding crucial issues necessary for most of society in his electoral areas. Meanwhile, 
the proposed creation of the Village Law was part of his big idea, as well as his political 
promise regarding the key role of parliament in producing legislation that would provide 
a broad range of benefits, especially for rural communities. They comprise 70 per cent of 
the Indonesian population but have received little attention in the development process. 
When asked about the increasing trend for reformist activists to be nominated as 
legislative candidates, he suggested that such candidates were different from most 
politicians, as they were mostly [assumed] to have strong ideals, organisational networks 
and experience with community advocacy programmes at grassroots level. But without 
alternative ideas and concrete programmes to offer to their constituencies, it will be 
difficult for them to gain trust and support from heterogeneous voters within the current 
electoral system, which is highly competitive and, in many cases, tends to be elitist and 
populist. 
The fourth is related to the type of partisan strategy unionists adopt in order to be 
nominated as legislative candidates. Regarding this choice, Indonesian unions face 
dilemmatic and challenging conditions. They are confronted with a political terrain in 
which no party espouses pro-labour principles (Caraway et al. 2015). Indonesia’s political 
parties differ little on policy matters and differentiate themselves primarily by whether 
they are religious or nationalist (Ufen 2008; Tomsa 2010; Aspinall 2014). The term 
“opposition party” is rarely used, as most parties in the post-Suharto era are involved in 
“oversized rainbow coalitions” (Aspinall 2015: 100). In addition, the typical left and right 
parties that could lead fierce debate and competition in elections is largely absent. As a 
result, political alliances built between legislative candidates and political parties are 
mostly no longer based on programmatic and ideological commonalities, but instead on 
short-term interests and the proximity of legislative candidates to party officials. In this 
regard, the choice of the majority of union elites to advance in the 2014 legislative 
elections through individual partnership with certain political parties - particularly 
without organisational support from home unions - has further weakened their position in 
 
164 Informal discussion with Budiman Sujatmiko during a conference at Warwick University, 28 July 





electoral contestations. The same is true of the unions’ choice to support their cadres’ 
nomination through different political parties, as in the case of Bekasi and Serang where 
union candidates from the same organisation have been nominated by different parties in 
the same electoral areas at national, provincial and district levels. These strategies not 
only have eroded workers’ trust, they have made them question the true political motives 
of union elites candidacies in electoral politics and confirmed that the candidates are no 
different from those outside the unions who approach workers to gain their potential votes 
for personal and elitist interests. In response to this challenge, as well as to the subsequent 
political developments and electoral system, it is crucial for Indonesian unions to develop 
their partisan politics using a more strategic and programmatic strategy, and particularly 
to consider the option of building a partisan coalition with one of the major well-
established political parties.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined union experiences in electoral politics by examining three case 
studies of trade unions’ engagement strategies for local electoral contestation. It reflects 
the diversification of strategies among some trade unions in their attempts to engage in 
electoral politics. Regarding the first strategy, the trade unions established partnerships 
with five different parties as a political vehicle to nominate their cadres in a local election. 
The trade unions promoted their candidates by establishing success teams and volunteers, 
and by mobilising their members under the movement termed Labour Go Politics. 
Through this strategy, the unions tried to consolidate the strength of their membership in 
supporting their cadres’ nomination, regardless of which political party was supporting 
them.  
In the second strategy, the trade unions established an inter-union alliance to 
support the nomination of their leaders through different political parties under the 
movement called Labour Vote Labour. Unlike the first strategy, which involved the 
FSPMI working alone to promote their cadre candidates, through the Labour Vote Labour 
movement several trade unions and labour organisation sought to consolidate their wider 
collective strengths to support candidates from various unions in one inter-union alliance.  
By contrast, the third strategy involved trade union elites competing in local elections by 
joining political parties without support from their union organisations. However, as 





It appears that union engagement in electoral politics is about the strategic use of 
new opportunities offered by democratic reforms to present unions and civil society actors 
as an alternative base of political power. Although most of the union candidates failed to 
gain significant votes, their experiences may have started to undermine the legacy of 
economic unionism which was firmly institutionalised by the New Order regime. A 
lesson learned from the unionists who successfully won legislative seats in the 2014 
legislative elections was that the personal qualities of union candidates as well as their 
track records are necessary to convince workers to support union cadres’ nominations. 
However, also crucial in determining their success in local electoral contestations is the 
ability of union candidates to recruit success team members; map membership and 
potential voters; communicate their plans and programs to workers; strengthen their 
networks; maximise their own political resources. 
The three case studies discussed in this chapter also reflect how union candidates 
in local electoral settings still face various structural and political challenges in 
transforming their collective power into electoral contestation. On the one hand, the 
enthusiasm of the union elites for engaging in electoral politics is apparent, especially 
after the establishment of the open-list system following the 2009 legislative elections, 
where the number of union candidates nominated by political parties increased. On the 
other hand, most workers still seem to lack an understanding of their strategic position 
and identity as well as being reluctant to trust their union candidates. Therefore, 
strengthening union organisation and building political consciousness is a necessary 
priority for the union elites and also for workers in general. 
Indonesian elections are becoming more competitive, but money politics is still 
the main tool for winning votes. There is a lack of political parties standing specifically 
to represent the interests of workers, thus the ideas and strategy for building an alternative 
political party that can be supported by the majority of trade unions and other civil society 
groups is crucial. At the same time, the success of placing some union candidates within 
some local parliaments gives them a political stake in the future of union engagement in 
electoral politics. This is heavily dependent upon the extent to which they can contribute 








Chapter Five  
Structural and Organisational Constraints 
 
Introduction  
This chapter addresses the following research question: to what extent do structural and 
organisational constraints affect the mobilisation capacity of union candidates in 
contesting legislative elections? In this chapter, structural constraints are defined as 
electoral dynamics and systemic political practices that are beyond the control of union 
candidates and affect the success or failure of a union’s engagement with electoral 
politics. Meanwhile, organisational constraints can be defined as a variety of problems 
arising from internal union organisation and that directly or indirectly affect the ability of 
union candidates to mobilise their collective power in a legislative election. 
Changes since 1998 have transformed Indonesia’s political life, both at national 
and local levels. Some scholars note that democratic changes have been few and slow, 
pointing to the return of powerful elements that were nurtured under the New Order and 
have continued the corruption, collusion, money politics and other practices strongly 
associated with the previous regime. Others argue that the democratic process has 
challenged traditional authorities and that we should be optimistic about Indonesia’s 
political future. Hadiz and Robison (2013: 35) contended that “the fall of Suharto’s New 
Order regime and the dismantling of his highly centralised authoritarian regime did not 
mean a shift in the power structure toward liberal modes of government”. The state 
officials and politico-business families nurtured during the New Order regime have not 
only survived and quickly adapted to political changes but also successfully seized the 
country’s economy and political development through their wealth in the new democratic 
Indonesia (Hadiz and Robison 2014; Winters 2014). Using the material power accrued 
during the New Order era, combined with increasingly competitive elections and the high 
dependence of political parties on financial support from outside sources, established 
elites now fund and often control major political parties as well as organisations linked to 
them. In short, the actual power configuration in the post-Suharto era has not changed a 
great deal. Instead, it is limited to the establishement of new identities by previous 
wealthy elites and the reorganisation of the old power relations within a new system of 





well as with the military, police and other law enforcement authorities (Hadiz and 
Robison 2013: 37-38). 
By contrast, those who see a more optimistic future for Indonesia’s politics argue 
that material power is necessary but only one of the many resources mobilised in electoral 
politics. Other positive trends such as the development of civil society, the rule of law, 
the organisation of oppositional or reformist forces, and popular mobilisation are all 
important aspects in understanding the significance of political changes in Indonesia 
today (Aspinall 2013; Liddle 2013; Ford and Pepinski 2013). The analysis in this chapter 
places the power configuration and the ability of unions to mobilise their resources as 
necessary aspects in understanding trade union politics in post-1998 Indonesia. In this 
regard, the power configuration is understood as a process of political involvement among 
the various parties with roles to play and influence in the development of electoral 
democracy in Indonesia. These include: political parties, local and national government, 
civil organisations (including trade unions), and the public. 
 The chapter starts by focusing on how corrupt practices and material inequalities 
have affected the mobilisation capacity of union candidates in contesting legislative 
elections. Here, corrupt practices are defined as strategies used by most wealthy 
legislative candidates to secure votes and consolidate their power by distributing money, 
gifts and other material benefits during campaigns. As argued by many scholars of 
Indonesian politics, the country’s elections have long been dominated by money politics 
in which political parties and political candidates rely on the distribution of cash, gifts 
and other material resources through campaign structures and intermediaries (vote 
brokers, society leaders) to influence voters (Fukuoka 2013; Choi 2014; Aspinall and 
Mas’udi 2017). Voters tend to show little interest in party manifestos and become 
increasingly “pragmatic” or “transactional” by taking advantage of the opportunity 
presented by money politics as a common practice in exchange for their votes (Aspinall 
and Mas’udi 2017: 420). With the open-list electoral system, legislative candidates, either 
from the same or different parties, are not only expected to compete with each other to 
obtain votes, but also have to finance their own campaigns. In such a context, it is 
obviously not easy for union legislative candidates with their limited material resources 
to compete for political power. I therefore present evidence of a new approach from union 
legislative candidates to surmount the practice of money politics and their lack of material 





compete in legislative elections. It aims not simply to reiterate what has already been 
identified by various studies about the practice of money politics in Indonesia, but to 
contribute new insights into how unionists as newcomers compete in local legislative 
elections, and in particular how they deal with issues related to vote-buying. Aspinall and 
Mas’udi (2017: 417-426) call this a new inventiveness by candidates to tackle the practice 
of money politics when running for office. This “inventiveness” refers to the ability of 
individual candidates to compete with locally powerful and wealthy candidates by 
combining: a wide variety of political networks; supporting organisations: sources of 
finance, social and political capital; and new campaign strategies (Aspinall and Mas’udi 
2017: 418). 
 The second important form of structural constraint found in this research is the 
problem of union-party alliances. In the 2014 legislative elections, no single political 
party could be said to represent the union vote. None of the labour-related parties that 
participated in the three previous elections (1999, 2004 and 2009) had successfully 
qualified or passed the selection process conducted by the General Electoral Commission 
(KPU).165 Under a revised legislative election law, the parliamentary threshold increased 
from 2.5 per cent (Law on Legislative Election Number 10/2008, Article 202) to 3.5 per 
cent (Law on Legislative Election Number 12/2012, Article 218).166 Moreover, the 
number of party branch offices has also increased from 75 per cent to 100 per cent in each 
province, and at least 75 per cent and 50 percent of party’s branch office in districts and 
in sub-districts respectively. Further, at least 30 per cent of a party’s legislative candidates 
have to be female. As a consequence, unions had to build partnerships with mainstream 
parties to participate in the 2014 legislative elections.  
 
165  From a total of 46 parties registered in the KPU, only 12 parties passed the requirement to contest in 
the 2014 legislative elections. The Labour Party was among 46 parties that registered to participate in 
the 2014 but failed to meet new requirements stipulated under the Law Number 8/2012 on Legislative 
Elections.   
166  Initially, under the Law on Legislative Elections Number No.8/2012, a threshold requirement of 3.5 per 
cent of parliamentary votes was applied in all three level of legislative elections (national, provincial 
and district or municipal levels). However, two months near to legislative election’s day on 17 April 
2014, this regulation was contested by several parties in the Constitutional Court and was agreed only 
to be implemented at the national level. Since the first multi-party elections in 1999, discourse 
surrounding the need to increase the parliamentary threshold level has often been one of hot issues in 
Indonesian electoral politics. One argument is that the number of political parties should be decreased 
in order to improve the quality of democracy and effectiveness of the presidential government system. 
However, efforts to increase the parliamentary threshold level in every legislative election in Indonesia 
have been considered to benefit only large, well-established parties as well as being part of a political 






As non-party cadres, however, union legislative candidates as newcomers with 
limited financial capability face the dilemma of being secondary to the interests of the 
political parties. In a context where legislative elections have become more competitive 
– from closed to open proportional electoral representation – parties’ political machines 
and strategies to compete with candidates from within and outside are becoming crucial 
to every union legislative candidate. In addition, the candidacy of union elites in party 
lists is an effort to reach worker constituencies in industrial areas.167 Therefore, union 
legislative candidates are expected to optimize their collective power and organisational 
support, as well as to obtain majority votes compared to other candidates in the same 
party and electoral areas. 
The following sections of this chapter discuss two important organisational 
constrains found in this research that affect the success or failure of union engagement in 
electoral politics. The first factor is union fragmentation and elite factionalism. The 
second factor is a decline in union membership and workers’ understanding of their 
political position and identity in the elections. While the Indonesian labour movement has 
made several gains since the fall of the authoritarian regime in 1998, especially in the area 
of freedom to organise, the problem of union fragmentation has also emerged, which 
complicates attempts to engage in electoral politics. Further, in the absence of a strong 
and unifying party for unions to cooperate with, they have no obvious partisan home. This 
condition further increases the difficulties unions face building cooperation across 
organisational lines, which is vital for unions’ ability to strengthen their electoral position. 
In addition, the nature of union membership and the political identities of workers 
determine patterns of support for trade union candidates in competing for legislative 
positions. 
Corrupt Practices and Material Inequalities 
The implementation of the 2014 legislative elections has been criticised not only for 
procedural, administrative and operational logistical problems but also the increasing of 
corrupt practices during political campaigns. Compared to previous elections, the practice 
 
167 Based on Indonesia’s open proportional electoral system, a legislative candidate with the highest number 
of votes will gain the accumulated votes from other candidates in the same party and electoral areas in 
the final vote’s recapitulation. If the total votes meet the minimum threshold for legislative seats than it 
will be counted as a share of 1 seat for party representation.  In the legislative elections, a voter has at 
least two choices either to vote for one legislative candidate based on the list offered by a party or to 
choose a party via a symbol printed on the ballot. Votes for the party symbol will be given to candidates 






of vote-buying and individual gifts became “more flagrant” in 2014, increasingly vulgar, 
and moreover, widespread across the country (Aspinall and Mietzner 2014: 121). Based 
on a large research project on the practice of money politics in the 2014 elections, which 
involved 50 researchers and interviews with about 1500 legislative candidates and 
campaigns workers in 20 provinces, Aspinall and Sukmadjati (2015: 10) concluded that 
the practice of money politics in the 2014 elections was a central aspect of the campaign 
strategy for most legislative candidates and the practice of vote buying was more intense 
in 2014 than 2009 and earlier elections. This greater intensity and the more widespread 
nature of vote-buying and money politics practiced during 2014 elections can be seen in 
three aspects: the proportion of candidates who were involved in the practices, the 
candidates’ total expenditures, and the sum distributed to individual voters and 
communities (Aspinall and Sukmadjati 2015: 29-32).  
 Aspinall and Sukmadjati (2015: 39) also highlighted the role of vote broker as a 
popular strategy used by most candidates to connect them with the voters individually 
and secure votes in the 2014 legislative elections. The brokers are recruited to provide 
information about candidates to voters, to mobilise the voters to support and vote for the 
candidates, and to ensure that the voters actually vote for the candidates on the polling 
day. In order to seal the deal, the brokers generally delivered cash and goods to voters 
(Aspinall and Sukmadjati 2015: 34). These findings further confirmed that the practice of 
vote-buying and individual gifs has become an undeniable feature of Indonesia’ electoral 
democracy.  
The relationship between Indonesian elections and the use of money and other 
material resources could be described as “two sides of the same coin”, especially in a 
society where patron-client relationships are significant (Simandjuntak 2012: 102). It 
often found in a society where strong patron-client relationships have traditionally co-
existed side by side with religious and cultural value. As note by Simandjuntak (2012: 
108) in most traditional societies in Indonesia where there is an enduring patrimonial 
system, such as in regions of North Sumatra, potential voters tend to prefer candidates 
who are wealthy because it is “manifestation of power and prosperity” and a form of 
guarantee to “supply security and protect” their followers if they are successfully elected. 
Benefiting from their material power, the wealthy candidates often use their material 
advantages to secure votes and consolidate their power by distributing cash, gifts and 
other material benefits to voters. The voters, in turn, behave like clients, as they seek 





rather than opting to give their votes to candidates who offer specific programs or broad 
policy changes (Mas’udi and Kurniawan 2017: 450). Personalistic relations and voters’ 
preference wealthy candidates are often found in many young democratic countries as 
“the traditional understanding of elite in which wealth constitutes the most important of 
elite capitals” (Simandjuntak 2012: 108)  
The use of money, gifts and other material transactions is itself in line with the 
increasingly pragmatic condition of Indonesia’s electoral democracy which lacks policy 
debates and prioritises materialistic aspects in elections (Fukuoka 2013; Jati 2014; 
Aspinall and Sukmadjati 2015). Due to this, several observers of Indonesian elections 
have questioned the quality of electoral democracy in Indonesia. According to Fukuoka 
(2013: 61), electoral democracy in Indonesia has created a “business bias” where money 
plays a crucial role and has effectively marginalised non-elite actors who may have the 
potential to become effective politicians if elected. According to Jati (2014: 13), an 
election is no more than a political-economic arena where each of the actors - candidates 
and the voters - mutually reinforce their political bargaining for the sake of fulfilling their 
respective interests.  
The widespread practice of vote-buying and individual gift practices in the 2014 
legislative elections had a strong connection with the implementation of the open 
proportional representation electoral system adopted in Indonesia after the 2009 
legislative elections (Aspinall 2014: 101). Under the proportional electoral system, voters 
may choose to vote for either the candidate or the party symbol on the ballot paper. The 
number of seats for the political party in each electorate area is then determined by 
combining the total votes all relevant candidates and the votes for the party symbol. The 
candidate who has the largest number of votes will then have the first opportunity to gain 
a parliamentary seat in an electoral area. This condition, in turn, causes competition 
between candidates to be very tough, not only regarding those from different political 
parties, but also those from the same party. To obtain optimal votes, the candidates rely 
not only on campaigns coordinated by political parties, but also on individual campaigns, 
and they form success teams that extend through layers of brokers to connect them with 
potential voters.  
Although the practice of vote-buying has been increasingly open since the 2009 
elections, the number of cases reported to the Constitutional Court were relatively 





elections. One of the reasons is that the majority of political parties and legislative 
candidates competing in legislative elections in 2014 are suspected of violating 
campaigns with money politics (Rumah Pemilu 2014). Based on an evaluation report 
published by the Rumah Pemilu (2014), the Constitutional Court received 903 lawsuits 
against legislative election violations from political parties. Of these, the allegations of 
balloting and vote-busting during vote recapitulation were most significant, reaching 
approximately 59 per cent, followed by bureaucratic neutrality (21 per cent), voter list 
manipulation (9 per cent), vote-buying (4 per cent), and other cases (7 per cent).  
Most union candidates interviewed for this thesis confirmed that the use of cash 
and gifts of various sorts to constituents in exchange for votes was an undeniable political 
reality that they faced during their candidacy in the 2014 legislative elections. As one 
union candidate in Bekasi explained: “voters have become more open and vulgar about 
money politics. They shamelessly embarrassed me by asking for cendol money during the 
campaign”.168 Another candidate in Serang claimed that “voters often even compared 
what other candidates had given when I tried to approach them to support my 
candidacy”.169 It is the opinion of Sahat, a union candidate from the Gerindra Party in the 
2014 legislative election in Bekasi, that “money politics is obviously real and often 
difficult to avoid because our society generally regards it as something acceptable in the 
election. Even with friends and neighbours, asking for votes can be a business”.170 Similar 
views were also confirmed in interviews with other union candidates who regularly 
expressed that they were left speechless with regard to money politics during their 
candidacy in the 2014 legislative elections. In this regard, several admitted defeat, others 
felt regret and refused to re-engage in electoral politics, while others accepted it as 
valuable experience and part of a useful learning process. As one informant commented: 
I was not surprised when many voters I met during campaigns often asked me: 
is there no cendol money, mas? Where's the envelope, mas? What can you do 
for us, mas? That’s the reality in our society. However, in essence, I do not 
regret the defeat of my candidacy, and surely the previous election has become 
a good learning process for myself and also for FSPMI with its Labour Go 
Politics. For the next election, I think it is essential to educate and empower 
 
168 Interview with Ferry Nurzali, union candidate from the Gerindra Party in Bekasi. Jakarta 8 September 
2016. Cendol money is a phrase used by voters in Bekasi to ask for money in exchange for their votes. 
The word cendol refers to a popular Javanese traditional sweet drink made from rice jelly, coconut milk, 
palm sugar syrup and ice. Other popular phrases openly used by Indonesians during the election as a 
form of vote-buying are: “envelope money”, “cigarette money”, “pulse money” and “salt money”. 
169  Interview with Intan Dewi, union candidate from PAN in Serang, Serang, 3 December 2016  






the workers and other voters about the importance of clean elections. Surely 
this is not an easy task considering our society is very complicated. Regarding 
the workers, most do not yet understand, why is it important for workers as 
well as unions to have their political representation in parliament. Of course, 
to develop political capacity, Indonesian trade unions and workers still have 
to go through a long process.171 
In contrast to other candidates such as party cadres, public figures and business-
politicians, there are at least three challenges that union candidates frequently face 
regarding the practice of money politics in legislative elections. The first challenge is that 
most union candidates are poor candidates due to their lack of financial capacity. For 
instance, one union candidate in Bekasi, admitted that he spent about 10 million (US$666) 
for his operational expenses.172 Another stated that he only had about Rp 20 million 
(US$1,333) in his bank account when he decided to run for the legislative position in the 
2014 election.173 A union candidate from Gerindra in Medan explained that he spent 
roughly Rp 25 million (US$1,666) on campaign attributes, although he said this was 
nowhere near sufficient.174 In an interview, a political consultant that had experience 
forming success teams in the 2014 elections explained that a legislative candidate needs 
to allocate at least 500 million (US$35,000) to fund campaign operations in a legislative 
election at district/municipal level.175 This funding is required for various expenses, 
mostly for regular meetings, campaign logistics (t-shirts, flags, banners, pamphlets), 
transport and success teams allowances, and is regarded as the bare minimum.176 It does 
not include cash and gifts, where the amount required can be much larger depending on 
how much cash needs to be inserted in an every envelope.177 Where money gift are 
concerned, is no way union candidates with limited financial capability can match their 
more wealthy rivals, and they may also not be able to fund alternative campaign strategies 
that can attract voters to vote for them. 
 
 
171 Interview with Aji, union candidate from PKPI in Bekasi, Jakarta 3 October 2016 
172 Interview with a union legislative candidate in Bekasi (name withheld), Jakarta 3 October 2016. 
173 Interview with a union legislative candidate in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 28 September 2016.  
174 Interview with a union candidate in Medan (name withheld), Medan 5 December 2016 
175 Interview with Sarifuddin, political consultant at Survey Monitoring Independent Network, Bekasi 23 
September 2016. 
176 Interview with Sarifuddin, political consultant at Survey Monitoring Independent Network, Bekasi 23 
September 2016. 
177 Interview with Sarifuddin, political consultant at Survey Monitoring Independent Network, Bekasi 23 





The second challenge is that most Indonesian workers have relatively low-
incomes, especially those who work in labour-intensive industries - so-called blue-collar 
workers.178 A study conducted by the Electoral Research Institute and the KPU (2014) 
concluded that the economic situation in a region is strongly affected by voters’ political 
reasoning in elections. At the grassroots level, a household’s economic conditions 
significantly influence the level of maturity and rationality its members of voting age 
possess when making political choices in elections. This conclusion is in line with the 
results of a national survey on voter behaviour in the 2014 legislative elections conducted 
by LIPI (2014), which established that 67 per cent of voters from households with income 
levels categorised as good tend to have high levels of resistance to money politics 
practices. Regarding these findings, with their low income, blue collar workers could 
possibly be the main target of money politics practices.  
The third challenge is the distinctiveness of a union’s political identity with 
regards to other candidates, such as party cadres. In terms of supporters, the party cadres 
have a broad-base - a sort of floating mass - while union candidates have specific 
electorates encompassing workers in specific industries or occupations. Moreover, union 
political identity is based on organisational membership or even class struggle as a result 
of specific conditions, such as the abuse of worker’s rights, economic inequality and 
political repression (Edwin 2003; Nang and Ngai 2009). On the one hand, this condition 
benefits the union candidates because they have voters who can be recognised and 
moreover, who are clearly approachable. In contrast, the situation can be more 
challenging for union candidates, because the issues related to workers' social and 
economic conditions, such as minimum wages, the abolition of contract-working systems, 
health and education services, housing, and transportation costs regularly become 
political themes in campaigns and are used by every candidate in the elections.  
According to Aspinall and Sukmadjati (2015: 22), the influence of money politics 
on voters’ decisions on whether to follow the instructions of candidates is repeatedly 
problematic and complex. The relationship between patrons and clients (the voters who 
 
178 A survey conducted by AKATIGA-FES (2012), found that the average monthly salary among 600 
workers working in the metal industry across 7 districts in West and East Java provinces reached IDR 
1,264,351 (US$84). This amount is marginally below the average of the provincial minimum wage in 
West and East Java Provinces which reached IDR 1,345,678 (US$91) in 2012. Additionally, outsourced 
and non-permanent workers tend to have lower monthly salaries than permanent workers. According to 
LIPI (2013: 56), the minimum wage is often implemented as the maximum wage by most employers, 





receive money or goods) is only transactional, and certainly not obligatory or binding. 
Under free, open and competitive elections, those who attempt to buy votes are unsure 
whether the electorate will automatically give their votes to them on polling day (Aspinall 
and Sukmadjati 2015: 22). Owing to the intense competition among candidates, voters 
frequently receive money or goods from different candidates.179 Therefore, there is no 
guarantee that voters will follow the instructions given by a success team and in many 
cases the money was used by vote-brokers for their personal benefit.180 To overcome the 
uncertainty associated with money politics and to obtain more sympathy from potential 
voters, the well-funded candidates generally use specific strategies during campaigns, 
such as making charitable donations, arranging free health treatment (pengobatan gratis), 
sponsoring sports events, or attending religious activities to deliver items used for praying 
(Aspinall and Sukmadjati 2015: 45).  
Union candidates interviewed for this thesis acknowledged that the use of money 
politics not only affected voter’s behaviours in the 2014 election, but that it might also 
have limited their campaign activities. Some union legislative candidates tried to 
approach potential voters who were non-union members by conducting door-to-door 
campaigns with their success teams in the workers’ residential areas. Others tried to use 
more traditional ways, approaching family and social networks as well as union leaders, 
though they were unsure if these were effective. Those who were nominated as legislative 
candidates through their individual connections with parties and who ran without support 
from their home union organisation, not only accepted their limitation but even stopped 
campaigning before the election day. For instance, a union legislative candidate in Serang 
district explained that she only used social media, in addition to family and kinship lines 
to seek votes when running as legislative candidate during the 2014 legislative 
elections.181 She acknowledged that besides having little or no financial ability to fund 
the operational costs of campaigning and forming a success team, her electorate were 
controlled by the success teams of several better-funded candidates. They not only used 
banners, pamphlets, flags and other promotional materials to gain the attention of 
potential voters but also recruited local figures as success team members and vote-brokers 
to support their candidacy. Another union legislative candidate explained that he chose to 
 
179 Interview with Saman, success team coordinator of Nyumarno in Jatireja village, Bekasi 29 September 
2016.  
180 Interview with Sarifuddin, political consultant at Survey Monitoring Independent Network, Bekasi 23 
September 2016. 





apply a strategy of small meetings and endeavoured to meet voters as much as possible 
to compete with the well-funded candidates.182 He also placed at least several members 
of his support team in densely populated areas where many blue-collar workers were 
based, in an attempt to seek votes. However, he admitted that those strategies were not 
effective and were costly because of the diverse nature of the voters and the vastness of 
his electoral area.183 Other union candidates also admitted experiencing difficulties when 
forming a voluntary success team to support their candidacy.184 In one interview, a union 
legislative candidate explained that a few union colleagues who were initially willing to 
support his candidacy even switched to another more wealthy candidate’s success team 
because of the attraction of the material rewards provided by them.185  
Nevertheless, not all union candidates simply accepted their limitations when 
dealing with widespread corrupt practices and their material limitations in the 2014 
legislative elections. A variety of situations can be seen in the experiences of union 
candidates who competed in the 2014 legislative election under the Labour Go Politics 
movement in Bekasi. Through this movement, resistance to money politics was achieved 
by optimising the union’s collective power, especially at the grassroots level. The FSPMI 
in Bekasi, for instance, turned their lack of financial resources into a strength by co-opting 
their militant members from Garda Metal to run an anti-money politics campaign and to 
work voluntarily to convey an organisational message to support union legislative 
candidacies.  In this respect, the cohesiveness of the union officials, success teams, 
volunteers and union members in campaigning against anti-money politics was essential, 
including gaining publicity and sympathy from non-members and non-labour voters.186 
As one of the union candidates commented: 
We cannot work on our own [referring to most union candidates who 
competed in an election without union support] to fight money politics. 
They [the well-funded and incumbent candidates] are not only supported 
by many members of success teams, but their logistical support is also 
impossible to compete with”. Our strength rests on organisation 
membership, so we should make sure that our members cannot be 
influenced by the lure of money politics and rotten-politicians for the sake 
of their short-term and personal interests. Therefore, political education 
for workers is very important, it must be carried out continuously not just 
during political campaigns in elections, so that workers cannot be fooled 
 
182 Interview with a union legislative candidate (name withheld), Serang 2 December 2016.  
183 Interview with a union legislative candidate (name withheld), Serang 2 December 2016. 
184 Interview with a union legislative candidate (name withheld), Medan 5 December 2016. 
185 Interview with a union legislative candidate (name withheld), Medan 5 December 2016. 





again by political candidates who think that the end justified the means, 
including the handout of cash and goods.187 
 
According to Supriyatno, the use of money politics in Bekasi had been anticipated 
before the FSPMI launched their political campaign under the Labour Go Politics 
movement.188 For instance, when recruiting the FSPMI’s legislative candidates, one of 
the requirements was that the candidate agreed and committed to resisting various forms 
of money politics practices during campaigns. Furthermore, during campaigns and the 
mobilisation of workers, all members of the campaign teams, ranging from national, local, 
and factory to grass-roots levels worked voluntarily.189 In addition, all operational 
expenses during the campaign that involved union-backed candidates were borne by the 
union (FSPMI) or without any contribution from political parties.190 As described by 
Supriyatno in the interview:  
If we talk about money politics in Bekasi, it is not a secret anymore. It has 
become a common issue in every election. Just look at names like (names 
withheld). They are not only known as party officials and well-funded 
politicians, but also successful local businessmen and have also been 
repeatedly elected as members of the legislature. Through Labour Go 
Politics, we want to show that even though we don't have money we can 
work and win elections. We are committed to saying no to or going against 
money politics. We want to educate workers and the public about the true 
value of electoral democracy. We are already accustomed to mobilise our 
members and voluntary workers, just like when we were organising 
demonstrations or protests on the street. So, we just need to work with our 
existing networks. At the grassroots level, our cadres from Garda Metal 
certainly cannot be doubted for their loyalty and voluntary to 
organisation.191    
 
At the grassroots level, the FSPMI’s union candidates applied several methods to 
confront the prevalence of vote buying practices. For instance, in electorates (dapil) 4 and 
6 in Bekasi district, the union candidate with their campaign team and voluntary 
supporters applied a strategy which they named a “dawn guerrilla attack” or “gerilya 
serangan fajar” in the days before the poll.192 They mobilised FSPMI members in each 
 
187  Interview with Nyumarno, legislative member and former union leader in Bekasi, Bekasi 28 September 
2016. 
188 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
189 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
190 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
191 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016. 
192 Interview with Nyumarno, legislative member and former union leader, Bekasi 28 September 2016. 
Interview with Aji, legislative candidate from PKPI in Bekasi, Jakarta 3 October 2016. Interview with 





local community to approach their family members and neighbours and appeal to them 
to resist vote-buying in the final week before the election, as well as to secure their support 
for the union candidates. As explained by one of the unions’ success team members in 
dapil 6, the use of a personal approach involving union members is an effective way to 
promote the union candidacy to non-workers voter (family members and neighbours), as 
most Indonesians tend to trust people they know.193 As stated by a success team member:  
The most difficult thing is to convince the parents, especially the elderly. 
They certainly are not familiar with the union candidates and are easily 
affected by money politics. But if the child (union member) delivered the 
message, it could be more effective, especially if the child served as a 
breadwinner in the family. Then surely what is recommended is more 
easily accepted.194  
In several specific areas where the use of money politics during the campaign was 
prevalent, the union success team encouraged voters to accept money or goods but ignore 
the candidates.  This strategy was part of their campaign to punish corrupt candidates and 
to support anti-money politics and anti-politisi busuk or the anti-rotten politician’s 
movement.195  
Based on the several cases discussed above, it can be argued that the practice of 
vote- buying and individual gifts as forms of corrupt practices used by wealthy candidates 
and material inequalities faced by most of union candidates in the 2014 legislative 
elections had a genuine effect on the capacity of the latter to compete in elections. On the 
one hand, it has limited most union candidates to expanding their mobilisation strategy to 
obtain votes from non-worker electorates in particular, due to the characteristics that 
distinguish them from other candidates, such as party cadres, community leaders and 
businessman. On the other, it reveals that union candidates were lacking the ability, or 
more precisely were unprepared, to compete with well-funded candidates in a new 
electoral system which is more open and competitive.  
The wider implication seems to be that union candidates failed to create what 
Aspinall and Mas’udi (2017: 417) called “inventiveness” from their specific 
characteristics and to optimise opportunities presented by the new electoral democracy. 
 
193 Interview with Saman, member of success team of Nyumarno in Jatireja village, Bekasi 29 September 
2016. 
194 Interview with Saman, member of success team of Nyumarno in Jatireja village, Bekasi 29 September 
2016. 





Their nominations were driven by a mix of instant political choice and popular political 
identity, but they failed to convince their main supporters. As such, while it is true that 
both challenge the union engagement in electoral contestations, candidates also 
encountered a lack of organisational support and ability to reach not only union members 
but also broader constituencies among different social groups. However, as they have 
such different characteristics from other candidates, there is actually an advantage or 
opportunity that can be optimised by union candidates in contesting in democratic 
elections.  
The success of two union candidates in parliamentary seats in Bekasi under the 
Labour Go Politics movement can be a good lesson learned in this regard. Under the 
Labour Go Politics movement, the FSPMI has succesfully mobilised its collective power 
at the grassroots level and is capable of competing with the power of money politics as 
well as well-funded candidates. They have successfully transformed their lack of financial 
resources into a strength, for example, by optimising their membership and organisational 
networks and campaigning for anti-money politics to gain recognition of their political 
stance and strong message against the handout of cash and gifts during political 
campaigns. In this regard, a more democratic election can be a political opportunity for 
unions to engage in formal politics, as long as in the process of the contestation, the union 
candidates are supported by cohesive union organisational lines from central, local, 
sectorial and shop floor level, to grassroots members. 
The Union-Party Alliance 
In contrast to the previous three elections in post-authoritarian Indonesia, the 2014 
legislative elections were marked by a significant reduction in the number of participating 
parties. Of the 38 political parties that participated in the 2009 legislative elections, only 
12 managed to participate in 2014. This number included a new party, the National 
Democrat Party, which successfully passed the administrative selection procedure 
conducted by the KPU under the new legislative election law. Both labour-related 
political parties that participated in the 2009 legislative elections, the Labour Party and the 
Indonesian Entrepreneur and Workers Party, failed to obtain enough votes to pass the 
parliamentary threshold. Similarly, an attempt to re-register by the Labour Party in the 
KPU also failed to meet the administrative requirements. The implementation of the new 





participation of the labour-based parties in the 2014 legislative elections.196 Consequently, 
attempts to engage in electoral politics by building political partnerships with non-labour-
based parties played a key role in unions’ strategy in the 2014 legislative elections. 
The unions’ attempt to build political partnership with non-labour-based parties 
in the 2014 elections was not an entirely new phenomenon. Since the first multi-party 
election was conducted in 1999, in addition to being allied with labour-related parties, 
several unionists have pioneered developing personal relationships with nationalist and 
religious-based parties to participate in legislative elections. A noticeable example was 
Jacob Nowaweya, the SPSI’s leader, who successfully won a seat at the national 
parliament assembly from the PDIP during the 1999 elections. He was subsequently 
appointed as the PDIP’s spokesman on labour issues and promoted to a strategic position 
as a Minister for Manpower and Transmigration under President Megawati’s 
administration in 2001-2004. A further example was Bambang Wirahyoso, the chairman 
of the SPN who was nominated by an Islamic-based party, the PKS, to run in the national 
2004 legislative elections. Despite failing to be elected as a member of the national 
parliament, Bambang then played a significant role in the formation of the SPN’s 
partnership with PKS in the 2009 legislative elections (Caraway, Ford and Nugroho 2015: 
1301).  Furthermore, in the 2009 legislative elections, a number of union elites from SPN, 
FSPMI and SPSI were nominated by several political parties, such as the PKS, PAN, PPP, 
PBB and PMB. They were nominated either on the basis of organisational partnership or 
individually by lobbying party boards. For instance, the SPN and FSPMI formed a 
political partnership with the PKS in the 2009 legislative elections. This alliance was 
formed in the lead-up to the 2009 election, where both unions and the party agreed to 
mobilise their members to support PKS candidates; in return the PKS committed to 
nominate SPN and FSPMI cadres on the party’s legislative list (Caraway, Ford and 
Nugroho 2015: 1304).  
 
196 In the 2014 legislative elections, the requirements of a political party participating in the legislative 
election were increasingly tightened to support the effectiveness of the presidential government system 
(Subekti, 2015: 159). For instance, the parliamentary threshold increased from 2.5 per cent in the 2009 
election (Law on Legislative Election Number 10/2008, Article 202) to 3.5 per cent in the 2014 
legislative election (Law on Legislative Election Number 8/2012, Article 208). Similarly, party 
stewardship requirements have further complicated the conditions placed upon small parties, from a 
minimum of 75 per cent at the provincial level in the 2009 legislative election (Law on Legislative 
Election No. 10, year 2008, Article 8: b, c), increasing to 100 per cent at the provincial level, 75 per 
cent at the district level and 50 per cent at the district level (Law on Legislative Election Number 10/ 






As argued by Crouch (2010: 89), since the fall of the New Order regime in 1998, 
ideas concerning political liberation, the recognition of civil rights and the role of civil 
government were accepted as an ideological foundation for Indonesia’s new political 
order. The foundation of civil government has become stronger, especially after a series 
of military reforms took place by withdrawing the military’s position from practical 
politics and following the implementation of regional autonomy, which changed the 
relationship between central and local government. The political system moved toward 
the establishment of a more democratic government or a political system that was not 
devoted to legitimising the exclusive powers of certain groups. These developments are 
seen by several civil society activists, including trade unionists, as an opportunity that did 
not exist in the past and have compelled them to become involved in formal politics (Noor 
2010: 34).  
According to Aspinall (2004: 87), the engagement of several civil society activists 
in formal politics in the early stage of post-authoritarian Indonesia is in some ways 
reminiscent of the pre-New Order situation. In the late 1960s, several student activists 
who opposed Sukarno's leadership sought to support the formation of a new government 
and later became part of the New Order regime. They were not only involved in creating 
economic developments under Suharto’s administration but also played a key role in the 
establishment of Golkar, the ruling party of the New Order regime (Aspinall 2004: 89). 
Nevertheless, the engagement of civil society activists in formal politics in the post-
Suharto era is no longer seen as part of the effort to sustain or legitimise a regime, but 
rather to represent the interests of society, although not all of society’s interests have been 
represented (Noor 2010: 41). 
Trade unions are confronted by at least two political dilemmas in relation to 
building partnerships with political parties in the 2014 legislative elections. First, 
Indonesia’s political parties comprise poor policy platforms and could be differentiated 
as either religious or nationalist parties (Aspinall 2014: 102). Linkages between voters 
and parties are emotional and mostly influenced by their perception of party leadership 
and economic conditions (Sukma 2009; Mujani and Liddle 2010). If voters’ perception is 
positive, they tend to choose the incumbent governing party; if negative, the voters tend 
to choose the opposition party (Mujani and Liddle 2010: 131). In addition, party 
stewardship has displayed a similar structure, and most have had a bureau for workers to 





Consequently, the party identity has regularly become less relevant for union candidates 
promoting issues relevant to workers’ interests in their political campaigns.  
Second, unions are facing an absence of typical leftist or socio-democratic parties 
that usually espouse pro-labour principles. Attempts to build such a political party have 
been made several times, although none have succeeded in the electoral competition. For 
instance, a leftist party, the Democratic People’s Party (PRD), participated in the 1999 
election, but gained only 0.07 per cent of the votes. In July 2003, several former PRD 
boards and over 50 mass organisations sought to establish another new leftist-populist 
party called the People’s United Opposition Party to participate. However, this party 
failed to pass the electoral requirement and was thus unable to participate in the 2004 
election.  
 In contrast to the 2009 legislative elections, where the union-party alliance was 
formed involving only one specific political party, in the 2014 legislative elections the 
nomination of union candidates was spread widely across the party spectrum. The SPN 
and FSPMI, for instance, were no longer relying on one political party to engage in the 
2014 election, as they did with the PKS in the 2009 legislative elections but preferred to 
nominate cadres by involving numerous political parties. This strategy was also carried 
out by several union officials from other federations under the KSPSI, KSPI and KSBI, 
who were first involved in electoral politics in the 2014 legislative elections. They were 
nominated by political parties based primarily on individual candidacy, seeing as their 
union organisation had declared itself as having neutral position or was refusing to 
support the candidacy of its cadres with any parties in the 2014 legislative elections.197 
However, as unionists competing in an electoral competition, they wished to gain support 
from union membership and workers in general.198 In addition, the nomination of 
unionists in the 2014 legislative elections was not only dominated by small and medium 
size parties such as the PKS, PAN, PKPI and PBB, it also attracted large and established 
parties, for instance the PDIP, Golkar, Democrat and Gerindra. This situation not only 
reveals the fact that unionists are increasingly open to engaging in electoral politics, but 
 
197 Interview with Abdullah, chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI, Jakarta 8 September 2016; Interview with Saiful 
DP, chairman of FSP KEP KSPI, Jakarta 28 September 2016; Interview with Mudofir, chairman of 
KSBSI, Jakarta 16 September 2016.  
198 Interview with Fery Nurzali, union candidate from FSP KEP KSPSI nominated by the Gerindra Party at 
West Java electoral area VII, Jakarta 8 September 2016; Interview with Sahat Butarbutar, union 
candidate from FSP KEP KSPI nominated by the Gerindra Party at Bekasi municipal electoral area 1, 
Jakarta 2 September 2016; Interview with Napitupulu union candidate from KSBSI 1992 nominated by 





also shows that union preferences regarding political parties in elections have changed. 
In contrast, it can be inferred that the trade unions increasingly have a significant role in 
delivering votes for political parties. 
 Apart from the failure of most of the union candidates in the previous elections, 
unionists acknowledged that they had learned a great deal from their previous electoral 
engagement, particularly in building partnerships with political parties. In the interviews, 
union leaders realised that forming partnerships with only one political party limited the 
nomination of union candidates in legislative elections.199 The political parties not only 
control the access of trade unionists to the electoral areas but also the number of allocated 
seats, in addition to the selection of electoral location for union candidates. In Tangerang 
district for example, in the lead-up to the 2009 elections, the local SPN board had 
proposed six of its cadres via the PKS; however, only one ticket was allocated.200 In 
Bekasi, the FSPMI’s proposal to nominate its two officials through the PKS in the 2009 
legislative elections was unfulfilled as the party cadre rejected the request.201 Furthermore, 
instruction from unions’ national leaders to support a particular party may not necessarily 
have corresponded to aspirations at a local level and could have hampered the nomination 
of prospective cadres who had personal networks with different political parties.202 In 
addition, unionists realised that signing a partnership with only one political party might 
give the appearance of the union being beholden to a certain political party, something 
that most unionists interviewed in this study wanted to avoid. 
Regarding the party affiliation of the SPN’s candidates in the 2014 legislative 
elections, its national leaders adopted a new strategy by freeing all their potential cadres 
to engage in electoral politics through any participating political parties. Furthermore, 
SPN leaders also encouraged cadres to compete in local elections (district level) rather 
than at provincial and national levels. In highly competitive elections, SPN leaders 
believed that nominating union candidates in union-dense localities could deliver a 
possible victory in contrast to the provincial and national races.203 Negotiation and 
partnership with party leaders were handed over to each SPN cadre, while 
organisationally, the SPN took an independent position, not wishing to be tied to any 
 
199 Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016; Interview with Supriyatno, 
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political parties. Prior to deciding to run in legislative elections, several SPN cadres had 
their own personal networks with specific political parties.204 The SPN and its cadres 
were bound in a political contract so that none of the SPN’s legislative candidates engaged 
in the 2014 legislative elections were nominated by political parties without the approval 
of the organisation. The SPN agreed to provide its organisational support, especially by 
mobilising its boards at a local level. In turn, if successfully selected, the candidates 
agreed to prioritise the interests of SPN members and assist the development of the SPN 
in each of the areas they represented.205  
 In the case of the FSPMI, its local and national leaders not only endeavoured to 
form partnerships with different political parties but also pursued a more optimistic 
strategy by nominating potential cadres to engage in national, provincial and local 
elections. Furthermore, the relative success of the FSPMI in mobilising its membership 
in several national labour demonstrations increased their confidence with regard to 
engaging in three different levels of electoral contestations in the 2014 legislative 
elections.206 Negotiations with several potential political parties were conducted either by 
FSPMI leaders or individual cadres who had personal connections with particular 
political parties. In any negotiations with political parties, the FSPMI refused to pay 
‘mahar’ (contribution money) for its cadres’ candidacies; nevertheless, the organisation 
agreed to offer its full support to each of its cadres, including the formation of the success 
teams, campaign financing and mobilisation of its officials and members at factory, 
sectoral and national levels.207 At a national level, only the PKS was willing to place two 
FSPMI cadres in the 2014 legislative elections. The personal relationship between the 
national leaders of both organisations is recognised as playing a key role in this 
partnership.208 In the 2009 legislative election, the FSPMI president, Said Iqbal was 
nominated by the PKS as their national legislative candidate in Riau Island province.209 
Although he failed to gain significant votes, the organisational relationship that had 
formed following the 2009 legislative elections was believed to have paved the way for 
 
204 Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016. 
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206 Interview with Maxie Ellia, former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 23 August 2016. 
207 Interview with Supriyatno, head of FSPMI Branch in Bekasi, Bekasi 30 September 2016.  
208 Interview with Maxie Elia, labour activist and vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 23 August 2016. 
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(KSBSI) who was nominated by the Labour Party at the same electorate. Neither was successfully 





closer links between both the FSPMI and the PKS to form partnerships in the 2014 
legislative elections.210  
 Besides the PKS, other parties such as the PDIP and Hanura Party also ran several 
FSPMI cadres in numerous provinces in the Sumatra and Java islands. The nomination 
of FSPMI cadres from these parties was mostly individual, especially as the candidates 
had a close relationship with the parties, as sympathisers or as local branch officials. 
Moreover, in union-dense electoral districts, local branch leaders of the FSPMI attempted 
to approach several large established parties; however, only small and medium-sized 
parties did not ask for money in exchange for the candidacies of FSPMI cadres. In Bekasi 
district, for example, FSPMI local leaders only managed to form political partnerships 
with the PAN and PKPI to place their four cadres in six different electoral areas. 
Nevertheless, ahead of the registration deadline for legislative candidacy on 28 February 
2014, one FSPMI cadre was accepted by the PDIP in Bekasi district. He was nominated 
by the PDIP Bekasi branch via a recommendation from the PDIP national committee.211 
It should be mentioned that in addition to being selected by the local party leaders, a 
legislative candidate in a local election may also be nominated by the consensus of 
national party leaders.212 
 In practice, as non-party cadres make minimum material contributions to political 
parties, a union-party alliance tends to disadvantage union candidates. Many union 
candidates were frequently placed lowest on the ballot paper by political parties in the 
2014 legislative elections.  For instance, Minggu Saragih, the head of DPW FSPMI North 
Sumatra, was placed at the bottom of the list (number 10) for his legislative candidacy in 
North Sumatra province by the PDIP. Similarly, Irwan Abdullah, the vice-president of 
FSPMI and member of National Tripartite was placed number 9 out of 10 candidates 
nominated by the PKS in Wes Java VII electorate its national legislative seat.  The same 
 
210 Besides Said Iqbal, several FSPMI leaders in Batam and Serang were also nominated as legislative 
candidates by the PKS in the 2009 election. In an interview with a union leader (name withheld), it was 
not surprising to hear that the FSPMI and the SPN leaders have a close relationship with the PKS. In 
2006, Said Iqbal (president of the FSPMI) and Bambang Wirahyoso (president of the SPN) were among 
several union leaders who were sponsored by the PKS to go to Saudi Arabia for doing Umrah- the 
second pilgrimage after the Hajj for Muslim. In 2007, Said Iqbal and Bambang Wirahyoso were also 
involved in the establishment of Labour Work for Jakarta’s Coalition to support the candidacy of Adang 
Dorojatun and Dani Anwar by the PKS in the Jakarta gubernatorial election. 
211 Interview with Iwan, head of PDIP winning team in Bekasi district, Bekasi 28 September 2016.  





pattern was evident where SPN and KSPSI leaders were concerned in the provincial and 
local elections in Bekasi and Serang; they were mostly nominated in the lower list.  
 As argued by Mietzner (2007) and Ufen (2010) the decline of state subsidies for 
political parties has contributed to the increase of parties’ attempts to exploit external 
financing. Mostly due to an inability to fund the campaigns of their cadres in the elections, 
party have resorted to nominating popular or wealthy non-party cadres who could 
contribute external financial resources in exchange for their nominations (Mietzner 2010: 
251).  The greater the ability of a candidate to contribute financially to the party, the more 
likely he or she is to be placed top on the ballot paper. While candidates with limited 
financial capabilities may be popular, they are usually placed middle and lower, with no 
guarantee of being elected. In this regard, non-party cadres who make no significant 
material contribution are usually listed as legislative candidates with a “shoe number” on 
the ballot paper. These candidates are regularly considered as a merely complementary in 
relation to electoral contests and only have a small chance of gaining more significant 
votes than those at the top of a list (Noor 2010: 49). 
Seat allocation may be considered an aspect that is no longer influential in the 
open-list proportional electoral system. The implementation of this new electoral system 
since the 2009 election gives voters the opportunity to vote for individual candidates 
rather than having to vote for a party, as in the previous closed-list system. In practice, 
however, being placed low on the ballot paper list more often than not produces losses 
rather than advantages for a legislative candidate in an election. Likewise, voters in 
Indonesia often find it difficult to choose their candidates, as they have to vote from long 
list of names from many participating parties and lack information regarding candidates’ 
backgrounds. Nonetheless, this condition is beneficial for popular figures, especially 
those who often appear on television, such as community leaders, businessmen, 
government officials, politicians and celebrities.  
Data from the Centre for Political Studies at the University of Indonesia reveals 
that instead of voting for legislative candidates’ names, 30 per cent of voters voted for 
party symbols on the ballot paper in the 2014 election (Puskapol UI 2014). This figure is 
almost the same as that found in the 2009 election. The study also found that among 97 
elected female legislative candidates at the national level, the majority of them were listed 
at the top of the ballot paper. They were party leaders’ official relatives such wives and 





members of the legislature (9 per cent), and NGO activists (8 per cent) and celebrities (6 
per cent). In this regard, the fact that many union candidates were placed lowest on the 
list in the 2014 legislative elections suggests that the parties wanted to use union 
candidates as vote-gatherers but did not want to give union candidates a real chance to 
win the seats. 
 In term of party’s’ political resources, although union members may be nominated 
as party representatives, it does not mean that most of them have the same opportunity to 
utilise the party machine during political campaigns. The fact that party cadres and non-
party cadres from the same party are contesting the same constituency and electoral area, 
means the party resources themselves typically become “a site of contestation” (Aspinall 
2014: 102). Candidates who are party officials and have influential positions in the party 
hierarchy will regularly dominate the party resources to support their own candidacies. 
They have wider access than other legislative candidates to party facilities and 
organisational networks, especially at the grassroots level such as in the district and sub-
branch offices.213 As newcomers and outsiders, party resources therefore become 
irrelevant to union candidates and this compels them to manage their own financial 
support for campaigns. Furthermore, on the day of voting, new-comers from non-party 
cadres have also to provide their own team (vote witnesses) to monitor the vote 
recapitulation at every level of their electoral areas.214 The possibility of votes from non-
party cadres being transferred to candidates who are from party officials is likely to 
occur.215 Likewise, during the recapitulation of votes at sub-district and district levels, the 
votes cast between party cadres and non-party cadres could be manipulated by party 
officials, especially if they are split between two candidates from party and non-party 
cadres, to obtain a relatively balanced vote.216 Therefore, union legislative candidates are 
required not only to have the ability to place a vote witness in every polling station but 
also to gain majority from other candidates in the same party to secure their votes in the 
 
213  Interview with PAN and PDIP success team members (names withheld), Jakarta 22 September 2016. 
214 Conflict during vote recapitulation in legislative elections usually involves claims between political 
parties. Lawsuits involving pitting one legislative candidate against another candidate in the same party 
are rare because generally problems involving candidates in one party are resolved internally (Interview 
with PAN and PDIP officials).  
215 In the interviews, several union legislative candidates admitted that not all votes result at polling 
stations could be recorded by their success teams. Thus, in the polling station, where no representation 
of vote witnesses were recruited by union candidates, it is highly possible that they lost some of the 
votes they gained. In urban areas, one polling station usually represents about 400 voters maximum 
from one or two household groups (Rukun Tetangga, RT). For instance, there are 150 polling stations 
spread across five sub-districts in the Bekasi electorate area 5. 
216  Interview with Safrudin, Commissioner of KPU Medan, Medan November 2016; Ahmad, commissioner 





recapitulation process.217 In this regard, the role of a union organisation in forming union 
success teams and mobilising the membership to support union candidacies is arguably 
the most important aspect for union candidates in gaining optimum votes and monitoring 
the process of vote recapitulation.  
Union Fragmentation and Elites Factionalism 
In contrast to the single union policy under the New Order regime, the post-1998 
Indonesian labour movement is confronted by an over-abundance of trade unions, which 
has caused “divisive expansion” (Tornquist 2004: 377), created collective bargaining 
difficulties (Isaac and Sitalaksmi 2008: 243), increased “personal rivalries” (Tjandra 
2016: 45) and contributed significantly to the “political insignificance” of union 
involvement in electoral politics (Silaban 2014: 45). Since the approval of ILO 
Convention Number 87 in 1998, followed by the establishment of the Trade Union Law 
in 2000, hundreds of new union federations at a national level and thousands of new 
unions at plant level, rapidly emerged throughout Indonesia. The growth of trade unions 
in post-1998 Indonesia was impressive, especially in relation to national confederation 
and federation levels. In 2006, for instance, there were six national confederations and 90 
union federations registered at the Ministry of Manpower and Transmigration Indonesia 
(Pusdatin Ministry of Manpower 2017). Ten years later, in 2016, the number of union 
confederations had more than doubled to 14 national confederations, while the union 
federations had reached 120. In addition, the freedom of association guaranteed after the 
regime changed in 1998 tends to be interpreted as proliferation rather than consolidation 
by trade unions in post-1998 Indonesia (Hadiz 2010: 158).  
 Freedom of association clearly facilitated the division of trade unions in post-1998 
Indonesia. According to Caraway (2006: 221), the existing Trade Unions Law Number 
21/2000 places far too much emphasis on freedom of association. Moreover, Caraway 
argued that the establishment of the Trade Unions Law Number 21/2000 has produced 
 
217 In Bekasi district, the case of Nurdin Muhidin and Nyumarno can be a clear example of how union 
candidates benefited from the open proportional system. Nurdin Muhidin received a majority of votes 
(10,345 votes) compared to seven other candidates from the PAN in Bekasi district electorate area 1, 
while Nyumarno was in second place among the other six PDIP candidates in Bekasi district electorate 
area 6.  In the final vote recapitulation, they benefited from votes transferred from other candidates of 
the same party which meant their total exceeded the threshold (Bilangan Pembagi Pemilih, BPP) to 






two contradictory effects. On the one hand, it has abolished obstacles to independent 
unionism, on the other, it has “facilitated extreme union fragmentation” (Caraway 2006: 
222). As the law also allows independent unions, new trade unions have mushroomed 
into various structures with thousands of unaffiliated shop-floor level unions. In addition, 
there has not yet been a case whereby the government has rejected the registration of a 
new union. Registration of a new union at the Ministry of Manpower office simply acts 
as notification and only involves submitting a simple document with a list of founding 
members, union officers, number of members, and the address of the union secretariat.218   
Union divisions and elite factionalism in the Indonesian trade unions are regularly 
caused by personal rivalry rather than principles or programmatic reason (Silaban 2011: 
90). The formation of new trade unions is also frequently driven by economic interests, 
as a union is seen as a source of income for many union leaders (Silaban 2011: 91). In 
this regard, losing a position in the union means a unionist is closing access to his 
livelihood. Furthermore, a new union often emerges after elections for new union leaders. 
Instead of giving their support to the new leadership, the losing elites typically choose to 
form a new counter-union and claim the same members as new elected leaders. This is an 
issue that is frequently mentioned during interviews with union leaders in this research. 
For instance, the SPN was separated into two distinct organisations after Iwan Kusmawan 
was elected as the chairman of the union federation in 2014. The former SPN chairman, 
Bambang Kusworo and his supporters established a new union confederation called the 
KSPN. Another reason is the absence of regeneration in relation to union leadership. 
Division in the unions has often also occurred due to long-standing old union leaders in 
the union structure, and a progressive group of workers in this situation may opt to exit 
and form a new union rather than work with old union bosses (Tornquist 2004: 388). For 
this reason, the divisions in the KSPSI and SPN bodies are genuine examples. At factory 
level, divisions among union elites are generally preceded by distrust and inter-union 
rivalry within union elites that has various causes.219 Several main reasons are: the alleged 
 
218  In a separate interview with an official at the Ministry of Manpower, a revision to Law Number 21/2000 
concerning Trade Unions was said to be urgently needed, especially to review the requirements of 
unions at national and local levels. However, the proposal to revise this law was considered very 
sensitive, considering it was related to the basic right of freedom to organise. According to this officer, 
the proposal to revise the law on unions should come from the unionists.  
219  During my visit at the head office of a union in Jakarta, September 2018, I had the opportunity to witness 
a meeting attended by 10 representatives of unions at plant-level who wanted to change their federation 
affiliation to the new one. The previous federation was acknowledged by those union representatives to 
have been failed to build regeneration in union management because it was controlled by old union 





misappropriation of members’ dues; neglect of members' demands to employers by union 
officials; and allegedly colluding with employers to negotiate workers’ demands 
(Rokhani 2009: 12). Although labour activists and union leaders have generally 
recognised the need to unite their movement into one powerful and effective front, the 
acute problems linked to union fragmentation and elite factionalism, in turn, have 
contributed to the complexity of organising the labour movement in post-1998 Indonesia. 
 Confronted with the problem of organisational divisions, Indonesian trade unions 
are in the challenging position of having to maximise their attempts to engage in electoral 
competition. In the absence of a unifying and sustained labour-based party, the 
nomination of union candidates in electoral contests requires unions to establish a strategy 
for working with each other to mobilise membership and pool their support for union 
candidacies. Likewise, given the fact that Indonesian trade union membership is 
geographically concentrated, particularly around industrial areas, limiting unions to 
putting forward only one candidate in each labour-based electoral district could provide 
larger margins of victory. It would facilitate the unions pooling their collective power, 
prevent the division of labour votes and maximise the number of union candidates elected. 
In the provincial and national elections, where the number of districts is much larger and 
requires bigger vote accumulation, the role of union confederations, federations and 
regional branch union leaders in facilitating a front to support union candidates is a crucial 
one. In practice, however, rivalries between the union elites, short-term interests and 
cynicism regarding politics, frequently become a major constraint for Indonesian trade 
unions in creating powerful and effective fronts during electoral contests (Tornquist 
2004).   
 The union leaders and union candidates interviewed for this research 
acknowledged that attempts to build political collaboration with union leaders from 
various federations are complex and challenging. Contestation in electoral politics is 
commonly regarded as an extension of the interests of political parties rather than as a 
strategic means for unions to engage directly in the policy-making process.220 
Furthermore, when a union declares itself to be neutral in an electoral contestation, it 
implies that the organisation closes the door on collaboration with other unions to support 
 
220  Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016; Interview with Maxie Elia, 
former vice-president of FSPMI, Jakarta 23 August 2016; Interview with Fery Nurzali, vice-chairman 





the nomination of the union candidates.221 In addition, amid intense competition for 
unions to maintain their membership, allowing other unions to enter its base, for example 
by conducting political campaign, is a rare possibility.222 For many union leaders, 
ensuring their membership to follows their leadership and organisation’s direction is more 
important than opening their door to other union leaders.223 The increasingly tight 
competition among trade union candidates to gain votes from workers’ constituencies are 
becoming grounds for competition among trade union elites which have used different 
parties and campaign strategies. Consequently, most union candidates have preferred to 
use their own strategy and rely fully on their own union organisation and personal 
network to support their legislative candidacies.  
 In the 2014 legislative elections, for instance, three unionists from three union 
federations competed against each other in the same electoral area: West Java VII. They 
were: Nurzali, vice chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI from the Gerindra Party, Abdullah, vice 
chairman of FSPMI KSPSI from PKS, and Ahmad Fuad Anwar, chairman of the PPMI 
nominated by PKB. The West Java VII electoral area encompasses three districts, 
specifically: Bekasi, Karawang and Purwakarta, which also represent the most densely 
populated union localities in Indonesia.224 Apart from the union elites, the West Java VII 
electoral area was also enlivened by well-known national politicians, former mayors and 
regents, and celebrities. In this electoral area, there were 119 legislative candidates 
competing for the ten allocated national legislative positions. To be successfully elected, 
each candidate would have to gain a minimum of 235,851 votes. This included the 
condition that the party would pass the parliamentary threshold of 3.5 percent. There was 
a total of 2,189,677 registered voters spread across 11,108 polling stations in the 70 sub-
districts (KPU 2015). Thus, competition among legislative candidates in this electorate 
area, including for support from workers as the dominant constituency, was very tight.  
 
221 Interview with Sahat Butarbutar, union candidates nominated by the Gerindra Party in Bekasi, Jakarta 
13 September 2016. Interview with Zainal Abidin, union candidate nominated by the Hanura Party in 
Serang, Serang 2 December 2016. 
222 Interview with Iwan Kusmawan, chairman SPN, Jakarta 1 October 2016; Interview with Sahat 
Butarbutar, union candidates from the Gerindra Party in Bekasi, Jakarta 13 September 2016. 
223 Interview with union leaders in Bekasi and Serang (names withheld), Bekasi 20-25 January 2017 and 
Serang December 2016.  
224 In addition to five union candidates supported by the Labour Go Political movement, there were also 
three union candidates from three federations who competed against each other using different parties 
in this local electorate area. For instance, in the Bekasi district electorate 1, they were Butarbutar from 






 Despite West Java VII being known as the most densely populated labour 
constituency in Indonesia, as was predicted, none of union legislative candidates 
mentioned above won national or local legislative seats. Even the votes cast for them in 
several sub-districts known as union base-voter areas were disappointing. Hence, 
competition between union leaders in the same electoral area not only weakened the 
collective power of unions and workers, but also made many workers become less 
enthusiastic to support their union leader’s candidacy. Several union leaders and workers 
even put forward union legislative candidates with no difference from other political 
candidates, including those who had advanced from an organisation using different 
political parties for national, provincial and local legislative elections. With unions still 
developing their strength and political identity, nomination of union leaders in legislative 
elections through different political parties is ineffective and tends to make workers 
apathetic and further influence them to use other political identities when voting.225 
 Although Indonesian unions are being confronted by a fragmentation problem, 
several efforts were made to create electoral cooperation among them to support union 
candidacy in the election. For instant, several union leaders in Serang formed a joint front 
to support nine candidates from five different unions nominated by several different 
parties in the 2009 legislative elections. Initiated by two influential local labour 
organisations, the Serang’s Labour Solidarity Forum (FSBS) and Serang’s Trade Unions 
Alliance (ASPSB), union elites sought to form a joint campaign as part of a movement 
called Labour Vote Labour. A further example was related to a similar movement carried 
out by a number of national union leaders who established the Indonesian Worker’s Axis 
(Poros Pekerja Buruh Indonesia, PBPI) to support union candidacy in the 2014 legislative 
elections.226 These efforts tend to flourish at the elite level but are less consolidated at the 
grassroots level.   
 One successful example of electoral cooperation among unions and workers 
across the federation was not in a legislative election, but during the Anis-Sandi 
nomination in the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial election (Pilkada) in early to mid-2017. 
Despite the different political contexts, the cooperation of a number of union federations 
to support the nomination of the Anis-Sandi candidacy in 2017 Pilkada Jakarta provides 
 
225 During my fieldwork in Bekasi I talked to several workers and asked their opinions on their leaders who 
competed in the 2014 legislative elections. These opinions were expressed by most of workers whom I 
talked with.  





a valuable lesson that could help overcome union constraints to form electoral 
cooperation. Anies-Sandi won the DKI Jakarta gubernatorial seat after they successfully 
defeated other candidates in two rounds of the election. Anies-Sandi formally gained 
political support from the unions after they agreed to sign a political contract with 13 
union federations under a joint front; specifically, the Jakarta Worker’s Coalition (Koran 
Perdjoeangan, 12 November 2017).  
 The political contract contained 10 points concerning popular issues which have 
always been common concerns for unions and workers, such as an increase in minimum 
wages, the removal of outsourcing working systems, the provision of affordable housing 
for workers, and improvements in social security services for workers. In exchange, union 
leaders agreed to form a union and workers’ support network and mobilise its membership 
for the Anis-Sandi campaign using a popular tagline “Maju Kotanya Sejahtera 
Pekerjanya” or “Develop the City, Prosper the Workers” (Koran Perdjoeangan, 12 
November 2017). The union and workers’ support for the Anies-Sandi victory was visible 
in several sub-districts in East and North Jakarta where union support was strong. This 
successful experience pertaining to the electoral cooperation of the unions in 2017 
Pilkada Jakarta suggests that Indonesia’s unions, even with their fragmentation problem, 
still had the ability to surmount barriers and achieve electoral cooperation. The Anies-
Sandi candidacy was a one-time event and had successfully unified the divided 
Indonesian unions that used to compete against each other in legislative elections. 
Nevertheless, to what extent this successful experience can be transformed into other 





227  Less than a month after Anis and Sandi being inaugurated as the Governor and Vice-Governor of DKI 
Jakarta on 16 October 2017, unions and workers staged a protest against their new policy on 2018’s 
provincial minimum wage (UMP). Unions and workers were disappointed as the newly elected 
Governor of Anis Baswedan has set 2018’s minimum wage (IDR Rp 3.6 million/ US$265) at a level 
lower than that demanded by unions and workers (IDR Rp 3.9 million/US$ 285). Anis has also broken 
his political contract with the unions as he had promised not to set the UMP based on Government 
Regulation No.78/2015, and instead to formulate the UMP based on Law No.13/2003 on Manpower 
(The Jakarta Post, 2 November 2017). Several union elites who previously had joined the unions' 
coalition to support the Anis-Sandi candidacy then withdrew their political support for their leadership 
in DKI Jakarta (2017-2022). In this regard, many believed that Anis-Sandi had used their political 
contract with the unions merely as a political strategy to gain votes from labour constituents during 





Union Membership and Workers’ Political Identity 
Union membership and workers’ understanding of their important political role and 
identity play a crucial role in determining vote accumulation for union legislative 
candidates in elections. In contrast to other legislative candidates, such as party cadres, 
community leaders and business-politicians, who have broad-based supporters, union 
legislative candidates depend on specific electorates encompassing workers in specific 
industries or occupations (Marks 1989: 5). In the Indonesian context, those who are often 
referred to as blue collar workers are the main constituent of most union legislative 
candidates in election. They are categorised as factory workers in the manufacturing 
industries and dominate Indonesian trade union memberships. Nevertheless, the majority 
of workers, such as those in the agriculture sector who have little awareness of their legal 
rights as workers, are still not members of a trade union. 
Trade unions, workers and union legislative candidates bond through political 
identity and organisational ideology, which is based on a collective consciousness or even 
class struggle (Edwin 2003, Santoso and Parto 2016). Moreover, their intensive 
communication in defending workers’ socio-economic interests has made union 
legislative candidates easier for workers to recognise than other legislative candidates. 
This condition benefits the union legislative candidates because they have voters who can 
be mobilised in elections.  
In addition to organisational constraints such as union fragmentation and elite 
factionalism - which have caused schisms among workers with regard to voting - attempts 
by union candidates to compete in legislative elections are also facing the problem of a 
decline in union membership. Data from the Ministry of Manpower indicates that in the 
last decade there has been a downward trend in the number of workers who join trade 
unions in Indonesia. In 2007, the number of union members reached about 3.7 million 
workers. The number then decreased by about 1 by 2017, to around 2.7 million members 
(Pusdatin 2017). Conversely, as discussed earlier, the number of trade unions at the 
confederation and federation levels has increased since the single union policy was lifted 
in 2000. This situation confirms that the increase in the number of trade unions was not 
followed by an increase in the number of union memberships. Instead, union elites are 






Scholars of Indonesian labour politics argue that the decline in union membership 
has been caused by the recruitment system applied in Indonesia, which in the past several 
years has tended to apply a contract and outsource-based work system (Tjandraningsih 
and Nugroho 2008; Juliawan 2010; Rajagukguk 2011). According to Juliawan (2010: 45), 
the contract and outsource-based work system not only eliminates the opportunity for 
workers to gain secure work and a decent living but also hinders their political right to 
organise by alienating workers from unions. Based on his research on the role of 
employment agencies in Tangerang, Juliawan (2010: 45) noted that employers and 
contracting agents have hampered the consolidation of workers' political power not by 
implementing anti-labour or anti-union movements, but by modifying worker status, from 
permanent to non-permanent workers. The contract and outsource-based system are 
considered to have a non-permanent working relationship, which appears to prevent 
workers from becoming members of trade unions. “Even if they have the courage and a 
chance to join a union, contract workers are concerned that union membership might be 
seen as an act of dissent and would jeopardise their already fragile employment” 
(Juliawan 2010: 45). 
The practice of a contract and outsource-based system in Indonesia is part of the 
flexible labour market policy implemented in Indonesia since 2003. It was part of the 
financial aid requirements set out by the World Bank and the IMF who came in to save 
the Indonesian economy following the severe economic crisis that also hit many Asian 
countries in 1997-1998. The policy was meant to ensure that the establishment of three 
new labour laws during democratic transition (1999-2004) was supported by a stable 
environment for business and economic growth as well as improvements in the 
investment climate. The implementation of the flexible labour market policy is covered 
by Manpower Law Number 13/2003, particularly Articles 64-66 which regulate the terms 
of the contract and outsource-based work system. Despite the lack of law enforcement, 
the implementation of the flexible labour market policy has been violated on a vast scale 
by employers and employment agencies, particularly with regard to the restriction on 
business types and fulfilment of workers' basic rights, such as salaries, contract lengths, 
and freedom to organise (LIPI 2011: 45).  As a result, rejection of these contracts and 
outsourcing, and demands for their abolition, have been part of the main agenda in every 
union demonstration. Similarly, the unions have also rejected the government's proposal 
to revise Manpower Law Number 13/2003, which they believe will further liberalise the 





 Interview data suggests that the pressure on trade union membership due to the 
widespread nature of the contract and outsource-based work system has become a main 
concern among most union leaders at national and local levels. Their concerns often relate 
to the rights of contract and outsource workers, which are often violated, particularly the 
right to organise through trade unions. In the unionists’ view, “a trade union is not only a 
place to represent workers in the company but also to fight in defending and advancing 
wider popular socio-economic interests in the society”.228 Trade unions play a crucial role 
as a school for their members to understand who they are and how to protect their interests 
and to advance their causes.229 Another unionist expressed the idea that “during the 
Suharto era, unions and workers were not only depoliticised, they were also weak in term 
of bargaining position and set in following what the management had decided”.230 In 
short, unionists claimed that the existence of trade unions plays a crucial role in building 
workers’ collective consciousness, which can develop a degree of class solidarity and 
awareness of their political identity and role in the context of legislative election. As one 
unionist commented: 
It is not easy to mobilise workers to vote for union candidates in elections. 
It is not only for contract workers and outsourcers but also for those who 
are permanent workers and members of trade unions. We need a process 
and various methods and more time to build workers’ collective 
consciousness (awareness about their political identity and role), about the 
idea of movement, about the importance of electoral politics, who they are, 
and so on. Building workers’ collective consciousness cannot be instant. It 
takes a process; even two, three times participating in strikes or 
demonstrations will not necessarily guarantee that they are conscious of 
their political identity as workers. It needs a continuous approach. We now 
have the freedom to organise. However, the union had long been asleep 
under Suharto. Indeed, it is not just asking them to join the union. Our 
workers are mostly just nerimo (accepting) because our culture often 
teaches us to be like that. Most workers, especially those who work under 
the contract and outsource system, they feel that they are grateful to be able 
to get a job. Because, surely, they are afraid to lose their jobs if they join 
the union. There are still many anti-union parties out there. In fact, they try 
to influence workers to avoid the union, or direct workers to choose union 
‘a’ rather than ‘b’ because ‘b’ only do demonstrations. Hence, the presence 
of unions is crucial to support those workers. If they understood the 
importance of unions, about why they need to organise, then their 
understanding about their identity as workers would also certainly change. 
But it is important to note, who the leaders of their unions are. If it is those 
 
228  Interview with Ahmad Saukani, head of DPD SPN Banten, Serang 6 December 2016. 
229  Interview with Abdul Gani, member of DPP FSP KEP KSPSI, Jakarta 8 September 2016. 





who always say yes sir yes sir to HRD [company management], the story 
will be different. 231   
The effect of unions’ political consciousness-raising efforts for their members was 
apparent in my interviews involving a different group of workers.232 Workers who 
supported union candidacies in the 2014 legislative elections strongly differentiated 
between themselves and other workers, who they considered unconscious still in term of 
their political identity as workers. In the interviews, one worker who supported the Labour 
Go Politics movement said, “Why are we afraid to be involved in electoral politics? Do 
we want only to fight in the factory and on the street? Until when”?233 A second worker 
stated, “I often participate in the strikes, so what would the world say if I did not vote for 
him [referring to one union candidate]”.234 A third worker reflected that “Those who are 
still unconscious often say that politics is not part of the unions. So, isn’t the wage policy 
a political product”?235 Likewise, a fourth worker explained, “Yes, I voted for him 
[referring to one union candidate], although I am not a supporter of his party. If not us, 
who else should support union candidates in the election”?236 Similar views can also be 
noticed on social media such as Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter whose use among 
workers and union leaders has become increasingly prevalent since the 2014 elections. 
Most statements show workers’ hope for success in placing their representatives in the 
parliament, as well as improvement of labour welfare. Other expressed their hopes for the 
establishment of a new labour party supported by unions and workers.237  
The above views were expressed by workers who consciously understood their 
political role and identity. It is certain that the role of their union as “a political school” 
in providing political education has succeeded in building its members’ collective 
consciousness, which is one of the essential methods used to mobilise workers in 
elections. Hence, political education can be understood as a learning process for workers 
in their capacity as members of trade unions, both through training on labour issues and 
worker experiences involving action taken to defend their rights and socio-economic 
interests (Tambunan 2014: 116). As an outcome of the learning process, workers change 
 
231  Interview with Nicolas, coordinator of SBSI North Sumatra province, Medan 2 December 2016. 
232 In the interviews, most unionists often used alternately the term of “collective consciousness” and 
“political awareness”. These terms referred to a form of class struggle with a condition where workers 
are aware about their specific identity, position and role among different group of people in the society.  
233  Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 26 September 2016 
234  Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 26 September 2016 
235  Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 26 September 2016. 
236  Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 26 September 2016. 





their perception of electoral politics and make attempts to participate in legislative 
elections by supporting union candidates. In this regard, political education for workers 
can be seen as an important tool for building workers’ political consciousness.  
 It is important to note that the above workers’ views remain the minority. Most 
Indonesian workers do not perceive their political role and position in the election as part 
of their political identity. Instead, what emerges is often related to other identities such as 
religious, ethnic, geographical, and historically related choices. With reference to 
historical accounts, workers’ political identity as being part of a class struggle grew 
strongly in the pre- and post-independence eras (1945-1966) and then disappeared as a 
result of the deconstruction of the unions’ ideology and the depoliticisation of workers 
during the New Order era (Hadiz 2010:89). The authoritarian New Order regime was 
successful in cutting the strong links between unions and political parties through the 
implementation of the single union policy and the prohibition of communist ideology 
which had a strong link with the unions. These conditions contribute to an understanding 
of the form and values of the labour movement in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
Consequently, in post-authoritarian Indonesia, trade unions and workers are constrained 
or have no alternative but to reinforce their identity and rebuild their political strategy, 
including how to understand the links between workers’ interests and community needs, 
and those between unions with the interests of political parties, and how they can be 
achieved. Unfortunately, as the process of democratisation continues to evolve, the debate 
over the ideology of the labour movement, as well as the importance of political unionism, 
is being abandoned, and conflict between union elites, marked by the formation of new 
trade unions, is increasing (Suwigno 2008: 145). In certain cases, there are various unions 
that have strong ideological bases, such as the SBSI and the KASBI. However, problems 
arise when the base at grassroots level is so small that when it comes to mobilising 
membership, it remains extremely limited. Conversely, unions with an exceptionally 
large membership base, such as those under the KSPSI and KSBSI, are still in a strong 
enough organisational position to refuse to engage in electoral politics.238 
There are many factors that can influence workers’ behaviour in voting. However, 
understanding voting behaviour is particularly complex since it relates to many factors, 
such as political, psychological, economical, sociological, and cultural issues – most 
 
238 Interview with Abdullah, chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI, Jakarta 8 September 2016; Interview with 





notably religious affinities, region, ethnicity, social class, and voters’ perceptions about 
national economic conditions (Baswedan 2007; Mujani and Liddle 2010). According to 
Norris (2004: 21), voting in an election is not only about the decision-making process, 
but also how voters reconfirm their political identity. This process is alive and exists in 
any individual as a result of the continuous internalisation, social interaction, and political 
education that may emerge as a dominant factor affecting voters’ decisions in elections 
(Norris 2004: 23). Likewise, Pratt (2003: 10) noted that the process of voters confirming 
their political identity is typically influenced by their political consciousness, which is 
constructed from how they realise “who we are” and how they identify their collective 
interests through identifying similarities and their political purpose. In the case of 
workers, their collective interests and political consciousness grow as a result of specific 
conditions, such as the abuse of workers’ rights, economic inequality, social injustice and 
political repression (Nanggai 2009; Santosto 2016).  
  In terms of workers’ political identity, my interviews involving a different group 
of workers confirmed two essential factors that influenced them in understanding their 
political role and position in elections. The first aspect is related to the difference between 
workers’ point of view and their political identity as workers. When asked about their 
views related to the Labour Go Politics and Labour Vote for Labour campaigns in the 
2014 legislative elections, workers who stated that they did not support these campaigns 
tended to see themselves as “workers” (pekerja) or “employees” (karyawan) rather than 
as “labourers” (buruh). They directly refused to be called as buruh, instead preferring to 
be categorised as pekerja or karyawan.  
 The identity dichotomy between the so-called buruh and pekerja or karyawan is 
still strong in workers in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Workers who work in retail 
companies, financial sectors, and services prefer to be referred to as karyawan and refuse 
to be categorised as buruh.239 Likewise, workers in the state-owned enterprises (BUMN), 
who have permanent working status preferred to be called karyawan rather than buruh.  
In the interviews, some workers commented that the Labour Go Politics and Labour Vote 
for Labour campaigns in the 2014 legislative elections were held only for those labourers 
working in factories or those who often took to the streets to demonstrate.240 Moreover, 
in the view of workers in permanent positions, employee status is different for labourers 
 
239  Interview with workers in Bekasi (names withheld), Bekasi 24 September 2016. Interview with 
workers in Serang (names withheld), Serang 7 December 2016. 





as the former have a standardised salary and benefits, and they cannot be made redundant 
without notice as it should involve along and complex process.241  
 Worker’s indignation at being called labourers confirms the legacy of the New 
Order regime which is still strongly influencing Indonesian workers, particularly in 
understanding their political identity as workers. It also underscores the success of the 
authoritarian regime in Indonesia (1968-1998), of their political strategy to discourage 
left-wing political activism based on collective labour power, organisational solidarity 
and class consciousness. As argued by Rudnyckyj (2018: 156) dichotomy of labour 
identity was a key part of the political strategy of Suharto’s authoritarian regime; he 
sought to foreclose labour’s political activism, including suppressing communism, as the 
term buruh had been widely used by unions during Sukarno era (1945-1968). Moreover, 
a distinctive labour strategy was sought to make Indonesia an attractive country for direct 
foreign investment, in accordance with its industrialisation and export-led growth policies 
established in the late 1980s (Rudnyckyj 2018: 158). Meanwhile, a distinctive policy on 
workers’ employment status as a group of permanent, salaried workers, and another group 
of non-permanent workers such as contract and outsource-based labourers, seems also 
have contributed to undermine workers’ understanding about their political identity in 
post-authoritarian Indonesia.  
 In the era of president Sukarno (1945-1967), the use of the word buruh for workers 
was more common than pekerja. This condition can be seen, for example, in the use of 
term Menteri Perburuhan, which refers to the Ministry of Manpower and the use of trade 
unions words such as Serikat Buruh, which tends to have a strong association with being 
working class. In addition, unions were also given political privilege as they were 
allocated eight seats in the national parliament to represent labour interests 
(Tedjasukmana 1959: 35). During Suharto's presidency (1967-1998), the word buruh was 
replaced words such as pekerja and karyawan. Under the Pancasila industrial system, use 
of the word buruh was perceived to strengthen the stigma of the class dichotomy between 
employers and workers and to preclude the establishment of harmonious industrial 
relations (Ford 2009: 68). However, since the reformasi in 1998, the word buruh has been 
used again to accommodate freedom of expression (Semeru 2002; Ford 2009). Trade 
 
241  Interview with a worker in Medan (name withheld), Medan 23 January 2017; interview with a worker 
in Jakarta (name withheld), Jakarta 5 December 2017; Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name 
withheld), Bekasi 28 September 2016; interview with a worker in Bekasi, Bekasi 29 September 2016. 
Similar opinions also expressed during my informal conversation with many workers during my field 





union words such as serikat pekerja/serikat buruh are also used simultaneously in any 
regulations related to unions.242  
 The second aspect is related to workers’ perceptions about the function of trade 
unions. Most Indonesian workers still consider the function of trade unions to be 
economic rather than political. This is evident from a survey conducted by LIPI (2014) 
about workers’ perceptions and their participation in the 2014 legislative elections. The 
survey indicated that 64 percent of workers tended to choose their union in the workplace 
to focus on economic functionality rather than politics. Similar findings were also made 
by a survey conducted by the All-Indonesian Workers Organisation (OPSI) in 2009, 
which concluded that the levels of knowledge, awareness, and political participation of 
workers are relatively low. This view is more visible when traced on the basis of unions’ 
organisation where workers from unions who chose neutral positions in elections tended 
to have a different orientation (outside of their identity as workers) in legislative elections. 
This means that the influence of union organisations in shaping their members' 
understanding of unions’ functions and role in electoral politics is crucial.  
 In interviews with numbers of young female workers who shared rooms in small 
rented house (rumah petak) in Bekasi, most of them showed no interest talking about 
politics (elections). As one respondent commented: “There is no benefit involved in 
politics.  It is better to think about how we can work to collect money to live and then get 
married”.243 When asked about the Labour Go Politics campaign, most of them knew 
about the campaign and were able to name the union that had initiated the campaign, but 
they said they did not support it. One worker responded that “Labour Go Politics was 
good, but it would not impact us much. When they reached the top (in the parliament), 
they would have forgotten us”.244 These young female workers are members of one union 
that has split into four different factions and they seemed confused when I asked who the 
union leader was. Furthermore, a group of workers who I met during a lunch break at a 
small food stall in front of a textile factory in Serang, expressed similar views. They had 
no interest in joint political campaigns organised by union, which they said deviated from 
the unions’ true function. One worker stated that he had been approached by members of 
 
242 See Trade Unions Law Number 21/2000 and Ministerial Decision Number 78/2001 on amendments of 
Ministerial Decision Number 150/2001 where references to pekerja was amended to read pekerja/buruh 
and references to serikat pekerja to serikat pekerja/serikat buruh.  
243 Interview with a worker in Bekasi (name withheld), Bekasi 24 September 2016. 





a union success team to support one union candidate, but he did not vote for him as he 
had never met the candidate and questioned his motives and capacity.245   
The cases discussed above highlight the complexity of how Indonesian workers 
expressed their political identity and positioned themselves strategically in elections. 
Workers’ preference to identify as a karyawan rather than as buruh clearly underscored 
a strong influence of the 32-year legacy of labour’s depoliticization in the New Order era.  
Likewise, workers’ understanding ofthe function and role of a union which leans more 
towards them having an economic function than being agents for political representation. 
In addition, the current policy on workers’ employment status as fitting into several 
categories, can also be said to have influenced workers’ understanding about their 
political identity in post-authoritarian Indonesia. Nevertheless, in an era where the state 
no longer takes an active role in manipulating the political identity of citizens, including 
industrial workers, the above situation directly shows the weakness of the strategy that 
has been used by union leaders in post-authoritarian Indonesia. In this regard, the 
weaknesses are not only related to efforts to build a ‘political consciousness’ for union 
members but also how serious the union elites are about consolidating their movement in 
a more organised way and on a broader front. Without these two efforts, it is difficult for 
Indonesian trade unions to optimize and mobilise their collective power and be politically 
represented through taking part in electoral contestations. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has identified and examined the structural and organisational constraints 
regarding union electoral engagement in the 2014 legislative elections. Particular 
attention has been given to key aspects of the unions’ structural and organisational 
constraints: corrupt practices and resource inequalities; the relationship between unions 
and political parties; union fragmentation and elite factionalism; the decline in union 
membership; workers’ political identity. Overall, these aspects have a genuine effect on 
unions’ mobilisation in legislative elections and limit most union candidates capacity to 
approach union members and non-worker electorates during political campaigns. 
 Most union candidates appeared unprepared when confronted with Indonesia’s 
electoral politics, which are dominated by corrupt practices such as vote-buying, in which 
 





political parties and candidates rely on the discretionary and transactional distribution of 
material benefits to attract potential voters. Furthermore, corrupt practices have limited 
the campaign activities of most union candidates and some of them are even accepting of 
their limitations. This condition is evident with regard to union candidates who run 
individually for legislative seats with a lack of financial support and limited preparation. 
Despite vote-buying being so prevalent in the 2014 election, a handful of candidates in 
several labour-rich districts won, with the full support of their organisation. In this regard, 
a well-planned strategy and solid organisation among union leaders, candidates, success 
teams and voluntary supporters proved able to surmount the practice of vote-buying and 
money politics in the 2014 legislative elections. 
 In terms of union-party alliances, the union strategy of forming alliances with 
many political parties or freeing its officials to form connections with any parties 
increased the number of union candidates in the 2014 legislative elections. However, this 
is only the first step and is not an indicator of a more stable process for the trade unions’ 
transformation to organisations able to compete effectively in political contestation. The 
relationships built with political parties are not based on a grand design agreed and 
supported by many unions, but rather on the short-term strategy of individual unionists 
or particular unions ahead of the election. Furthermore, as newcomers and outsiders with 
minimum financial resources, union candidates tend to be placed unfavourably position 
on ballot forms, especially since party machines are not part of a system that can bring 
them closer to the electorate to gain maximum support. In this regard, the party machine 
therefore becomes irrelevant for union candidates and thereby compels them to finance 
and manage their own political resources for campaigns. 
 The findings also revealed that union fragmentation and elite factionalism have 
placed union candidates in a difficult position to form inter-union electoral cooperation. 
The relative success of Indonesia’s trade unions in transforming their collective power 
into street politics has not yet been replicated in union engagement in legislative elections. 
One reason is that short-term interests still dominate most of the union elites so that 
engagement in legislative elections is still regarded as a separate interest between union 
candidates and political parties. Consequently, political support for union candidates is 
more individualised and limited to the capabilities of each union organisation in terms of 





 Regardless of the various obstacles and challenges faced by Indonesia’s unions, 
the efforts that have been made by union candidates to optimise their role in competing 
for legislative positions has not failed completely. Most union candidates have attempted 
to introduce constructive electoral strategies, which in turn helps the development of 
democracy in Indonesia by promoting pluralism and diversity. Union efforts are 
especially significant in terms of their commitment to reject the transactional politics 
which has tarnished the quality of electoral democracy in Indonesia. Union engagement 
in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections has provided valuable lessons about the future 
of the Indonesian labour movement. For instance, their political movements must be 
conducted in a more organised way and built based on a grand design that is supported 
by many unions, especially with regard to objectives, strategies and role-sharing. In 
addition, efforts to empower workers and strengthen their political identity through 
political education are also crucial. If this can be achieved, it is possible that the political 
agenda of the Indonesian labour movement to disrupt electoral politics and win legislative 




















Unions’ Political Role in Local Parliaments 
 
Introduction 
On 5 August 2014, 50 newly elected legislative members were inaugurated in the 
parliament office of Bekasi district for their 2014-2019 term of office. In contrast to 
similar official events held in previous periods, the inauguration ceremony was attended 
by hundreds of workers and unionists, mostly from the FSPMI, who appeared enthusiastic 
while waiting outside the parliament building. In the afternoon after the inauguration 
ceremony had ended, hundreds of workers on motorcycles travelled from Bekasi's 
parliament office to Omah Buruh in the Bekasi EJIP Industrial area.246 The parade was 
held as a form of celebration for the official inauguration of two newly elected MPs from 
the FSPMI in the Bekasi District People’s Representative Council. That day was 
acknowledged by unions and workers in Bekasi as a symbol of their success with regards 
to the Labour Go Politics campaign in the 2014 legislative elections and marked the 
beginning of a new struggle in relation to policy decision-making in formal politics. Obon 
Tabroni, the head of FSPMI of Bekasi at that time, stated in his speech at Omah Buruh, 
that it was “a victory day for Labour” and a “new era for the labour movement in 
Bekasi”.247 
The Bekasi parade reveals the magnitude of the unions’ and workers’ expectations 
of their newly elected representatives in the local parliament. This achievement at the 
same time answered many parties’ doubts about the ability of trade unions to mobilise 
members in electoral political contestations. Following the inauguration of union elites 
as members of parliament, the next research question that it is crucial to answer is the 
extent to which union elites are capable of representing the voice of the workers and 
defending their causes via formal negotiations and policy-making mechanisms in local 
parliaments. Analysing this question will shed light on the new political role played by 
union elites in parliament, the magnitude of the challenge they face regarding the 
 
246 Omah Buruh is a term for a non-permanent place or building built on a bridge located in the EJIP area 
of Bekasi. The site was built in 2002 and later became the secretariat of all workers' activities in three 
industrial estates in Bekasi (EJIP, Silicon and Hyundai). The word “Omah” comes from a Javanese 
word meaning “house”. On 9 September 2017, Omah Buruh was evicted after the authorities decided 
to continue the construction of the bridge that had been abandoned for about 15 years. 
247 Personal observation during inauguration day of 50 members of parliament at Bekasi’s parliament 





dominance of elite actors in party politics, and the complexity of bureaucratic procedures 
in modern-day Indonesia.  
Literature on Indonesian civil society shows that scholars remain deeply divided 
in their understanding of the potential role that can be played by reformist activists and 
civil society actors in formal post-authoritarian politics in Indonesia. Optimists believe 
that the presence of civil society activists in parliament will have a positive impact on the 
performance of Indonesia’s legislative institution, which has been acknowledged to be 
too slow in managing various demands for political changes (Ziegenhain 2008: 73). In 
contrast to other newcomers, such as celebrities and business figures who have little 
experience in handling public issues, civil society activists in parliament are expected to 
improve the critical attitude of the legislature (LIPI 2011: 2). They can act as a new class 
of politicians who can build bridges between society and the state and provide a 
counterbalance in the policy-making process (Mietzner 2013: 29). In the context of local 
autonomy, their experience in advocating and empowering society at the grassroots level 
is expected to strengthen the mainstreaming of local issues as well as to provide 
alternative ideas to advance reforms at the local level (LIPI 2011: 22). However, one may 
question the ability of civil society actors to influence policy-making once they have 
moved into formal politics. As noted by Beittinger-Lee (2013) and Mietzner (2013), they 
must not only be able to cope with strong resistance from powerful elites who dominate 
the distribution of political and economic resources, but also deal with the strength of the 
party’s structure and the existence of patronage relationships that are deeply rooted in 
Indonesian mainstream politics.  
This chapter analyses the political role played by elected trade union elites in local 
parliaments and its implication for union engagement in electoral politics. As pointed out 
by Mietzner (2013: 44), the influx of reformist activists and civil society actors into 
formal politics is something of a dilemma. Once the unionists have moved into formal 
politics, they become part of the state institutions they previously criticised or opposed. 
Their position in parliament is inseparable from their bearer party’s interests, particularly 
in the political decision-making process, which often involves backroom lobbies, 
collective consensus and the assignment of certain political roles (Ziegenhain 2008; 
Sherlock 2010). At the same time, their inherent identity as union activists with specific 
constituents (mainly workers) continues to be attributed to something that sets them apart 
from career politicians. In carrying out their political role, union activists in parliament 





the word compromise. Therefore, as newcomers in the political domain, the ability of 
elected union elites to maintain the trust of their members while negotiating their political 
position within the party’s structure and interests will be put to the test. The outcome will 
determine their success in parliament as well as the likelihood of re-election. 
Focusing on the dynamics of Indonesia’s local politics, this chapter analyses the 
legislative role played by elected union elites in Bekasi, Serang and Medan. The 
discussion of the empirical data on the political role of union elites is structured according 
to their representative function as members of local parliaments, particularly regarding 
legislative (law-making) and monitoring functions. An understanding of the political role 
played by union elites in local parliaments is important at least in two ways. First, many 
union elites have been engaging with electoral politics since the first multi-party election 
conducted in 1999, but few of them have won legislative seats. For instance, of the 36 
union candidates who ran for legislative positions under the Labour Go Politics campaign 
in the 2014 legislative elections, only two unionists succeeded in gaining parliamentary 
seats. Second, very little is known regarding the political role played by activists or civil 
society actors who successfully entered parliament at national and local levels. Many 
scholars have produced studies on the importance of civil society in Indonesia’s 
democratisation (Hadiwinata 2003; Beittinger-Lee 2010); however, only a few deal with 
the observation and assessment of case studies of the presence of civil society actors in 
parliament. Therefore, analysing the involvement of union elites in parliament is crucial, 
not only to complement the few related studies on this specific subject, but also as part of 
an important effort to understand the future engagement of union elites in electoral 
politics as well as civil society actors as a whole. 
Struggle in the Formation of Local Labour Regulation 
The implementation of the decentralisation policy has been one of the most important and 
observable political changes in Indonesia since 1998. It marks the end of the uniform 
policies carried out by central government across all districts and municipalities. As stated 
in the fourth revision of Law Number 23/2014 on Regional Government, the 
establishment of local regulation is the authority of both the Head of District (regent or 
mayor) and the District People’s Representative Council (DPRD II).248 Furthermore, 
under the principle of equal partnership, the process of drafting, deliberating and the 
 





promulgation of a regulation must be involved and jointly approved of by both the head 
of the district and the DPRD II.249 In addition, Law Number 23/2014 concerning Regional 
Government also grants the right of the community to provide oral or written input into 
the drafting process.250 Therefore, the implementation of decentralisation in Indonesia is 
not only a form of delegation of political and administrative authorities from central to 
local government, but also a strategy to support local diversity and the distinctive 
challenges faced by each local government, taking into account the unique characteristics 
of each region across Indonesia’s archipelago (Hidayat 2008; Tyson 2010; Choi 2011). 
A study conducted by the Monitoring Committee for the Implementation of 
Regional Autonomy or KPPOD (2016) on 185 local regulations established from 2010 to 
2015, reported that the regulation on local labour is one of those most applied by local 
governments in Indonesia.251 Other local regulations include local tax (retribution), 
licensing services, investment in regional enterprises, Corporate Social Responsibilities 
(CSR), spatial and environmental regulations, and regulations related to basic needs such 
as education and health services (KPPOD 2016: 3). However, in some major industrial 
areas in Indonesia, such as Subang, Batam, Karimun and Medan, labour regulation has 
not yet been implemented. This situation can be related to the fact that the establishment 
of local labour regulation in industrial areas is complex, lengthy, and regularly involves 
different interests from trade unions, employers and local government. Moreover, in 
specific locations designated as industrial areas, there is usually a national strategic 
industrial zone so that the assignment of local regulations must consider national interests, 
which are under the authority of the central government. In addition, local labour 
regulation covers various aspects and involves multiple sectors or local government 
agencies in its implementation. This includes:  licensing and employment services; the 
provision of facilities and infrastructures that support workers’ welfare; provision of 
workers’ rights (such as membership of the social security programme); licensing of 
foreign workers; education and training; priority recruitment for local workers; the 
protection of vulnerable workers.  
 
 
249  Government of Indonesia, Law Number 23/2014 on Regional Government, Article 241. 
250  Government of Indonesia, Law Number 23/2014 on Regional Government, Article 237. 
251  These local regulations do not include the management of regional government organisations which are 
adjusted annually and annual mandatory local regulations which are stipulated in Law Number 32/2014 





Following the inauguration of two union officials as parliament members in 
Bekasi district, one of the main targets of their political agenda in law-making is to 
establish local labour regulation. In my interviews, the two elected union representatives 
in the Bekasi parliamentary office stated that the existence of local labour regulation is 
“an urgent requirement” considering the strategic position of Bekasi as the largest 
industrial and most union-dense area in Indonesia.252 There are at least three principal 
reasons related to the demands for the establishment of local labour regulation in Bekasi 
district. First, Bekasi is one of the main destinations for job-seekers who come from 
across Indonesia to find job opportunities in the industrial sectors. However, the 
unemployment rate in Bekasi is higher than the national figure. Based on data from BPS 
in 2013, the unemployment figure in Bekasi reached 97,922 workers or 7 per cent of the 
total workforce (1,345,909 people). By 2015, the number had increased to 149,859 
workers or 10.03 per cent of the total labour force of 1,494,680 workers (BPS 2017). 
Most of these unemployed workers are local residents around industrial zones, are 
generally less skilled and educated than migrant workers and are therefore less able to 
compete in the employment market.253  
In the context of local autonomy, the implementation of local labour regulation is 
expected to protect marginalised workers, strengthen the quality of local labour and avoid 
horizontal conflict between local workers and migrants.254 Since its introduction in 
August 2003, violations of the implementation of Manpower Law Number 13/2003 have 
occurred in many areas, including Bekasi district. One of the reasons is the inherent 
problem of certain rules stipulated in Manpower Law Number 13/2003, such as those on 
the limitation of contract and outsource-working systems, severance payment and 
dismissal cases, which can be interpreted by trade unions, employers and local 
governments in several ways. The establishment of local labour regulation is expected to 
remove the disadvantages in Manpower Law Number 13/2003, so that workers, 
employers and local governments can obtain protection and legal certainty.255 A proposal 
for the formulation of local labour regulations, which was initiated by the head of Bekasi 
 
252  Interview with Nyumarno, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 28 September 2016; 
Interview with Muhidin, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 26 September 2016. 
253  Interview with Nyumarno, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 28 September 2016. 
254 According to the final draft of Naskah Akademik. Document obtained from Sekretariat DPRD II 
Kabupten Bekasi, 28 October 2016.  
255  According to the final draft Naskah Akademik. Document obtained from Sekretariat DPRD II Kabupten 
Bekasi, 28 October 2016. See two research reports published by five universities (2006) and LIPI (2010) 





district, had been registered in the Regional Legislation Programme (Program Legislasi 
Daerah, Prolegda) in 2013 and 2014. However, until the end of the 2014 parliamentary 
term, the proposal had never been followed up by the People’s Representative Council in 
Bekasi district. Despite the alleged lack of commitment by members of parliament to 
follow up the proposal, the political situation at that time is also believed to have 
influenced parliament’s decision-making, given that 2013 was the political year ahead of 
the April 2014 legislative election.256 
At the beginning of 2015, the head of Bekasi district and the local parliament had 
targeted 26 local regulations in Bekasi’s 2015 legislative programme. Of the 26 targeted 
regulations, 12 local regulations were initiated by the head of the district, while another 
14, including the local labour regulation, came from initiatives established by the district 
representative council (Secretariat DPRD II Kabupaten Bekasi 2016). The target of 26 
local regulations in one year appears over-optimistic, considering that in the previous 
period (2009-2014), the local parliament was only able to disseminate around 14-16 
regulations per year.257 Except for annual mandatory regulations such as annual budgeting 
affairs, a local regulation typically needs at least six months to be established, from 
preparation of the academic document, legal drafting and deliberating, to promulgation 
in an official regulation document (lembar peraturan daerah).258 In cases where the 
formulation of a regulation requires input from the public, the process of drafting, 
deliberating and promulgation tends to be complex and lengthy. For instance, the 
formulation of Bekasi District Local Regulation Number 12/2011 (concerning tourism) 
took approximately a year and half to be completed.  
One of criticisms that regularly arises in the public debate regarding 
decentralisation in Indonesia is that the implementation of regional government may have 
created new spaces for democratisation, but it has also caused local governments to 
compete with respect to issuing local regulations. In many cases, local regulations are 
formulated without comprehensive reviews, let alone consideration of the quality of the 
regulations produced. In order to be able to produce a number of targeted local 
regulations, the legal drafting and deliberation of regulations are frequently conducted 
hurriedly and with a lack of serious debate (PSHI 2016: 45). Consequently, since the 
implementation of decentralisation in 1999, many local governments have produced 
 
 
257  Interview with Darmansyah, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 25 September 2016. 





problematic regulations that contradict public interest or higher laws and regulations, 
violate human rights and are poorly implemented. 259  
A study conducted by KPPOD (2005) on the implementation of local labour 
regulations established during the political transition period (1999-2004) in 38 districts 
across Indonesia found that those reviewed had faced many problems, in terms of judicial 
proceedings, substance, or the fundamental principles of local regulation. Of the 38 
districts reviewed, fourteen local labour regulations were contradictory to higher laws, 
ten local labour regulations had substantial problems, eight regulations violated the 
principle of local regulation, whilst the remaining six regulations were ascertained to be 
problematic regarding justice, principles and substance (KPPOD 2005). Furthermore, in 
2016, the Ministry of Home Affairs released a list of 3,143 local regulations categorised 
as problematic and recommended that they should be annulled by way of an official 
Presidential Decree. One example is Local Regulation Number 1/2011 of Karawang 
district on labour regulations, which was established four months before the end of the 
regent's term of office. Due to the hurried process of legal drafting and the political 
interest behind the establishment of this regulation, it was deemed to be problematic. It 
violated higher laws, such as regulating the minimum wage that had been regulated in 
Manpower Law Number 13/2013 and was too excessive, stating that local workers must 
be recruited first to fill jobs (KPPOD 2016).  
At the end of 2015, only 18 out of 26 targeted local regulations were promulgated 
by the Bekasi district parliament. Among the eight remaining regulations that failed to be 
established was the local labour regulation (DPRD Bekasi District Secretariat 2016). 
According to Nurdin, the discourse to follow-up the draft relating to local labour 
regulations was discussed once, at an inter-faction meeting in August 2015. However, the 
majority of the factions preferred to prioritise the establishment of two regulations on 
education services and Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR).260 By necessity, local 
labour regulation has been registered in the Prolegda since 2013. However, from an 
economic and political perspective, local regulations on education services and CSR have 
undoubtedly attracted more attention from most members and faction leaders in the 
Bekasi district parliamentary office.261 According to Nurdin, although a proposal on local 
 
259  See list of 3,143 local regulations categorised as problematic local regulations published by Ministry of 
Home Affairs in 2016.  
260  Interview with Nurdin, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 26 September 2016. 





regulation has been given priority in the Prolegda, it does not mean that the proposal will 
be directly approved in parliament. The establishment of a local regulation is part of a 
political process which requires not only collective approval from most of the factions 
but also determines how strongly political interests are embedded in the proposed 
regulation.262 
With regard to the order of procedure (tata tertib) pertaining to Indonesia's 
legislature, the decision to follow-up the proposed legislation in the Prolegda through 
legal drafting should be based on the approval of all factions.263 In this regard, the decision 
to discuss draft regulation also very much depends on this approval.  In practice, it is a 
rare occurrence in Indonesia’s legislature that a member of parliament rejects or goes 
against the decisions of his/her political party. A member of parliament who expresses an 
opinion or position beyond the party line will be labelled disobedient and often doomed 
to the risk of being recalled from parliament by the party’s executive board (Ziegenhein 
2010). This rule on the recall of MPs by political parties is often regarded as a ‘barrier’ 
used to restrict MPs from being critical or contrary to the decisions of their political 
parties (Huda 2015: 1). Although Law Number 17/2014 on the People’s Representative 
Council guarantees immunity for each member of parliament raising questions or giving 
their opinion outside and inside parliament, the law also gives a political party the 
authority to discharge members of the parliament through recall or interim change 
mechanisms (Pergantian Antarwaktu, PAW).264  
Having been neglected for one year, in the first inter-faction meeting conducted 
on 20 January in 2016, the Bekasi District People’s Representative Council eventually 
agreed to follow-up recommendations from the legislative committee (Badan Legislasi, 
Baleg DPRD) for making legal drafting of local labour regulations their main priority.265 
The meeting also appointed Nurdin as the Chairman of Special Committee XIV, with the 
primary task of finalising the legal drafting of proposed local labour regulations. 
 
262  Interview with Nurdin, parliament member of DPRD II Bekasi, Bekasi 26 September 2016. 
263 Prolegda is a planning instrument for the establishment of local regulations arranged in a planned, 
integrated and systematic way (Ministry of Home affairs Decree Number 12/2014). Prolegda consists 
of the composition or listing of local regulations derived from proposals by the head of the district and 
DPRD that stipulate their completion within one financial year. 
264 The rule on recall of MPs by a political party was removed in Law Number 4/1999 on the Formation 
and Position of the MPR, DPR and DPRD during the Reformasi era (1999-2003). It was then re-
activated in 2003, as stipulated under the second revision of Law Number 22/2003 Article 6.  
265 Baleg DPRD is part of the organisational structure of the District People’s Representative Council, 
whose main function is to coordinate the formulation of the regional legislation programme and 
preparation of legislative material requirements for the legal drafting process relating to local regulation 





Regardless of Nurdin’s role as the chairman of the Baleg DPRD, his appointment as the 
chairman of Special Committee XIV was politically beneficial, especially in relation to 
guiding the drafting process and ensuring that the discussion about the draft would not be 
delayed, as had happened three years earlier.  
Prior to completion of the draft, which involved several meetings with related 
government departments in Bekasi district and working visits to DKI Jakarta, Cimahi and 
Pasuruan for comparative studies, the special committee also conducted two separated 
public hearings involving representatives of trade unions and employers (Apindo and 
Kadin). Ideally speaking, a public hearing aims to gather the opinions of the public, 
especially those who have a direct interest in the establishment of a local regulation. This 
mechanism is considered a recognition of a citizens’ rights to participate in public policy-
making and moreover, is central to democratisation (Lay 2017: 21). In practice, with an 
over-optimistic number of targeted regulations, the process of a public hearing in local 
parliament is frequently acknowledged to be a mere formality, considering that the 
process is only part of the procedure that should be conducted by the special committee. 
In the interview, one union activist who attended the public hearing argued that the 
process was unsatisfactory, as there was no clarification on whether or not input from 
unions would be accommodated in the draft.266 The same opinion was also expressed by 
one member of Apindo Bekasi, who established that there had been no substantive 
changes between the draft discussed in the public hearing and the final regulation.267 
Apart from these views, the performance of the Bekasi district parliamentary institution 
has often been criticized by the public, especially with regard to its quality and the 
accountability of parliament members involved in the policy-making process. For 
instance, at the end of 2015, the parliament of Bekasi district was criticised by the Centre 
for Indonesian Law Studies (LKHI) which acknowledged a lack of transparency and often 
ignored standard procedures followed in the formulating of regulations.  
On 10 August 2016, before it was officially approved, the draft regulation on local 
labour regulation in Bekasi district was discussed in a plenary session, which was 
attended by 34 out of 50 parliament members in the Bekasi District People’s 
Representative Council. Unlike most plenary sessions, which tend to be a formality 
 
266  Interview with Nasrudin, union leader at PT DJabesmen, Bekasi 5 October 2016 





(Ziegenhein 2010), this one comprised a serious debate.268 As will be described below, 
the debate was triggered by statements delivered by Nyumarno, who criticised the 
limitations of two articles in the draft and proposed one additional article in order to make 
the implementation of the draft proceed effectively.269 However, the proposal from 
Nyumarno was opposed by other politicians, which indirectly reveals the political interest 
among different parties concerning the establishment of local labour regulation in Bekasi 
district. 
In an attempt to play his part in law-making, during the plenary session Nyumarno 
criticised the substance of Article 7 (6) and Article 28 (1) in the draft prepared by the 
Special Committee, which stipulated the obligations for employers and the management 
of the industrial areas in Bekasi district but did  not comprise any sanctions with respect 
to violations.270 Article 7 (6) in the draft, stipulated that in relation to the training 
programme for workers, the management of industrial areas and employers must provide 
support facilities at workers’ training centres (BLK). Furthermore, in Article 28 (1), 
relating to the recruitment of local workers and residents around industrial areas, the draft 
stipulated that every company would be obliged to cooperate with local education 
institutions to accommodate local workers and residents under the coordination of a 
designated official local organisation (Organisasi Perangkat Daerah, OPD).271 According 
to Nyumarno’s argument, the use of the word ‘obligation’ in both articles should be 
complemented by requirement of sanctions regarding violations. To support his 
argument, Nyumarno mentioned similar local labour regulations in other areas, for 
instance Serang and Karawang districts, which he claimed were being implemented 
inadequately because there was no section on violations. To ensure legal certainty in the 
implementation, and prior to the dissemination of the draft as a definitive regulation, in 
his final statement, Nyumarno recommended that an additional article on administrative 
sanctions for violation of both articles mentioned above should be added.  
While Nyumarno’s proposal was supported by one solitary member of parliament, 
who also shared his views during the plenary session, two members of parliament sought 
to oppose by giving different recommendations. The first opponent was Taih Minarno, a 
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politician from the Democrat Party, who argued that the addition of the article in the draft, 
which had been prepared by the Special Committee, should not only consider other 
parties’ interests but should also suspend the enactment of local labour regulation.272 
Furthermore, Taih Minarno argued that the proposal recommended by Nyumarno could 
be alternatively accommodated through the establishment of a Head of District decree. 
As stated in Law Number23/2014, in addition to proposing local regulation, which is the 
authority of both the head of the district and the People’s Representative Council, local 
government via the regent or mayor has the authority to issue a regent’s regulation 
(Peraturan Kepala Daerah, Perkada). This supports the implementation of local 
regulations and gives the authority to issue a regent’s decree to undertake local 
government duties.  
Another opponent of Nyumarno’s proposal was Suganda, a senior PAN politician 
in Bekasi district who was also a member of the Special Committee XIV, and who also 
expressed a similar opinion to Taih Minarno in the plenary session. In his 
statement, Suganda argued that the recommendation from Nyumarno concerning Article 
28 had been accommodated in a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the head 
of the district and Apindo Bekasi. As reported by one local media source in Bekasi, on 
26 April 2016, the representative of employers in Bekasi made an agreement with the 
head of the district, in line with  the MOU, to have a recruitment quota of 30 per cent for 
local workers (Dakta, 14 April 2016).273 In his final statement, Suganda stated: “Please 
do not change the things that have been discussed in the special committee in this plenary, 
so we are consistent”.274  
In an effort to respond to the statement made by the politicians, which opposed 
his recommendation, Nyumarno filed a second interruption and argued that both just 
wanted to divert attention away from the substantial weaknesses evident in the prepared 
draft.275 To counter their argument, Nyumarno argued that in addition to parliament 
initiating the draft, issuance of a regent’s regulation to accommodate the absence of the 
article, such as a sanction in local regulation, is not only contradictory to the authority of 
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the regent but would undoubtedly cause the implementation of local labour regulation to 
be ineffective. 276 Moreover, he also criticised the statements from Suganda which he 
considered to show that his adversary did not understand the purpose of the plenary 
session and had disregarded the rights of each MP to express his/her opinion in the plenary 
session.277 At the end of his statement, Nyumarno concluded that “a plenary session is a 
place for final decision-making in the legislature, so before this draft is approved for local 
regulation, do not say that we cannot add or propose something for the draft”.278 To 
conclude, Nyumarno’s recommendation was eventually approved in the final deliberation 
by all factions involved. At the end of the plenary session, the head of Bekasi District 
People’s Representative Council, who chaired the final plenary session, officially 
approved the addition of Article 87 on administrative sanctions for the violation of 
Articles 7 (6) and 28 (1).  
The above description shows how the presence of two union representatives in 
Bekasi district parliament office has effectively contributed to labour-related law-making 
at the local level. According to Ziegenhain (2010: 42), law making is the most 
fundamental function of parliament, as the creation of general and compulsory rules for 
all members of a certain social entity are “determined, granted and limited by laws”. 
Although any laws or regulations produced by parliament are a form of collective 
decision-making, each member of parliament still has influence to determine the direction 
and the form of the law and regulation they produce (Ziegenhain 2008: 43). As the case 
of Nyumarno in the plenary session has shown, his success in struggling for additional 
articles on penalties for non-compliance is not only important to minimise violation but 
also to ensure legal certainty in the implementation of local labour regulation. In addition, 
it is a demonstration of his role in channelling the reality of the implementation of 
regulations related to employment, which are often difficult to enforce due to the absence 
of sanctions against violations. In the interview, he admitted that he was not surprised 
that he encountered resistance from elite actors when proposing additional articles. 
However, under democratisation he still has space to influence effectively in law-making 
and to defence his reformist causes. In this regard, the union in Bekasi has gained a 
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political advantage through their direct involvement in policy-making, which has been 
provided by democratisation in the post-Suharto era.  
Representing the Interests of Workers 
Union activists in parliament represent the population of a specific constituency; that is, 
the union members or workers. Substantively, union elites in parliament should be a voice 
for their members as well as the aspirations of the working population in general (Hyman 
and Gumbrell-McCormick 2010: 319). This function is aligned with the basic idea of 
parliament as representing the people; as parliament members, they are expected to be 
responsive, meaning that they must care about the interests and demands of the voters 
they represent so that mutual trust can be guaranteed. According to Ziegenhain (2008: 
34), the degree of closeness to constituents and the commitment of members of parliament 
in defending the interests of their constituency are two of the most crucial factors 
determining a politician’s legitimacy. In addition, those factors are also crucial in 
determining the success of each parliament member in being re-elected, especially when 
an open, fair and competitive electoral system is adopted (Ziegenhain 2008: 35).  
In the case of Bekasi district, the two elected union representatives 
have recognised that their newly acquired political role as parliament members not only 
means they can achieve their personal objectives; it also means vital legitimisation for the 
future of the Labour Go Politics movement and union engagement in electoral 
politics. Although Nyumarno and Nurdin have moved into parliamentary office, both 
have claimed that they continue to maintain their relationships with their main 
constituents, particularly trade unions and workers.279 This aspect of the relationship is 
not only crucial in channelling demands at grassroots level and political dynamics inside 
parliament, but also can be placed as a clear indicator in understanding the impact of the 
presence of activists in parliament. Furthermore, given their background as union activists 
and their position in Commission IV of DPRD Bekasi district, which deals with 
employment, health and education issues, Nyumarno and Nurdin have been given greater 
confidence and privileged access to focus on representing the interests of workers and 
their causes in local parliament.280 
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In the interview, Nyumarno explained that “my background as a union activist has 
strongly influenced my current position in parliament and of course I am aware that all 
eyes are now on both of us (together with Nurdin) as it is unprecedented for unionists in 
Bekasi to be able to enter local parliament”. Of the 64 union candidates who ran for 
legislative positions under the Labour Go Politics campaign in the 2014 election, it was 
only Bekasi district where unions succeeded in placing two representatives in the local 
parliament. The position of Bekasi district is also privileged, both as the largest industrial 
area and as the main barometer of the labour movement in post-authoritarian Indonesia 
(Mufakir 2014; Tjandra 2017). Thus, it can be recognised that the presence of two union 
activists in Bekasi’s local parliament is a test case for their ability to work in policy-
making, besides building workers’ political trust in relation to the unions’ attempt to 
engage in formal politics.  
As noted by Duncan (2015: 48), the presence of two union representatives in 
Bekasi district’s parliamentary office has played a key role in the implementation of 
policies affecting workers in the district, such as doubling the number of labour inspectors 
and overseeing the distribution of social security benefits to an additional 8000 
residents.281 In the interviews, beside the establishment of local labour regulations, 
Nyumarno and Nurdin mentioned several political breakthroughs, which they claimed 
have never been carried out by previous politicians in Bekasi district. For instance, 
following their first role as parliament members, both initiated the establishment of a 
service facility in Commission IV of DPRD Bekasi district which they called a “complaint 
post”, enabling residents to directly report any problems related to government services 
and those that occur in society. Although not all reported cases have been followed up 
directly, in fact, this facility has provided a better channel of communication between 
their constituents and the monitoring function of parliament, which they claimed was 
ineffective in the previous parliament’s term of office.282 Together with other members 
of Commission IV, Nyumarno and Nurdin regularly spearhead surprise investigations in 
factories, particularly to follow-up reports from unions and local labour NGOs in relation 
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to violations of labour regulations. For instance, in November and December 2014, they 
were involved in a series of surprise investigations looking into cases of unilateral 
dismissals, such as in PT DMC, PT Sunstar, PT Hanken, PT Osung and PT Nippon. On 
28 July 2017, Nyumarno and two other members of Commission IV they also carried one 
out in the case of five workers detained in a factory for the alleged theft of company 
property. Through negotiation, the five workers were allowed to return home after being 
held for three days inside the factory. In addition, Nyumarno then gave the five workers 
legal assistance to file a lawsuit because the company was considered to have violated 
criminal law by detaining the workers in the factory (Berita Cikarang, 27 July 2017).   
On 22 February 2015, Nyumarno released a circular which gave the names and 
addresses of around 480,000 registered participants of the local health benefit programme 
(Jamkesda). As explained by Nyumarno in his circular, these data, which were difficult 
to access by union activists are believed to have been advantageous in helping residents 
who wanted to confirm their Jamkesda membership as well as for labour activists to 
monitor the implementation of the Jamkesda programme. In certain cases, Nyumarno and 
Nurdin are also frequently involved in the settlement of patient rejection cases by the 
hospitals. For instance, in mid-July 2015, Nyumarno was involved as a negotiator in the 
case of a patient from his electoral area who was refused treatment by a hospital as he 
was not registered on the government’s social security programme. Through his direct 
negotiation with the head of the hospital, the patient was eventually treated in the 
hospital.283  
In the eyes of certain union leaders in Bekasi, their fellow unionists in the local 
parliament are role models for their potential future political involvement. This view is 
not only reflected in their support of union engagement in electoral politics but in their 
approach to lobbying their representatives in parliament. Zarkasi, a union leader at PT 
DMC commented, “at least we are now more confident of showing our bargaining 
position when dealing with entrepreneurs and executives because there is stronger 
political support from our representatives in parliament”.284 A similar opinion was also 
stated by Ika, a union leader at PT ONG Bekasi, who negotiated a unilateral dismissal 
case in the company where he worked. “If it was not for the negotiation that was 
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facilitated by our representatives in parliament, it would have been unlikely that our 
demands were heard let alone be followed up by the company’s management”.285  
Apart from what they have undertaken as members of parliament, both Nyumarno 
and Nurdin admitted that working in parliament has given them a much better 
understanding of the political process and the complexities of political deals that involve 
the different interests of actors and many layers of decision-making. In the interviews, 
Nyumarno mentioned how he had to approach and lobby each parliamentarian in order to 
encourage them to attend the plenary session and approve the submission of the draft on 
local labour regulation.286 In certain cases, they were even forced to place themselves in 
opposition to the unions’ and worker’s demands. In the case of the implementation of the 
apprenticeship programme, both preferred to focus on controlling the violation rather than 
supporting union demands and workers who opposed the apprenticeship programme. At 
the time of the fieldwork, both Nyumarno and Nurdin were initiating a proposal for local 
regulation on industrial zones and campaigning for the establishment of an industrial 
relations court. However, both understood that these initiatives would not be easy to 
achieve, considering decisions in parliament are part of a political process which regularly 
necessitates compromise. Nevertheless, both argued that working in parliament has given 
them opportunities to make crucial changes and that it is different to merely fighting 
outside. As Nyumarno confessed:  
In parliament, we work at the same table as other politicians with different 
interests and political agendas. We need to be smart and read the situation 
carefully, otherwise we will lose. Of course, it is impossible for me to solve 
every labour problem, but at least I can contribute to certain meaningful 
aspects of labour issues. When we were fighting on the streets, we could 
only deliver our protest outside the office (the regent and parliament) and 
wouldn’t receive a serious response. But now, I can directly meet or phone 
them (government officials) to ask them to fulfil their responsibility or 
settle things directly. Indeed, what I fight for has not reached its peak yet, 
but I now feel that what I do makes a difference.287 
While only a few union activists have been successfully elected as parliament 
members, there are numerous elected unionists who have not only failed to have a 
significant impact on the policy fields they were previously concerned with, but 
moreover, were co-opted by party and elite structures for pragmatic reasons. Several have 
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not only left their union roots but also adjusted to political realities and aligned themselves 
with the elitist group that they had previously fought against. This situation shows that 
the unionists who turned to parliamentary politics are not always immune to the 
temptations associated with party and elite bureaucratic politics.  
The case of Juliaman Damanik, a former local leader of the SPSI and a politician 
from the Labour Party in Medan, can be seen as an illustration of the above case. After 
gaining a parliamentary seat in Medan’s parliament office in 2011, he transformed 
himself into a politician who not only turned against his previous colleagues but has made 
compromises where pragmatic politics are concerned. His legitimacy as a member of 
parliament was questioned by several local unionists, as he actually failed to win a seat 
in the 2009 legislative elections.288 He obtained 1,050 votes, while his competitor from 
the same party and the same electoral area, Remon Simatupang, won a seat after gaining 
1,297 votes. In May 2010, after being appointed as general secretary of the Labour Party 
in the Medan branch, he used his new position in the party structure to enter parliament 
by displacing Remon Simatupang through the interim change mechanism (Pergantian 
Antarwaktu, PAW).289 In response to questions about his political ambition and his 
connection with the PAW case, Damanik insisted that “politics is about how we utilise 
power and opportunity”.290 
In April 2012, instead of meeting with Damanik, as the only representative of the 
unions and workers in Medan’s parliamentary office, a group of unionists decided to meet 
other legislators to seek support in resolving their labour related issues.291 Similarly, in 
September 2013, a group of trade unions in Medan filed a motion of non-confidence 
against Damanik’s role and his position in parliament; they considered him to have no 
regard for the interests of workers.292 Referring to union opposition to his position and 
sharp criticism of how insignificant a role he played in supporting unions and workers in 
parliament, Damanik commented “I really know who they are, because I once worked 
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with and was part of them. They always refuse if I ask them to cooperate with the 
government, let alone with the entrepreneurs, but that they always want their demands to 
be accepted on behalf of the workers”.293 
According to Damanik, formal politics is different to labour activism. The latter 
is always putting forward ideas and demands based on what the members’ interests are, 
whereas in parliament there are many political interests and compromises to be reached. 
In the interview, Damanik stated that, “when you are an idealistic politician it means you 
put yourself out of the system”.294 In addition, by the end of October 2014, approximately 
two months after the end of his term as a member of parliament in DPRD Medan, his 
name was on the list of 13 former members of parliament who had not returned their 
official car. His position in parliament office had ended in mid-September 2014 (Tribune 
News, 17 September 2014). This unfortunately did nothing for the image of unionists in 
formal politics. 
In the case of Serang District, the case of two unionists in local parliament, Adhadi 
Romli from PDIP (2009-2014) and Zaenal Abidin from the Hanura Party (2014-2019), is 
a different story. Unlike the case of Bekasi District, their role in representing the interests 
of unions and workers in the local parliament was considered minimal.295 One major 
cause was that their commission’s membership in parliament had no direct relationship 
with the policy fields they had previously been concerned with as union activists. To carry 
out their parliamentarian functions and authorities, each member of parliament must be a 
member of a commission which determines his/her respective field areas and the affiliated 
government agencies they may supervise. The membership of each of the commissions 
is decided at the beginning of the five year-term of parliament by each faction and is 
determined in proportion to the size of the faction in the commission.  
As noted by Sherlock (2010: 67), a commission in parliament is the principal site 
for parliamentarians to exercise both their formal authority and practical power ahead of 
executive government and affiliated government agencies. In practical terms, Sherlock 
(2012: 560) explains, “members of parliament know what their own commission is doing 
but often have little or no knowledge about the work of other commissions, unless they 
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are particularly controversial ones”. In Serang District People’s Representative Council, 
the structure of the commission’s membership is divided into five areas. Employment 
affairs is included in Commission V. In the case of Adhadi Romli, he was a member of 
Commission IV, which is officially in charge of infrastructure development, for instance: 
spatial planning, public works and housing, transportation, communication and 
environmental management. Zaenal Abidin meanwhile worked for Commission I, which 
is responsible for governance services, such as: public administration, regional autonomy, 
licensing, personnel/apparatus, foreign and domestic cooperation, general elections and 
the parliamentarian secretariat.  Consequently, both had no direct authority over decision-
making related to the interests of workers and unions in local parliament.  
A further cause is related to the way union elites used to engage in electoral 
politics. As discussed in chapter three, the case of Adhadi Romli and Zaenal Abidin is an 
example of union elites who successfully moved into parliamentary office via individual 
partnerships or as people joining political parties. In contrast to those nominated by trade 
unions, such as in the Labour Go Politics movement in Bekasi, unionists who competed 
through individual partnerships with certain political parties formed their own success 
teams to mobilise voters and used their own money to campaign. They benefited from 
their close relationships and having their names recognised by the unions and used their 
position in the party structure as political capital to advance their careers in parliamentary 
office. Instead of being known as unionist-politicians, they prefer to be recognised as 
career politicians who view their political role in parliament as representing their 
respective political parties and constituents in general.296 As they are no different to other 
politicians from party-cadres, it is understandable if they make compromises in the face 
of political realities and the pragmatic nature of elite politics and adjust their role 
accordingly, including to gain personal benefits and to seek higher political positions in 
the party’s structure and parliament. In this regard, it can be said that electoral reforms 
have given union elites broader political opportunity to engage in formal politics, 
although this development does not necessarily guarantee that unionists who successfully 
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Implications for Trade Union Politics 
The three cases discussed in this chapter have several implications regarding unionist 
involvement in local parliamentary politics. As part of the union’s learning process by 
participating in parliamentary politics, the experiences of elected unionists in Bekasi, 
Medan and Serang can be perceived as valuable political education for other unionists in 
their attempts to influence policy-making in parliament.  
Given its privileged position as the most union-dense area in Indonesia, Bekasi 
district can be perceived as the new role model for further trade union engagement in 
electoral politics. Through the Labour Go Politics movement, the unions and workers in 
Bekasi have not only succeeded in placing two union representatives in local parliament 
but have also effectively formed a union-party alliance that has provided unions and 
workers with a stronger bargaining position to voice their interests in policy-making. The 
strong and sustained relationships between elected union leaders in parliament and their 
home organisations, including workers, is also crucial in determining the success of union 
elites in parliament. In this case, communication and cooperation between unions, 
workers and elected union leaders in parliament are key to maximising the political roles 
that elected union leaders can play in parliament, especially in resolving issues faced by 
unions and workers. 
The case of Bekasi district also indicates that the political roles played by elected 
union elites in parliament become vital when they are appointed to a commission that 
directly supervises labour-related interests. As noted by Ziegenhain (2010), commissions 
in the Indonesian parliamentary structure play a crucial role in brewing every policy 
decision in specific areas. Parliamentary members appointed to particular commissions 
do not have authority in every decision taken by those commissions, especially regarding 
parliament's function of supervising the implementation of policies proposed by existing 
commissions. Only in plenary meetings can every member of parliament have the right 
to influence any policies that have been decided previously in the work committee on a 
commission. However, with there being so many targeted regulations, the outcomes of 
most plenary meetings are usually set from the beginning, through political lobbying, and 
they are carried out as a formal procedure to validate the decisions that have been made 
at each commission session. Therefore, besides being able to increase the confidence of 
union elites in the parliament, the existence of union elites in the commission that handles 
labour issues can also offset bias in political interests, especially from business-politicians 





because they have a direct political channel in the parliament that can be used as a political 
mouthpiece related to labour violations as part of the implementation of the monitoring 
function carried out by parliament members. Cases of inspection and enforcement of 
labour regulations carried out by members of Commission C in Bekasi district mostly 
came from workers' constituents through the complaint post facility, whose formation 
was initiated by two elected legislative members from the union in the 2014 legislative 
elections. In this regard, the political roles played by elected union elites in Bekasi 
district’s local parliament are not only important for the development of the labour 
movement and local politics in this area - considering the strategic position of Bekasi as 
the most union-dense and industrial areas in Indonesia - but also for other regions in 
Indonesia which have been involved in electoral contestation.  
However, it would be an overstatement to suggest that the presence of unionists 
in parliament is a powerful political force that has fully overcome the challenges of the 
dominant elite forces in the local political sphere. By way of contrast, the case studies in 
Medan and Serang district have revealed that Indonesian union activists are by no means 
immune to the temptations of party and elite politicisation. They have not only failed to 
have an impact in the policy field that they were previously fighting for, but also were co-
opted by the party structure and elitist interests for pragmatic reasons. In relation to this 
issue, Mietzner (2013: 29) is correct, as he argued that the contemporary Indonesia’s 
electoral democracy is best described as a new arena of contestation between entrenched 
elites, who keep attempting to use any means to sustain their political power, and 
activists-cum-politicians, who try pushing for further political reforms to fight for their 
specific political agendas.  
Union activists who keep their distance from their previous union organisations 
and roots after being elected as parliament members tend to abandon issues and policies 
that were previously part of their concern in the union's struggles. This condition can be 
found in the cases of union elites who have advanced through electoral contestations via 
individual channels, built successful teams with their own capital and gained minimum 
financial support from union organisations. How union elites are nominated and compete 
to represent the interests of workers in electoral contestation is crucial in determining how 
and to what extent they will use their political roles for the interest of unions and workers 
when they are elected. The cases of Bekasi, Serang and Medan certainly provide valuable 





well as giving their political support to union elites’ nomination in subsequent legislative 
elections.   
Conclusion  
This chapter has discussed the political role played by elected union elites in local 
parliaments by means of three cases study in Bekasi, Serang and Medan. It gives a mixed 
picture with regard to the roles played by trade union elites in relation to their attempt to 
engage in local parliamentary policy-making. The case in Bekasi demonstrates that union 
activists have used their new positions as parliamentary members to fight for their specific 
agenda and to defend their reformist causes. However, others in Medan and Serang have 
failed to avoid the dilemmatic trap between elite co-optation and their new activist-
politician identity.  
This chapter suggests that the presence of union elites in parliamentary politics 
can be advantageous for worker and union interests when elected unionists maintain their 
relationships with former colleagues and their causes. This condition is not only important 
to maintain political trust between labour constituents and elected unionists, but also to 
provide political spaces among them in communicating demands at the grassroots level 
and political dynamics inside parliament. Maintaining cooperative relations and mutual 
control between unions and their elected leaders in the parliament creates mutually 
beneficial relations between the union and its representatives in parliament. This 
condition can be realised if unions and their legislative candidates could work together, 
especially in determining: the political platform on which they will fight in parliament; 
alliances with political parties; the formation of a success team; mobilization of union 
members in campaign activities. 
Given the significant position of commissions in the parliament, the placement of 
union activists in a commission should be in accordance with the field of policy with 
which they were previously concerned, so that they can perform their representative 
function as members of parliament as effectively as possible. Since legislative functions 
are generally fulfilled by parliamentary commissions, the appointment of elected 
legislative candidates by political parties to various commissions has created clear 
boundaries related to specific fields and tasks that must be handled by each member of 
parliament. As a consequence of this system, the ability of elected legislative candidates 





will determine their success in parliament, as well as the likelihood of further electoral 
victories by the unions.   
As the case of Bekasi district has shown, the political role played by both union 
representatives in Bekasi District People’s Representatives Council has had a positive 
impact on how they have contributed to labour-related decision-making and how union 
and worker’s interests were representated in local politics. Supported by their experiences 
as union activists and a placement in the commission corresponding to their field of 
interest, the union’s mission by way of the Labour Go Politics movement in Bekasi 
district can be considered a success - albeit a modest one - compared to the traditional 
approaches that unionists and workers used to pursue, such as mass strikes and street 
demonstrations. This success can be seen in their significant contribution to the 
establishment of local labour regulation and in the implementation of parliamentarian 
monitoring functions which directly affect workers, such as direct investigations over 
unilateral dismissal cases and overseeing of the distribution of social security benefits.  
Engaging in electoral politics is a strategic and legitimate way for union elites to 
secure a direct position at the policy-making table and can be beneficial for the unions in 
their struggle to voice workers’ interests in the political sphere. However, in the absence 
of unifying and sustained labour-related parties that typically espouse pro-labour 
principles, union elites have no choice except to build partnerships with mainstream 
political parties in order to be able to engage in legislative elections. In this regard, the 
unionists’ ability to maintain workers’ trust and negotiate their political position within a 
party’s structure and interests will determine their success in parliament, as well as the 
likelihood of further electoral victories by the unions. It is likely that unions will establish 
themselves as one of the key interest groups, and their involvement in formal politics can 
be placed as a necessary condition for successful labour movements in post-authoritarian 
Indonesia. In this context, what has been claimed by Hadiz and Robison (2010) through 
their Oligarch Thesis (in which political systems and Indonesia's economic resources are 
seen to have been occupied by predatory elites) has failed to capture the political dynamic 
and reality that has developed in the lower levels. The role of union elites in parliamentary 
politics is significant; in some specific areas of interests and in some regions, they have 
had successes. In this regard, although union activists do not have a dominant presence 
in parliaments, under democratisation there is still sufficient room for them to defend their 






Chapter Seven  
Conclusion 
 
Since the collapse of Suharto’s authoritarian New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia has 
engaged in the dual processes of economic liberalisation and political reform. The state 
has restructured its economy by integrating into the global marketplace through greater 
flexibility. With the support of the World Bank, the IMF and the ILO, the state has been 
implementing flexible labour market policies, a necessary option according to these 
international financial institutions. Simultaneously, the state has initiated a political 
reform process that includes recognition of political rights and the implementation of 
democratic elections and decentralisation, which provides broader opportunities for trade 
unions and all elements of civil society to participate in formal politics. These changes 
have not only created a new landscape for Indonesian institutional politics but also 
generated an essential redefinition of the relationship between the state, trade unions and 
employers. 
As revealed in Chapter 2, trade unions in Indonesia face the same challenges as 
general unions in many countries whose labour markets are globally integrated. 
Indonesian trade unions are in a rather weak position due to the impact of flexible labour 
market policies; however, political reforms after 1998 led to the establishment of three 
new labour laws that have benefited them. In contrast to their counterparts in Thailand 
and Malaysia, where the unions are completely confined to roles designated by the state, 
trade unions in Indonesia have been quick to strengthen their organisation and can sustain 
their movement and pursue interests so as negotiate with the state and employers. 
Democratisation is allowing trade unions and workers to: use their fundamental rights to 
organise and develop; defend their interests via collective bargaining; engage in collective 
mobilisation by way of massive labour demonstrations and protests; and even put pressure 
on governments to halt particular policies that hinder workers’ interests. In the context of 
political participation, reforms to political parties and elections have increased confidence 
among Indonesia’s trade unionists to engage in electoral contestation. The 
implementation of decentralisation and the establishment of an open proportional 
electoral system since the 2009 legislative elections have created greater opportunities for 
non-elite actors such as trade unionists to be involved in legislative elections, particularly 





Despite opportunities offered by political reforms, Indonesia’s trade unions still 
face several challenges. They are vulnerable to the fragmentation and elite factionalism 
that have intensified in response to recognition of the right to form independent unions. 
Labour organisations consisting of many different types, structures and political 
orientations have emerged, further hindering attempts by union elites to create a powerful 
and consolidated front during elections. At the grassroots level, workers generally do not 
perceive their political position and role in elections as part of their political identity. 
These conditions are increasingly exacerbated by the lasting legacy from the New Order 
regime regarding the stigma and dichotomy between workers (pekerja) and labourers 
(buruh), including workers’ and union leaders’ understanding of the traditional role and 
function of trade unions. These challenges have contributed to the complexity of union 
attempts to engage in electoral politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
Through operationalising the framework of political unionism developed by 
Hyman and Gumbrell-McCormick (2010) and similar criteria used by Fairbrother (2015), 
this thesis has examined the electoral engagement of Indonesian trade unions in the 2009 
and 2014 legislative elections. It has also explained how Indonesian unions legitimise 
their organisational position regarding electoral contestation. When democratisation took 
hold in 1998 in Indonesia, many trade union leaders still believed that trade unionism and 
party politics were two separate spheres. However, the labour movement found formal 
ways to engage in electoral politics, either by establishing labour-based parties or building 
political alliances with non-labour-linked parties. To account for different patterns of 
union electoral strategies, union mobilisation capacity and constraints were assessed, and 
the thesis questioned why only a few union legislative candidates were successfully 
elected. The ways in which elected union elites used their parliamentary positions to 
advocate worker’s rights and interests were then analysed. 
By examining union experiences in electoral contestations, this thesis has 
explicated the varied possibilities for, and limitations of, union electoral engagement in 
democratic Indonesia. New insights have been gained into the strengths and weaknesses 
of the politically active unions and their relationships with established political 
powerholders in Indonesia today. In line with my epistemological goals, through this 
thesis I have argued that Indonesian trade unions cannot be viewed just as economic 
actors. Despite their historical legacy and uneasy associations with communism and 
socialism in Indonesia, trade unions are highly political and have developed their 





for workers. This has been apparent since in 2012, when several major union federations 
refused to work collaboratively with employers and the government (which was prepared 
to revise Manpower Law Number 13/2003), deciding instead to use emerging political 
channels and networks to take part in electoral politics and lobby parliament. 
Unions’ Electoral Legitimacy: A Question of Motives 
Trade unions have engaged in electoral politics since the first multi-party elections in 
Indonesia in 1999, though unionists remain divided with regard to building alliances with 
political parties and supporting the candidacy of union elites in legislative elections. The 
transition to democracy in 1998 has clearly affected the growth and structure of trade 
unions in Indonesia. However, the role, function and orientation of trade unions remains 
somewhat mixed and the association between trade unions and political parties is still 
perceived as unusual both by union elites and workers. This situation not only shows that 
the unions are still strongly influenced by the legacy of the authoritarian regime of the 
past, but also reflects the different needs and interests of union leaders in organising their 
movements. It makes it difficult for unionists to break into the electoral arena, while 
creating a complex political terrain for unions to mobilise and gain votes from labour 
constituents. 
Chapter 3 considered why trade union elites engage in electoral politics and how 
they seek to legitimise this engagement (RQ2). Electoral engagement is determined to an 
extent by a union’s background and its leaders’ relationships with the past, elite interests, 
organisational priorities and strategies, and opportunities for union involvement in 
electoral politics. Moderate unions, particularly legacy unions characterised by their lack 
of leadership renewal, tend to focus on traditional trade union activities to maintain their 
economic function and represent their members in collective bargaining or negotiate 
workers’ interests with employers. Some may agree with the idea of union engagement 
in elections, although union organisations tend to position themselves as independent of 
electoral politics. More progressive union elites may take the opposing stance, 
considering partisan politics to be part of a necessary strategy and an effective mechanism 
through which trade unions can shape policy-making. They are primarily motivated by 
the opportunities offered by decentralisation and the implementation of the open 
proportional electoral system, either for their specific organisational agendas or personal 





The principal reason that union elites reject engagement in electoral politics is the 
desire to preserve the unity of their organisation and maintain organisational autonomy. 
Given the fact that workers have different religious and ethnic identities, and that their 
political choices are often affected by their political origins, histories and affiliations, 
forcing members to support particular candidates and a particular political party can cause 
internal strife and undermine organisational unity. One could argue that it is unions’ 
priority to strengthen their collective bargaining in factories for the benefit of members. 
This is crucial because the SPSI, the only legalised union during Suharto’s 32-year reign, 
did not engage in genuine collective bargaining or worker representation. On this basis, 
unionists who reject union engagement in electoral politics take the traditional position 
that unions and parties are distinct entities and should remain so. According to unionists 
in this group, the main goal of a trade union is to represent their members in negotiations 
with employers, while the aim of a political party is to gain legitimacy and power in 
political institutions via elections. In addition, with a political structure rife with elitism 
and an imbalance of power relations between unions and political parties, there are fears 
that the involvement of unions in political contests only benefits certain union elites and 
leads to the politicisation of labour issues in line with party interests. Suspicion among 
unionists relating to the political motivation behind the involvement of union elites in 
electoral contestation persists, although the main reason is different relative to the initial 
involvement of unionists in the 1999 election, which was an attempt to return to the New 
Order regime through the politicisation of trade unions. 
For most unionists who support union engagement in electoral politics, entry into 
the arena of electoral politics is not only part of implementing their new strategy but also 
an important opportunity offered to present themselves as an alternative base for political 
power, following the democratic reforms. After decentralisation in 1999, unions in 
industrial-dense areas possibly had more opportunity to shape decisions concerning areas 
of policy-making affecting worker interests. As part of the complex political learning 
process, engagement in electoral politics was designed to: raise the profile of labour 
related-issues in elections; educate and enhance political consciousness; develop an 
alternative labour party supported by the trade unions, workers and other civil society 
groups. The dramatic change in unionist attitudes toward electoral engagement is 
inseparable from the way in which union elites have opened themselves up to building 
relationships with political parties on top of gaining access to political education, 





Indonesia, this indicates a significant step forward for organised unions to take their 
collective potential in electoral politics seriously, besides the initial successful political 
empowerment of trade unions in post-authoritarian Indonesia. 
Union Electoral Strategies and Constraints 
The number of unionists nominated as legislative candidates has increased significantly 
since the 2009 elections; however, various electoral strategies pursued by unionists 
gained only limited success with respect to placing union candidates in parliament offices. 
The three case studies on union electoral strategies and constraints examined in Chapters 
4 and 5 revealed several shortcomings concerning union success in legislative elections. 
The empirical findings focused on the types of electoral strategies union elites use to 
mobilise union members and worker constituencies, and the extent to which structural 
and organisational constraints affect the mobilisation capacity of union candidates during 
legislative elections. 
Trade union structure, organisational capacity, networking and strategy are 
instrumental in their becoming more organised. However, those factors may not be 
enough to succeed when it comes to electoral contestation. Over the past decade, trade 
unions in Indonesia have improved their campaigns through various strategies such as 
labour strikes and demonstrations, lobbying parliament, and the use of lawsuits. They 
have achieved a significant outcome, shown by the increased number of collective 
bargaining agreements at the company level and likelihood of resolving industrial 
disputes. In the context of the labour movement, however, those strategies take place 
within more controlled settings and the results can be seen immediately when employers 
agree to accommodate union demands or through cancellation or delay of protests. 
Similarly, street politics and strikes have been fully understood by union leaders and 
workers to be part of their fundamental rights and have become the essence of unions’ 
daily struggles in the post-Suharto era. Workers are therefore easily convinced by elites 
and can be mobilised to take to the streets to voice their demands. In contrast, in the 
context of elections the ability of union elites to influence workers’ decisions to follow 
the union line is limited. Workers tend to position themselves one way in terms of their 
struggles in factories and in another when voting in elections. The desire to fight for 
workers’ interests via electoral politics, and stressing the potential benefits of doing so, is 
now pronounced among union candidates. Nonetheless, most workers either reject this 





In Indonesia’s highly competitive legislative elections, where vote-buying and 
money politics are so prevalent and multiple candidates from the same party compete 
against each other to attract votes in the same electorate, parties themselves have become 
sites of contestation. The candidates who hold power in a party tend to dominate its 
machinery and use it to support their candidacy. However, non-party cadre candidates 
such as unionists are regularly forced to manage and finance their campaigns, including 
forming a success team. As well as this, most union-party alliances in the 2009 and 2014 
legislative elections were based on the non-programmatic and short-term strategies of 
particular unions or individual unionists ahead of the election. Consequently, the party 
machine has become irrelevant for most union candidates. Compared to those who were 
nominated and supported by their home union organisations, union candidates who ran 
individually for legislative seats – which dominated the union’s legislative nominations 
in the 2009 and 2014 elections – found this situation unfavourable. Owing to factors such 
as their limited financial ability and lack of confidence, the majority of individual union 
legislative candidates failed to gain significant votes. 
In Serang, the majority of union legislative candidates from the SPN gained votes 
cast with no more than one third of the total political parties in each electoral area. The 
same result was also observed in the case of unionists from the SPSI: even fewer votes 
were cast. A slightly different situation was found in Bekasi, where two out of nine union 
legislative candidates from the FSPMI under the Labour Go Politics movement won local 
parliament seats. Without relying on party machines, the FSPMI Bekasi branch succeeded 
in forming a successful team, recruiting volunteers, rallying members, and designing and 
financing their own political campaigns. Their well-planned strategy and solid 
organisation surmounted the practice of money politics and fierce competition in the 2014 
legislative elections. 
Confronted by the absence of a unifying and sustained labour-based party in the 
2014 legislative elections, and a continuation of extreme organisational fragmentation, 
Indonesian trade unions are in the challenging position of having to maximise their 
attempts to engage in electoral contestation. It requires a political consensus among 
unionists to work with each other to pool their collective power, particularly strategy and 
role-sharing among union elites at confederation, federation and plant levels. In the 2014 
legislative elections, however, most union candidates competed against each other with 
different parties in the same electorates (inter-union and intra-union competition). As 





were more individualised and limited by the ability of the candidates and their respective 
union organisations to form their own success teams. Trade unions with no candidates in 
an electoral area did little to support union candidates or even closed the door on 
collaboration to support the nomination of union candidates from different unions. These 
conditions not only limited opportunities for union candidates to gain significant votes, 
but also indicated that trade unions in Indonesia remain focused on short-term interests 
and elite rivalries where electoral politics are concerned. 
Worker preferences and profiles are significant. Their political identity, the 
relationship between unions and political parties, and their trust of union candidates are 
among the crucial factors that determine their behaviour and voting decisions. The 
identity dichotomy between labourers (buruh), workers (pekerja) and employees 
(karyawan) strongly influenced how Indonesian workers positioned themselves in the 
2009 and 2014 legislative elections. The term “working class” generally refers to 
labourers working in factories or those who frequently demonstrate on the streets. 
Workers may also be affected by their different identities when voting, such as religious 
affinities, ethnicities and regions. Many people on the factory floor, or in the mill, 
continue to regard elections as an extension of political party interests, rather than as a 
strategic method for trade unions to improve their lot or resolve economic issues. 
Regarding workers’ trust in union candidates, the loyalty of union members and 
their willingness to follow the union direction in legislative elections is not only 
determined by organisational and contractual relationships, but also derives from the 
ability of union elites to convince workers by using alternative methods and solutions that 
could foster progressive policies for workers. Institutional and popularity capital are not 
strong enough to guarantee union legislative candidates will gain significant votes from 
union members and workers in general. The fact that most union candidates failed to 
convince their main constituents to vote for them in 2009 and 2014 indicates that workers 
tend to respond negatively to union-affiliated legislative candidates. Most union 
candidates are still trapped in a “politics as usual” mode driven by pragmatism and 
populism and have a lack of policy-based collective solutions, which in turn erodes 








Unions’ Political Roles in Policy-making 
Although the presence of union activists in parliaments is not a dominant one, under 
democratisation there is still sufficient room for organised unions to defend their cause 
and to fight for workers’ interests. Regarding RQ5 the relationship between union 
organisations and commission membership in parliament plays a crucial role in 
determining the success of a unionist working as a parliamentarian. Elected unionists 
nominated and supported by their organisation’s members tend to have a better chance of 
channelling union and worker interests toward parliaments than those who run as 
legislative candidates by joining an individual party. While the former tend to keep 
balancing their new position as both unionists and politicians, the latter very likely leave 
their union roots and align themselves with pragmatic elite politics. 
The case of two elected unionists from the FSPMI in Bekasi district can be used 
as a new model for understanding the nature of meaningful political engagement of unions 
in local politics in post-authoritarian Indonesia. The FSMI has learned from their failure 
in the previous elections by developing a new electoral strategy through the Labour Go 
Politics movement which provides a counter-argument to the notion that Indonesian 
unions are politically insignificant or unable to have an impact in a political landscape 
with such a strong aversion to leftist politics. This Labour Go Politics strategy allows the 
FSPMI in Bekasi district to overcome their lack of financial resources and to counter the 
practice of money politics by developing their organisational capacity, mobilising their 
organisational and membership potentials into election campaigns, and giving rise to new 
identities and interests of workers in electoral politics. 
The presence of two unionists in the local parliament of Bekasi district has had a 
positive impact on how they contribute to labour-related decision-making and how 
worker interests are represented in local politics. Union elites have made a significant 
contribution to the establishment of a local labour regulation and in the implementation 
of parliamentarian monitoring functions that directly affect worker interests, such as 
direct investigations into unilateral dismissal cases and overseeing the distribution of 
social security benefits. By way of contrast, cases in Serang and Medan reveal that elected 
unionists are by no means immune from the temptation of party and elite politicisation. 
They have not only failed to have a significant impact on the policy fields that they were 
previously fighting for but have also been co-opted by the party structure and elite 





parliament to maintain workers’ trust and to negotiate their political position within the 
party’s structure and interests will determine their success in parliament and the 
likelihood of their being re-elected. 
Implications for Trade Union Politics and the Future of Union Electoral 
Engagement  
Given the structural limitations and organisational complexities of Indonesia’s unions that 
restrict them from successfully engaging in electoral politics – the absence of a unified 
and sustained labour party, union fragmentation, inter-union and intra-union electoral 
competition – there are some positives to take from union experiences in the 2009 and 
2014 legislative elections. As part of the political process, it provides valuable lessons for 
future union electoral engagement. For instance, the union leaders’ commitment to 
engaging in electoral politics must be accompanied by efforts to strengthen union 
electoral strategy as part of a more consolidated movement.  
As a political process, electoral engagement clearly requires effective 
mobilisation, coordination and a long-term perspective for trade unions wishing to 
optimise their collective advantages. Solid leadership among union elites is crucial, 
especially to building consensus and redefining a union’s political position by means of 
establishing broader intra-union partnership and electoral collaboration with other similar 
interest groups belonging to civil society organisations. It also requires an appropriate 
participation structure and interconnection between members at the grassroots level, 
union leaders in factories and national level. In this regard, the engagement of trade 
unions and other civil society groups in the electoral arena, as part of a more consolidated 
movement, potentially allows unionist and civil society organisation activists with the 
same concerns and interests to develop constructive dialogue and strengthen their 
consensus with political parties, enabling the latter to be more open. In addition, it may 
also help to generate broader collective action and an electoral block that could, in turn, 
enable the establishment of an alternative and a unifying labour-related political party. 
For Indonesia’s trade unions, it is increasingly necessary to be insiders engaging in formal 
politics, rather than outsiders. It would be even more strategic for trade unions to represent 
as wide a popular base of the working population as possible. This is challenging work 
because any organisational consolidation involves the complexity of different interests. 





The union-party alliance should be developed to be more strategic and 
programmatic, particularly by building partisan coalitions with one of the major well-
established political parties. It would not only reassure labour constituents but also 
guarantee consensus with a political party. The experience from the 2014 election in 
Bekasi shows that votes cast for union legislative candidates at the district level were not 
necessarily parallel with those nominated at the provincial and national levels. The 
strategy of nominating union candidates through one package, with different parties 
scattered at the national, provincial and district levels had a varied reception by workers 
at the grassroots level. A similar experience was found in Serang, where the nomination 
of union candidates connected with different parties in the same electoral area eroded 
worker trust as well as leading them to question the true political motives of the union 
elite candidacies. Inter-union elite competition further explains the disunity among elites 
in developing their electoral strategy and confirms that their position is no different from 
other candidates outside the unions who approach workers to gain their potential votes 
for personal and elitist interests. In the absence of a unified labour party supported by 
many unions, and insufficient levels of worker understanding regarding their role and 
position in electoral politics, the nomination of union leaders through many different 
political parties is ineffective and has in fact weakened the collective power of union 
candidates contesting legislative elections. 
A more fundamental issue is enhancing workers’ political understanding, 
particularly via education, to strengthen their political identity and collective awareness.  
Political education for union members must be a prioritised and integrated part of trade 
union activities. This includes the need to establish a political department within each 
union’s structural management which is engaged in: strengthening the political literacy 
of each member (melek politik); the revival of prospective union leaders who have the 
quality and capacity to advance in legislative elections, and more serious attempts to build 
coalitions with well-established political parties. 
The experiences of trade unions in Taiwan and South Korea hold valuable lessons 
as examples of trade union engagement in electoral politics. During the authoritarian era, 
trade unions and workers in Taiwan and South Korea had similar experiences of being 
undermined and depoliticised by their respective governments (Buchanan and Kate 2003; 
Lee 2011). They entered the democratic transition with non-partisan ties and non-
programmatic parties and emerged with several different factions (Lee 2011: 45). 





to reconcile and consolidate their movement after years of democratic transition. Taiwan 
is representative of how unions get involved in partisan politics by building political ties 
with two major established parties. In South Korea, by contrast, trade unions and other 
civil society groups established a labour-related party to engage in electoral politics. 
Through these strategies, both unions in Taiwan and South Korea have been able to place 
their representatives in national parliament and to secure policy concessions in national 
labour reforms (Lee 2011: 47). These experiences suggest that if this can be achieved, it 
is possible that Indonesia’s unions may have a chance of establishing a successful labour 
party or a programmatic union-party coalition that benefits both unions and labour 
constituencies. 
Original Scholarly Contribution 
This thesis makes several important contributions to the knowledge of and understanding 
of trade unionism in contemporary Indonesia. It offers new insights into how union 
electoral engagement in Indonesia can paint a different picture for comparative studies on 
political unionism in post-authoritarian contexts. Having closely examined how union 
elites positioned and developed their electoral strategies in the 2009 and 2014 legislative 
elections, the process of union electoral engagement can mainly be seen to be about 
complex political learning. Unlike trade unions in Europe and Latin America in their early 
stages of development – which were supported by large union memberships, strong left-
leaning parties, and the existence of modern democratic institutions – Indonesian unions 
are still developing into visible political actors. Unions’ political activism in post-1998 
democratic Indonesia is fundamentally intertwined with the development of collective 
action, such as strikes and street demonstrations, and these are still at the heart of the 
labour movement’s strategy.  
Unlike Poland, Brazil and Argentina, Indonesia had no typically leftist or socio 
democratic parties that espouse pro-labour policies. Attempts to build such parties had 
been made by several labour activists in the first decade of democratisation but failed due 
to strong resistance against leftist ideology and the legacy of the fear of communism in 
the country. In Indonesia today, the topic of communism seems to be less restricted 
compared to the New Order era, but this does not guarantee that the public are ready to 
tolerate or support leftist parties or movements. Stigmatisation and illustrations of the 





lasting legacy from the Suharto era limits the political space available for unions to even 
discuss, let alone mobilise around, leftist politics in a newly democratic Indonesia. As a 
consequence, the unions must build political partnerships with mainstream parties or non-
labour related parties in order to participate in legislative elections. In this regard, leaders 
of Indonesian unions have taken a relatively different path to general trade unions in many 
countries, which usually build partisan politics based on programmatic and ideological 
communalities (Murillo 2001; Lee 2011). 
Another scholarly contribution concerns a reassessment of the work currently 
being undertaken on Indonesia’ local politics, particularly studies related to the 
participation of non-political actors and newcomers such as trade unionists in local 
policy-making, which has been under-explored. Countering existing literature, which 
emphasises that Indonesia’s trade unions and workers are politically insignificant and 
continue to be politically marginalised (Törnquist 2004; Hadiz 2010), this thesis 
demonstrates that organised unions in post-authoritarian Indonesia have consistently 
developed their collective potential to engage in electoral politics. Voting reforms in the 
last two elections have clearly affected them, and they are more embroiled in political 
activism and seem more politically confident, although these gains are over-shadowed by 
the problem of union fragmentation. Organised unions have divergent experiences in 
mobilising members, building union-party alliances and using their access to parliament 
to influence the policy-making process. They have built union-party links across 
mainstream parties to provide workers with alternative political choices and several 
unionists have been successfully elected as parliamentarians. 
This thesis confirms that although Indonesia’s political system has been held 
hostage by predatory elites, as Hadiz and Robison and (2014) and Winters (2014) have 
claimed, organised unions have established their own significant way of engaging in 
electoral politics, influencing labour-related policies and advancing reforms through their 
involvement in parliamentary politics. The case of the Labour Go Politics movement in 
Bekasi is an instructive example of how union leaders have learned from their failure in 
previous elections and developed their collective potential with a more consolidated 
strategy in the 2014 legislative elections. Unions sought to turn their lack of material 
resources into a strength; for example, by nominating cadres across parties, running an 
anti-money politics campaign, and mobilising voluntary networks to support the 
nomination of their leaders in the legislative elections. Two union leaders successfully 





defeat several business-politicians and wealthy “old guard” politicians who ran for second 
and third terms. The presence of unionists-turned-politicians in local parliament has 
provided political channels for workers to demand better enforcement of labour law 
violations at the factory level and significantly influenced the formulation of local labour 
regulation.   
This thesis also contributes by filling gaps in the small number of studies 
pertaining to Indonesia’s trade union politics (Juliawan 2014; Caraway, Ford and 
Nugroho 2015), and also provides analysis of the unions’ electoral legitimacy. The 
substantive chapters provide an interpretation of the unions’ positions and political 
motives regarding their electoral engagement and strategies. In addition to the strong 
influence of the authoritarian legacy, such as union de-politicisation and fragmentation, 
as Caraway, Ford and Nugroho (2015) have argued, this thesis also finds that union 
leadership, the ability of the unions to design a more consolidated political movement, 
and workers’ trust, are influential in the electoral success of the unionists. The fact that 
unions have learned from their previous mistakes and had members successfully elected 
as legislators shows that unions in Indonesia have significantly increased their capability 
to organise their engagement in electoral contestation. Moreover, it gives the impression 
of increased confidence among union leaders to become more involved in electoral 
politics. The question is no longer whether it is the right time for unions to engage actively 
in formal politics, but to what extent union elites will be able to redesign their political 
role and function in contesting electoral politics. Therefore, it can be assumed that 
attempts to improve industrial conditions for workers will be further integrated in 
subsequent elections, especially by unions such as the FSPMI, which has opted for a new 
political orientation and is building political alliances with opposition coalition parties. 
In this regard, the result of the 2019 presidential and legislative election could certainly 
have a variety of consequences for the direction of the Indonesian trade union movement 
in the near future.  
The empirical findings in this thesis add an additional analytical layer to the 
comparative literature on the political role of union actors in democracies, particularly in 
Southeast Asia. In recent years, most scholarly works on this subject have been divided 
into two major strands. The first relates to the risk of union actors being co-opted by the 
state and its various political actors in Southeast Asia’s elitist political systems. The 
second relates to the potential roles of trade unions in the political sphere, including direct 





society actors, in order to have further success in consolidating democracy through 
electoral engagement. 
Elinoff (2014), for instance, has analysed the political role of the “people’s sector” 
in Thailand since 1992 and discovered that civil society actors in Thailand have revealed 
themselves to be deeply ambivalent and rooted in self-interest politics. Through 
examining the cases of the 2006 and 2014 military coups, Elinoff (2014) concludes that 
instead of consolidating a better democratic government, union actors and NGOs in 
Thailand are involved in weakening its democracy by mobilising their members and civil 
society forces to oust democratically-elected governments and even support military 
intervention. In a different case study, Lilian and Croucher (2014) examined trade union 
and civil society organisation coalitions in the 2008 democratic election in Malaysia and 
ascertained that they contributed significantly to the political mobilisation and strong 
performance of opposition parties. Lilian and Croucher (2014) found that the main goal 
of union and civil society organisation activists who made the move into the electoral 
arena in Malaysia was not only to influence policies but also to trigger regime change 
from within. However, as the coalition between trade unions and civil society 
organisations was built without a meaningful tie, trade unions and civil society actors 
were trapped in a conflict of interest. During the political campaigns, workers’ issues 
were mostly being raised by civil society organisations without union cooperation. 
Unionists accused activists from civil society organisations of using workers’ issues to 
advance their political agenda (Lilian and Croucher 2014: 425). In the case of Indonesia, 
trade union elites have experienced several different ways of organising their movement 
into formal politics, and in some cases have had a significant impact on the trajectory of 
the democratisation process. While some co-optation of unionist-turned-politicians by 
elites has taken place, some union elites have successfully advanced pro-union reforms 
and policies. 
Wider Relevance and Contributions beyond Indonesia 
This thesis has wider political significance: the empirical findings can contribute to a 
more comprehensive understanding of trade union politics in contemporary Indonesia and 
beyond. The future research agenda includes further investigation of what basics are 
required to establish an institutionalised complementary channel for Indonesian trade 
unions to build a democratic bloc as a means of creating resistance, advocacy, and 





found a new issue in relation to the need for institutional arrangements that can facilitate 
unions in strengthening their collective mobilisation and position in relation to electoral 
contestation. The fact that labour movements are divided in many countries, also 
demonstrates the structural and organisational constraints which unions in the Indonesian 
context must work to overcome to be able to work collaboratively, and further scholarly 
scrutiny of them is crucial. 
In the broader context, a study on contemporary trade union politics in emerging 
democratic countries in Southeast Asia, such as Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, 
may also be required and will enable a comparative understanding of this thesis. Recent 
political changes in Malaysia (where there is a new government made up of previous 
opposition groups), the return of a military government as a result of political instability 
in Thailand, and the presence of a leftist-socialist elected president in the Philippines have 
undoubtedly had a serious impact on the development of trade union politics in each of 
these countries. Comparative research related to trade unions’ political issues in this 
region could contribute greatly to a more comprehensive understanding of the latest 
developments in that area and in political unionism in Southeast Asia. It would also help 
to tease out the importance of trade union activism with regards to democratisation, global 
politics and the existence of labour movements in this region. Therefore, this thesis offers 
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A. Composition of in-depth Interviewees 
 
Interviewee Number 
Trade Unionist 21 
Trade Union Legislative Candidate 16 
Politician/MP 7 
Workers  10 
Labour NGOs activist 4 
Employer association 2 
Bureaucrat 3 
Success team member 4 
Total 67 
Note: I also spoke to many workers and unionists during my fieldwork, but I do not count them in this 
thesis because the interactions were closer to informal communication than formal interviews.  
 
B. Direct Observations 
 
1. Plenary session in Bekasi district parliament office, Bekasi 10 August 2016. 
2. Nasional Seminar organized by Indonesian Institute of Sciences, 20 November 
2016. 
3. Labour demonstration (KSPSI), Jakarta 26 November 2016. 
4. Labour demonstration (FSPMI, FSP KEP KSPSI), Bekasi 29 October 2016. 
5. Trade union meeting at FSP KEP KSPSI, Jakarta 8 September 2016. 
6. Industrial court, Jakarta 18 October 2016. 
7. Omah Buruh, Bekasi 24 September 2016. 
8. Omah Tani, Pekalongan 20 January 2017. 
 
C. List of Interviewees 
1. Abdullah, general chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI. 
2. Abay, parliament member at DPRD II Kabupaten Bekasi from Democrat Party. 
3. Abdul Gani, union leader FSP KEP KSPSI. 
4. Abdul Hasan, union leader at PT Plast Indonesia-Bekasi.  
5. Adhadi Romli, former member of DPRD Kabupaten Serang 2009-2014, former 
head of DPW FSPMI Banten, head of DPC PDIP Serang. 
6. Agus Condro, politician from PDIP. 





8. Ali, worker at PT MDN, Bekasi. 
9. Ahmad Husein, worker at PT DJabesmen, Bekasi. 
10. Aji, legislative candidates (FSPMI) from PKPI, Bekasi district. 
11. A.J. Napitupulu, legislative candidate (SBSI 92) from Gerindra Party, Medan. 
12. A.P Sujatmiko, legislative candidate (FSP KEP KSPI) from PMB, Serang district. 
13. Edward Susanto, worker at PT LPA, Bekasi. 
14. Eryawan, politican from DPP PAN. 
15. Fachruddin, former union leader of SBMI Medan. 
16. Fayakun, union leader from FSP KEP KSPSI. 
17. Fatima, parliament member DPRD II Kabupaten Bekasi from PKS. 
18. Fernando L. Tobing, head of Labour Party Medan Branch. 
19. Fery Nurzali, legislative candidate (FSP KEP KSPSI) from Gerindra Party, vice-
chairman of FSP KEP KSPSI.  
20. Handoko Wibowo, founder and head of Omah Tani Batang Central Java, 
Pekalongan  
21. Heru Mualim, worker at PT KYK Indonesia, Bekasi.  
22. IL, labour activist in Serang district. 
23. Ika, union leader at PT SNG, Bekasi. 
24. Idin Rosidin, politician from DPP Gerindra Party and former union leader at KSBSI. 
25. Iwan, coordinator success team PDIP Bekasi branch office. 
26. Iwan Kusmawan, chairman of SPN and member of KSPI executive board 
27. Jalika, parliament member DPRD II Kabupaten Bekasi from Gerindra Party  
28. Joko Hadi, union leader at PT STK, Bekasi district. 
29. Joko, Omah Buruh JIEP Bekasi district. 
30. Juliaman Damanik, parliament member DPRD II Medan (2011-2014), from the 
Labour Party. 
31. Kahar.S. Cahyono, former secretary of Aliansi Serikat Pekerja Serikat Buruh 
Serang (2009-2010), vice-president of FSPMI and member of KSPI executive 
board. 
32. MA, labour activist in Serang district.  
33. Maxi Ellia, labour activist and former vice-president of FSPMI. 
34. MS, member of success team union legislative candidate in Serang district. 
35. Minggu Saragih, union legislative candidate (PDIP) for North Sumatra Provinces 
36. Muchtar Pakpahan, chairman of SBSI and former general chairman of the Labour 
Social Democrat Party (2004) and the Labour Party (2009). 
37. Mudofir Hamid, president of KSBSI. 
38. MI, union leader in Bekasi district 
39. Mahmud Sabar, worker at PT OAS, Serang. 
40. Nasrulloh, commissioner of KPU Serang district. 
41. Nicholas, chairman of SBSI North Sumatra.  
42. Noval Bahrudin, union leader in Bekasi district 
43. Nasrudin, union leader at PT DJabesmen, Bekasi. 
44. Nurdianto, union leader at PT NKS, Serang.  
45. Nursuhud, politician from PDIP. 





47. Nyumarno, parliament member of DPRD II Kabupaten Bekasi from PDIP 
48. Obon Tabroni, vice-president of FSPMI and former head of FSPMI Bekasi.  
49. Picky Tarigan, union leader at SBSI Medan. 
50. Sobar Gunandar, secretary of FSPMI Bekasi. 
51. Saukani, head of DPW SPN Banten Province. 
52. Rustan, legislative candidate (FSPMI) from PDIP at DPRD I West Java Province. 
53. Rustam, union leader at Fokuba (Bank BCA). 
54. Sahat Butarbutar, legislative candidate (FSP KEP KSPI) from Gerindra Party in 
Bekasi; vice-chairman of FSP KEP KSPI. 
55. Romi, success team member from PDIP. 
56. Sarifuddin, political consultant at Survey Monitoring Independent Network (JSMI). 
57. Saman, member of success team of Nyumarno at Jatireja village, Bekasi district. 
58. Saiful DP, general chairman of FSP KEP KSPI and founder of SPSI Reformasi. 
59. STA, worker at PT PVCI, Bekasi. 
60. SA, staff of the Bureau of Manpower services, Bekasi.  
61. Suhana, commissioner of KPU Bekasi District, Bekasi. 
62. Syahrial, worker at PT LMK, Bekasi. 
63. SB, informant of Apindo Bekasi Serang. 
64. Intan Dewi, legislative candidate (SPN) from PAN and board member of DPD SPN 
Banten province. 
65. Yudhi Darmansyah, politician from PDIP and member of Baleg at DPRD II 
Kabupaten Bekasi. 
66. ZKH, worker at PT LMK, Bekasi. 
67. Zainal Abidin, parliament member at DPRD II Kabupaten Serang, vice-chairman of 
Hanura Party Serang Branch, vice-chairman of DPD SPN Banten Province. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
